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Oneida Indian Nation (New York) Codes and Rules

Last amended: 2004

PENAL CODE - CHAPTERS 1-4D

Table of Contents [all chapters of the Penal Code]

Chapter 1 - General Provisions

101. Short title
102. Other limitations on applicability of this code
103. Definitions


Chapter 2 - Principles of Criminal Liability

201. Culpability; definition of terms
202. Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states
203. Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and mental culpability
204. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements
205. Effect of ignorance or mistake upon liability
206. Effect of intoxication upon liability


Parties to Offenses and Liability Through Accessorial Conduct

207. Criminal liability for conduct of another
208. Criminal liability for conduct of another; no defense
209. Criminal liability for conduct of another; exemption
210. Convictions for different degrees of offense
211. Criminal liability of corporations
212. Criminal liability of an individual for corporate conduct


Chapter 3 - Defenses

301. Defenses; burden of proof
302. Infancy
303. Justification; a defense
304. Justification; generally
305. Justification; use of physical force generally
306. Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person
307. Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary
308. Justification; use of physical force to prevent or terminate larceny or criminal mischief
309. Duress
310. Entrapment
311. Renunciation
312. Mental disease or defect


Chapter 4 - Specific Offenses

A. Anticipatory Offenses

401. Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree
402. Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree
403. Criminal solicitation in the third degree
404. Criminal solicitation in the second degree
405. Criminal solicitation in the first degree
406. Criminal solicitation; no defense
407. Criminal solicitation; exemption


B. Conspiracy

408. Conspiracy in the sixth degree
409. Conspiracy in the fifth degree
410. Conspiracy in the fourth degree
411. Conspiracy in the third degree
412. Conspiracy in the second degree
413. Conspiracy in the first degree
414. Conspiracy; pleading and proof; necessity of overt act
415. Conspiracy; jurisdiction and venue
416. Conspiracy; no defense
417. Conspiracy; enterprise corruption; applicability


C. Attempt

418. Attempt to commit a crime
419. Attempt to commit a crime; punishment
420. Attempt to commit a crime; no defense
421. Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree
422. Criminal facilitation in the third degree
423. Criminal facilitation in the second degree
424. Criminal facilitation in the first degree
425. Criminal facilitation; no defense
426. Criminal facilitation; corroboration


D. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation

427. Assault in the third degree
428. Vehicular assault in the second degree
429. Vehicular assault in the first degree
430. Assault in the second degree
431. Assault in the first degree
432. Aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer
433. Aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old
434. Menacing in the first degree
435. Menacing in the second degree
436. Menacing in the third degree
437. Hazing in the first degree
438. Hazing in the second degree
439. Reckless endangerment in the second degree
440. Reckless endangerment in the first degree
441. Promoting a suicide attempt
442. Promoting a suicide attempt; when punishable as attempt to commit murder
443. Homicide defined
444. Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definition of terms
445. Criminally negligent homicide
446. Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree
447. Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree
448. Manslaughter in the second degree
449. Manslaughter in the first degree
450. Murder in the second degree
451. Murder in the first degree
452. Abortion in the second degree
453. Abortion in the first degree
454. Self-abortion in the second degree
455. Self-abortion in the first degree
456. Issuing abortional articles
457. Sex offenses; definitions of terms
458. Sex offenses; lack of consent
459. Sex offenses; defense
460. Sex offenses; corroboration
461. Sexual misconduct
462. Rape in the third degree
463. Rape in the second degree
464. Rape in the first degree
466. Sodomy in the third degree
467. Sodomy in the second degree
468. Sodomy in the first degree
469. Sexual abuse in the third degree
470. Sexual abuse in the second degree
471. Sexual abuse in the first degree
472. Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree
473. Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
474. Unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping and custodial interference; definitions of terms
475. Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree
476. Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree
477. Unlawful imprisonment; defense
478. Kidnapping in the second degree
479. Kidnapping in the first degree
480. Kidnapping; defense
481. Custodial interference in the second degree
482. Custodial interference in the first degree
483. Coercion in the second degree
484. Coercion in the first degree
485. Coercion; no defense
486. Coercion; defense


