| (Cite
as: 661 N.W.2d 768, 2003 SD 49)
Supreme
Court of South Dakota.
In
the Interest of D.M., R.M., III, and T.B.C., Minor Children
and Concerning
R.M.,
Jr. and S.B.C.-M., Parents and Respondents.
In
the Interest of B.B.C., Minor Child, and Concerning L.M.L. and
S.B.C.-M.,
Parents
and Respondents.
Nos.
22563, 22564, 22565.
Considered on Briefs April
16, 2003.
Decided
April 30, 2003.
Rehearing
Granted June 9, 2003.
*770
Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Ann M. Holzhauser, Assistant Attorney
General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for appellee State of South Dakota.
Patrick M. Ginsbach of
Farrell, Farrell & Ginsbach, Hot Springs, South Dakota, Attorneys
for appellant S.B.C.-M.
Lynn A. Moran, Custer,
South Dakota, Attorney for appellant R.M., Jr.
PER CURIAM.
**1
This is an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights concerning
four minor children. The children are Native American and the provisions
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) are applicable.
FACTS
**2
S.B.C.-M. (Mother) is the maternal parent of B.B.C., D.M., R.M. and T.B.C.
R.M. (Father) is the paternal parent of three of the children; D.M., R.M.
and T.B.C. Father and Mother were married but are now divorced. L.M.L.
is the paternal parent of B.B.C. L.M.L. did not participate in the proceeding
below and does not appeal the termination of his parental rights. At the
time this
proceeding commenced, B.B.C. was age eleven; D.M. was age three; R.M was
age two and T.B.C. was age eight months.
**3
On January 1, 2001, Mother was transported by ambulance to the emergency
room after she was found unconscious in her home. It was determined Mother
may have suffered a seizure that evening. Mother had previously undergone
surgery in 1999 for a brain aneurysm and was medicating for pain stemming
from her condition. As a result of that surgery mother suffers physical
effects including short term memory loss, speech problems, slight paralysis
in the left arm, severe headaches and seizures on occasion.
**4
Earlier that evening Father arrived at Mother's apartment intoxicated.
Mother left with Father and contacted a niece to care for the children.
Mother believed that she was going to experience a seizure that day. Mother
later returned to the apartment "very, very drunk" and was angry.
She accidentally hit one of the children in the nose causing him to bleed.
Mother then took her pain medications and mixed them with beer by pouring
the beer into her pill bottle. Mother threw an ashtray at niece and niece
left.
**5
Mother called her pastor and told him that she was going to commit suicide.
*771
Law enforcement responded to the scene after reports of a possible assault.
Upon arrival at the scene the officers were informed of the suicide call.
Mother was discovered lying unconscious on the floor of the children's
bedroom. The children were temporarily placed with the niece until Father
sobered up. DSS was informed of the incident.
**6
Two days later, DSS received a report of possible abuse and bruising on
one of the children. A social worker and law enforcement agent went to
Father's residence to conduct a welfare check on the children that morning.
Father smelled of alcohol and he admitted he had been drinking. One of
the children had been sleeping on a bed with no obstructions to prevent
rolling off. Upon investigation, the majority of the bruises turned out
to be birth marks except for a bruise on the forehead that occurred when
the child fell off the bed. The social worker observed that the children
were very dirty and messy. Mother was contacted in the hospital and a
decision was made to take the children into protective custody. Mother
believed Father was a danger to the children when he was drinking. The
concerns at that time were Father's drinking, lack of supervision, appropriateness
of care and concerns related to Mother's physical and mental condition.
**7
Subsequently, the Department received a report that B.B.C., who was not
present on that night, was now in Mother's care. B.B.C. was believed to
have been born with fetal alcohol syndrome and was then sent to live with
an aunt. He later spent some time in the Black Hills Children's Home.
Thereafter, B.B.C. was sent to live with his grandfather until Mother
determined he was not properly caring for B.B.C. After verifying B.B.C.
was with Mother the social worker encouraged Mother to return him to grandfather's
care. She did not. As a
result, B.B.C. was removed from Mother's care.
**8
Mother and Father were both allowed visitation with the children. Mother
filed a motion with the trial court requesting that Father be prohibited
from visiting the children when Mother was present and requested Father
only be allowed supervised visitation. That request was granted. The trial
court also allowed increased and unsupervised visits for Mother. Following
an extended visit with Mother, a social worker, upon her arrival at the
house, was informed by one of the children Father was hiding in the closet.
Father was discovered in his boxer shorts. This violated both the terms
of the court's order and the Family Service Agreement (FSA) that Mother
signed three days prior.