E. Offenses Involving Damages to and Intrusion Upon Property

487. Criminal trespass and burglary; definition of terms
488. Trespass
489. Criminal trespass in the third degree
490. Criminal trespass in the second degree
491. Criminal trespass in the first degree
492. Burglary in the third degree
493. Burglary in the second degree
494. Burglary in the first degree
495. Possession of burglar's tools
496. Unlawful possession of radio devices
497. Criminal mischief in the fourth degree
498. Criminal mischief in the third degree
499. Criminal mischief in the second degree
500. Criminal mischief in the first degree
501. Criminal tampering in the third degree
502. Criminal tampering in the second degree
503. Criminal tampering in the first degree
504. Reckless endangerment of property
505. Unlawfully posting advertisements
506. Tampering with a consumer product; consumer product defined
507. Tampering with a consumer product in the second degree
508. Tampering with a consumer product in the first degree
509. Penalties for littering on railroad tracks and rights-of-way
510. Making graffiti
511. Arson; definitions
512. Arson in the fourth degree
513. Arson in the third degree
514. Arson in the second degree
515. Arson in the first degree


F. Offenses Involving Theft

516. Larceny, definitions of terms
517. Larceny; defined
518. Larceny; no defense
519. Larceny; defenses
520. Larceny; value of stolen property
521. Petit Larceny
522. Grand larceny in the fourth degree
523. Grand larceny in the third degree
524. Grand larceny in the second degree
525. Grand larceny in the first degree
526. Larceny; pleading and proof
527. Offenses involving computers; definition of terms
528. Unauthorized use of a computer
529. Computer trespass
530. Computer tampering in the second degree
531. Computer tampering in the first degree
532. Unlawful duplication of computer related material
533. Criminal possession of computer related material
534. Offenses involving computers; defenses
535. Robbery; defined
536. Robbery in the third degree
537. Robbery in the second degree
538. Robbery in the first degree
539. Misapplication of property
540. Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree
541. Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree
542. Unlawful use of secret scientific materials
543. Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree
544. Auto-stripping in the second degree
545. Auto-stripping in the first degree
546. Theft of services
547. Unlawful use of credit card, debit card or medical assistance card
548. Fraudulently obtaining a signature
549. Jostling
550. Fraudulent accosting
551. Fortune telling
552. Criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree
553. Criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree
554. Criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree
555. Criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree
556. Criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree
557. Criminal possession of stolen property; presumptions
558. Criminal possession of stolen property; no defense
559. Criminal possession of stolen property; corroboration
560. Definitions
561. Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree
562. Trademark counterfeiting in the second degree
563. Trademark counterfeiting in the first degree
564. Seizure and destruction of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks


G. Offenses Involving Fraud

565. Forgery; definition of terms
566. Forgery in the third degree
567. Forgery in the second degree
568. Forgery in the first degree
569. Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree
570. Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree
571. Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree; presumption
572. Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree
573. Criminal possession of a forged instrument; no defense
574. Criminal possession of forgery devices
575. Criminal simulation
576. Criminal possession of an anti-security item
577. Unlawfully using slugs; definition of terms
578. Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree
579. Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree
580. Forgery of a vehicle identification number
581. Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number
582. Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number; presumptions
583. Definition of terms
584. Falsifying business records in the second degree
585. Falsifying business records in the first degree
586. Falsifying business records; defense
587. Tampering with public records in the second degree
588. Tampering with public records in the first degree
589. Offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree
590. Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree
591. Issuing a false certificate
592. Issuing a false financial statement
593. Insurance fraud; definition of terms
594. Insurance fraud; defined
595. Insurance fraud in the fifth degree
596. Insurance fraud in the fourth degree
597. Insurance fraud in the third degree
598. Insurance fraud in the second degree
599. Insurance fraud in the first degree
600. Commercial bribing in the second degree
601. Commercial bribing in the first degree
602. Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree
603. Commercial bribe receiving in the first degree
604. Bribery of labor official; definition of term
605. Bribing a labor official
606. Bribing a labor official; defense
607. Bribe receiving by a labor official
608. Bribe receiving by a labor official; no defense
609. Sports bribery and tampering; definitions of terms
610. Sports bribing
611. Sports bribe receiving
612. Tampering with a sports contest in the second degree
613. Tampering with a sports contest in the first degree
614. Impairing the integrity of a pari-mutuel betting system in the second degree
615. Impairing the integrity of a pari-mutuel betting system in the first degree
616. Rent gouging in the third degree
617. Rent gouging in the second degree
618. Rent gouging in the first degree
619. Fraud in insolvency
620. Fraud involving a security interest
621. Fraudulent disposition of mortgaged property
622. Fraudulent disposition of property subject to a conditional sale contract
623. Issuing a bad check; definitions of terms
624. Issuing a bad check
625. Issuing a back check; presumptions
626. Issuing a bad check; defenses
627. False advertising
628. Criminal impersonation in the second degree
629. Criminal impersonation in the first degree
630. Unlawfully concealing a will
631. Criminal usury in the second degree
632. Criminal usury in the first degree
633. Possession of usurious loan records
634. Unlawful collection practices
635. Scheme to defraud in the first degree
636. Scheme to defraud in the second degree
637. Scheme to defraud in the first degree
638. Scheme to defraud the state by unlawfully selling prescriptions


H. Bribery Involving Public Servants and Related Offenses

639. Bribery in the third degree
640. Bribery in the second degree
641. Bribery in the first degree
642. Bribery; defense
643. Bribe receiving in the third degree
644. Bribe receiving in the second degree
645. Bribe receiving in the first degree
646. Bribe receiving; no defense
647. Rewarding official misconduct in the second degree
648. Rewarding official misconduct in the first degree
649. Receiving reward for official misconduct in the second degree
650. Receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree
651. Giving unlawful gratuities
652. Receiving unlawful gratuities
653. Bribe giving for public office
654. Bribe receiving for public office
655. Escape and other offenses relating to custody; definitions of terms
656. Escape in the third degree
657. Escape in the second degree
658. Escape in the first degree
659. Promoting prison contraband in the second degree
660. Promoting prison contraband in the first degree
661. Resisting arrest
662. Hindering prosecution; definition of terms
663. Hindering prosecution in the third degree
664. Hindering prosecution in the second degree
665. Hindering prosecution in the first degree
666. Perjury and related offenses; definitions of terms
667. Perjury in the third degree
668. Perjury in the second degree
669. Perjury in the first degree
670. Perjury; pleading and proof where inconsistent statements involved
671. Perjury; defense
672. Perjury; no defense
673. Making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree
674. Making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree
675. Making a punishable false written statement
676. Perjury and related offenses; requirement of corroboration
677. Bribing a witness
678. Bribe receiving by a witness
679. Tampering with a witness in the fourth degree
680. Tampering with a witness in the third degree
681. Tampering with a witness in the second degree
682. Tampering with a witness in the first degree
683. Employer unlawfully penalizing witness
684. Intimidating a victim or witness in the third degree
685. Intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree
686. Intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree
687. Bribing a juror
688. Bribe receiving by a juror
689. Tampering with a juror in the second degree
690. Tampering with a juror in the first degree
691. Misconduct by a juror in the second degree
692. Misconduct by a juror in the first degree
693. Tampering with physical evidence; definition of terms
694. Tampering with physical evidence
695. Compounding a crime
696. Criminal contempt in the second degree
697. Criminal contempt in the first degree
698. Criminal contempt; prosecution and punishment
699. Bail jumping in the third degree
700. Bail jumping in the second degree
701. Bail jumping in the first degree
702. Failing to respond to an appearance ticket
703. Bail jumping and failing to respond to an appearance ticket; defense
704. Unlawful disclosure of a criminal complaint
705. Unlawful disposition of assets subject to forfeiture