**9
The FSA's in this matter provided that Mother was required to complete
and follow a chemical dependency evaluation; attend all meetings of Parents
as Teachers; attend all visits with children; attend immediate and ongoing
counseling; attend parenting classes and find a suitable adult to live
with her and the children to help her parent. This last requirement was
instituted after a psychological evaluation was conducted on Mother by
Dr. Perrenoud. Dr. Perrenoud recommended that Mother not parent as a single
parent due to her medical condition.
[FN1] He stated that she needed a "committed form of skilled social
support available to her." This consisted of another competent parental
*772
figure living with Mother and the children on a full time basis, providing
daily and regular contact.
FN1.
Dr. Perrenoud was not the only doctor recommending this. Dr. Mulder from
the Pine Ridge Indian Health Services also opined "In my limited
opinion I do not believe [Mother] is capable of child-care and child protection
in emergencies." Mother's own witness, Dr. Simpson, also recognized
this as an essential requirement. Mother's pastor also acknowledged a
need for assistance.
**10
Father's FSA required that he abstain from alcohol and drugs; complete
and follow the recommendations of a chemical dependency evaluation; complete
parenting classes; attend AA meetings and provide verification; complete
an alcohol treatment program and also complete a parenting assessment.
Despite these requirements, Father continued to drink and was observed
intoxicated on four separate occasions. He was also arrested once for
DUI during the pendency of this proceeding. Additionally, he admitted
to drinking a case of beer the night before the dispositional hearing.
**11
Mother either failed to complete the requirements of her FSA or delayed
completion until the latter part of this proceeding. In addition, there
was a concern that she had become addicted to her pain medications. Father
also had difficulty completing the requirements of his FSA. A psychological
evaluation conducted on Father indicated that he suffered from narcissism
and had difficulty placing the needs of the children over his own. Father
failed to attend his required counseling. Though at certain points Father
made improvements toward sobriety, he did have relapses and lost his last
job because of his drinking. Though this case spanned nineteen months,
it was noted that Mother and Father only progressed to the point normally
expected within five to six months. The counselor for the children also
expressed concerns over Mother and Father's continued parenting given
their difficulties and the special needs of these children.
[FN2] The trial court terminated parental rights. Mother and Father appeal.
FN2.
The children all suffer from traits associated with reactive attachment
disorder. B.B.C. also suffers from attention deficit disorder and a learning
disability.
ANALYSIS
ISSUE ONE
**12
Did the trial
court err in denying the motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe?
**13
Notice of these proceedings was given to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe (Tribe)
and the Tribe filed a notice of intervention on January 26, 2001. The
Tribe moved to intervene on August 9, 2001. The motion to intervene was
granted August 10, 2001. On July 29, 2002, a month after the commencement
of the dispositional proceedings and nearly one-year after the tribe moved
to intervene, the Tribe filed a motion to transfer and the tribal court
entered an order indicating it would accept the transfer.
[FN3]
FN3.
The dispositional hearings were conducted on four occasions. Father was
absent twice, Mother was absent once.
**14
On July 31, 2002, the trial court indicated that it would consider the
motion at a later hearing and directed counsel to prepare memoranda on
that issue. At that hearing, no representative for the Tribe appeared.
The trial court then determined:
Now
I don't think it is necessary to take any testimony in this matter, and
I think it's simply a matter of looking in the record in this matter to
determine that the proceedings here were in advanced stage when the petition
to transfer was received, and that of course was one of the exceptions
or what's called good cause for not making the transfer. I am certainly
not making the transfer at this time in this case based upon that reason.
*773
There was no request by counsel to present witnesses or introduce further
evidence on this issue.
**15
"Transfer to the jurisdiction of the tribe is mandatory in the absence
of good cause to the contrary." In
re M.C., 504
N.W.2d 598, 601 (S.D.1993). This Court recently determined that good cause
existed not to transfer a case when the tribe had notice of the proceedings
but the case had already been pending for fourteen months before the tribe
filed its motion to transfer. In
re S.G.V.E.,
2001 SD 105, ¶ 28, 634 N.W.2d 88, 93. In that case, the final disposition
phase had already been entered and an order issued before the motion to
transfer was made. Id.
Therefore, this Court determined that good cause existed for denying the
transfer based on the timing of the motion. Id.
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the transfer.
Id. See also
In re Wayne R.N.,
107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (holding petition to transfer untimely when
received on the morning of the hearing). That reasoning is applicable
here.
**16
The parties were presented with an opportunity to argue their positions
on this issue to the trial court. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that any further evidentiary hearings were even requested. The record
demonstrates that the trial court considered the factors establishing
good cause and determined that this matter was at an advanced stage of
the proceeding. This is an explicit exception to the transfer requirement.
See In re M.C.,
504 N.W.2d at 601. The dispositional phase was already in progress when
the motion was made. On these facts, the trial court did not err in denying
the transfer.