I. Offenses Against Public Health, Morals

706. Controlled substances; definitions
707. Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree
708. Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
709. Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree
710. Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree
711. Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree
712. Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree
713. Criminal possession of a controlled substance; presumption
714. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
715. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree
716. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree
717. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree
718. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree
719. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds
720. Criminally possessing a hypodermic instrument
721. Criminal injection of a narcotic drug
722. Criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree
723. Criminally using drug paraphernalia in the first degree
724. Criminal possession of precursors of controlled substances
725. Criminal sale of a prescription for a controlled substance
726. Marihuana; definitions
727. Unlawful possession of marihuana
728. Criminal possession of marihuana in the fifth degree
729. Criminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree
730. Criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree
731. Criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree
732. Criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree
733. Criminal sale of marihuana in the fifth degree
734. Criminal sale of marihuana in the fourth degree
735. Criminal sale of marihuana in the third degree
736. Criminal sale of marihuana in the second degree
737. Criminal sale of marihuana in the first degree
738. Gambling offenses; definitions of terms
739. Promoting gambling in the second degree
740. Promoting gambling in the first degree
741. Possession of gambling records in the second degree
742. Possession of gambling records in the first degree
743. Possession of gambling records; defense
744. Possession of gambling device
745. Possession of gambling device; defenses
746. Gambling offenses; presumptions
747. Lottery offenses; no defenses
748. Prostitution
749. Patronizing a prostitute; definitions
750. Patronizing a prostitute in the fourth degree
751. Patronizing a prostitute in the third degree
752. Patronizing a prostitute in the second degree
753. Patronizing a prostitute in the first degree
754. Patronizing a prostitute; defense
755. Prostitution and patronizing a prostitute; no defense
756. Promoting prostitution; definitions of term
757. Promoting prostitution in the fourth degree
758. Promoting prostitution in the third degree
759. Promoting prostitution in the second degree
760. Promoting prostitution in the first degree
761. Promoting prostitution; accomplice
762. Permitting prostitution
763. Obscenity; definition of terms
764. Obscenity in the third degree
765. Obscenity in the second degree
766. Obscenity in the first degree
767. Obscenity; presumptions
768. Obscenity; defense
769. Disseminating indecent material to minors; definitions of terms
770. Disseminating indecent material to minors
771. Disseminating indecent material to minors; presumption and defense


J. Offenses Against Public Order, Public Sensibilities and the Right to Privacy

772. Offenses against public order; definitions of terms
773. Riot in the second degree
774. Riot in the first degree
775. Inciting a Riot
776. Unlawful assembly
777. Criminal anarchy
778. Disorderly conduct
779. Disruption, or disturbance of religious service
780. Harassment in the first degree
781. Harassment in the second degree
782. Aggravated harassment in the second degree
783. Aggravated harassment in the first degree
784. Loitering
785. Loitering in the first degree
786. Loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense
787. Appearance within the territorial jurisdiction of the Oneida Indian Nation under the influence of narcotics
788. Criminal nuisance in the second degree
789. Criminal nuisance in the first degree
790. Falsely reporting an incident in the third degree
791. Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree
792. Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree


K. Offenses Against Public Sensibilities

793. Public lewdness
794. Exposure of a person
795. Promoting the exposure of a person
796. Offensive exhibition
797. Public display of offensive sexual material; definitions of terms
798. Public display of offensive sexual material


L. Offenses Against the Right of Privacy

799. Eavesdropping; definitions of terms
800. Eavesdropping
801. Possession of eavesdropping devices
802. Failure to report wiretapping
803. Divulging an eavesdropping warrant
804. Tampering with private communications
805. Unlawfully obtaining communications information
806. Failing to report criminal communications