ISSUE
TWO
**17
Did the trial
court abuse its discretion in determining the State's expert witness was
qualified under ICWA?
**18
ICWA provides:
No
termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
25 USC § 1912(f). Parents contend that expert testimony, of the caliber
mandated by ICWA, was lacking in this case.
**19
Qualification of experts and admission of their testimony are matters
that fall within the trial court's sound discretion. In
re J.L.H.,
316 N.W.2d 650, 651 (S.D.1982). A trial court's rulings in this area will
be disturbed on appeal only if its discretion was clearly abused. In
re J.L.H.,
316 N.W.2d at 651.
**20
Pauli-Tarrell's testimony revealed that she possessed the following qualifications:
she managed the child protection program for five counties in South Dakota,
including an area encompassing the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation; she
had been employed by DSS for approximately fifteen years; she had prior
experience in handling delinquent youth; she worked with tribal court
and tribal agencies; she worked with Native American clients of the child
protection program; she had attended several trainings relating to issues
of family violence and child services for Native American families; she
had attended trainings on ICWA and had previously been qualified as an
ICWA expert. Based on these qualifications, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining the witness was a qualified expert under
ICWA.
*774
ISSUE THREE
**21
Did the trial
court err in finding the requirements of ICWA were met before terminating
parental rights?
A.
Active Efforts
**22
ICWA requires the State to show that it made efforts to prevent the breakup
of the Indian family. In this regard, ICWA provides:
Any
party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child under state law shall satisfy the
court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
25 USC § 1912(d).
**23
With regard to this requirement, the record demonstrates that DSS engaged
in "active efforts" designed to prevent the break-up of this
Indian family. Though we do not reiterate them all here again, the facts,
as previously
set forth, demonstrate that DSS offered a wide range of services to these
parents and attempted to work toward reunification of the family over
a considerable period of time. That the efforts were not successful does
not mean they were not made.
B.
Continued Custody Would Likely Result In Serious Emotional Or Physical
Damage To The Children.
**24
[C]hild custody proceedings involving the termination of parental rights
to an Indian child are subject to specific minimum federal procedures
and standards. ICWA provides:
No
termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
25 USC § 1912(f). Thus, the burden of proof that must be shown is
"evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
**25
The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional
or physical harm to the children would result from continued custody with
parents. The trial court entered the following findings beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1.
Father has a chronic history of alcoholism.
2.
Father's rehabilitation would be a long-term effort with significant probability
that it would not be successful.
3.
Father received a DUI during the pendency of this proceeding and drank
the night before the dispositional hearing.
4.
Father failed to complete inpatient treatment as required.
5.
Father has failed to consistently attend aftercare.
6.
Father lost his last job and apartment as a result of his drinking.
7.
Father failed to provide proof of AA attendance as ordered.
8.
Father has not enrolled in individual counseling.
9.
Father has cancelled or not shown for 27 visits with his children.
10.
Mother has not completed the Community Transitions program.
11.
Mother has failed to obtain individual counseling as required by her chemical
dependency evaluation.
12.
Mother has failed to participate and meet with Parents as Teachers.
13.
Mother has not identified anyone, other than Father, to be a support *775
to her as a parent, a requirement recognized by both the State's and her
own witness.
14.
Mother has failed to complete parenting classes.
15.
Mother has failed to maintain a level of consistency with her medication
and has gone to the emergency room on a number of occasions.
16.
Mother has failed to appear for 30 visits with her children.
These findings are amply supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.
Based on these findings, the trial court did not err in determining continued
custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage beyond
a reasonable doubt.
ISSUE FOUR
**26
Did the trial
court err in determining termination was the least restrictive alternative
in the best interests of the children.
**27
Mother contends that the least restrictive alternative would be allowing
her continued custody with supervision by DSS. We have always recognized
that the needs of the children are paramount and that their best interests
must prevail. In
re A.H., 421
N.W.2d 71, 75 (S.D.1988). Parental rights may be terminated if it is in
the best interests of the children and is also the least restrictive alternative
available. SDCL 26-8A-26. The best interests of the children are viewed
from the children's, not the parents', perspective. In
re E.D.J.,
499 N.W.2d 130, 135 (S.D.1993).
**28
The parents assert that they have made tremendous strides which support
the imposition of other alternatives in lieu of termination. The trial
court's findings, however, contradict that assessment. These children
are desperately in need of safety, certainty and stability in their lives.
The parents did not reach a point where they could adequately provide
for the children during the nineteen months this matter was pending and
it is uncertain if
they ever will. Further delay in the search for permanency is not in the
best interests of these children.
**29
Affirmed.
**30
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and MEIERHENRY,
Justices, participating.
661 N.W.2d 768, 2003
SD 49
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