M. Offenses Against Public Safety

807. Definitions
808. Criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree
809. Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree
810. Criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
811. Criminal possession of a dangerous weapon in the first degree
812. Unlawful possession of weapons by persons under sixteen
813. Criminal use of a firearm in the second degree
814. Criminal use of a firearm in the first degree
815. Manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of weapons and dangerous instruments and appliances
816. Criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree
817. Criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree
818. Criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree
819. Criminal sale of a firearm with the aid of a minor
820. Presumptions of possession, unlawful intent and defacement
821. Criminal sale of a firearm to a minor
822. Exemptions

N. Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs

823. Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
824. Arrest for violation of Section 823
825. Breath tests for operators of certain motor vehicles
826. Chemical tests
827. Compusory chemical tests
828. Chemical tests evidence


Chapter 1 - General Provisions


101. SHORT TITLE

This code shall be known as the Oneida Indian Nation Penal Code.


102. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON APPLICABILITY OF THIS CODE

1. Except as otherwise provided, the procedure governing the accusation, prosecution, conviction and punishment of offenders and offenses is not regulated by this Code but by the Oneida Indian Nation Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2. This code does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved in such civil action constitutes an offense defined in this Code.


103. DEFINITIONS

Except where different meanings are expressly specified in subsequent provisions of this code, the following terms have the following meanings:

1. "Benefit" means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary.

2. "Court" means the Oneida Nation Court.

3. "Crime" means a felony, misdemeanor or a violation.

4. "Dangerous instrument" means any instrument, article or substance, including a "vehicle" as that term is defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.

5. "Deadly physical force" means physical force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.

6. "Deadly weapon" means any loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged, or a switchable knife, gravity knife, pilum ballistic knife, dagger, billy, blackjack, or metal knuckles.

7. "Felony" means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year may be imposed.

8. "He" means both the male and female gender.

9. "Juror" means any person who is a member of any jury impaneled by the court. The term juror also includes a person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror.

10. "Misdemeanor" means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of six months cannot be imposed.

11. "Native American" means a person who is an enrolled member of a state recognized or federally recognized Indian tribe or Indian Nation.

12. "Offense" means conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any law of the Nation.

13. "Person" means a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.

14. "Possess" means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.

15. "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.

16. "Public servant" means (a) any public officer or employee of the Nation or of any political subdivision thereof, or (b) any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee.

17. "Serious physical injury" means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

18. "Vehicle" means a "motor vehicle", "trailer" or semi-trailer, "any snowmobile, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail.

19. "Violation" means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of three months cannot be imposed.


Chapter 2 - PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY


201. CULPABILITY; DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following definitions are applicable to this code:

1. "Act" means a bodily movement.

2. "Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.

3. "Omission" means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law.

4. "Conduct" means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

5. "To act" means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.

6. "Culpable mental state" means "intentionally" or "knowingly" or "recklessly" or with "criminal negligence," as these terms are defined in Section 202.


202. CULPABILITY; DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES

The following definitions are applicable to this code:

1. "Intentionally." A defendant acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.

2. "Knowingly." A defendant acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.

3. "Recklessly." A defendant acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A defendant who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.

4. "Criminal negligence." A defendant acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.


203. REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN GENERAL AND FOR OFFENSES OF STRICT LIABILITY AND MENTAL CULPABILITY

The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a defendant of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If such conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense is one of "strict liability." If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to every material element of an offense, such offense is one of "mental culpability."


204. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES WITH RESPECT TO CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. When the commission of an offense defined in this code, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly" or "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

2. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental culpability. This subdivision applies to offenses defined both in and outside this code.


205. EFFECT OF IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE UPON LIABILITY

1. A defendant is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless:

A. Such factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for the commission of an offense; or

B. The statute defining the offense or a statute related thereto expressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption; or

C. Such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification.

2. A defendant is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a statute or other enactment, or (b) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (c) a judicial decision of the Court, another Indian Nation court or a state or federal court, or (d) an interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.

3. Notwithstanding the use of the term "knowingly" in any provision of this code defining an offense in which the age of a child is an element thereof, knowledge by the defendant of the age of such child is not an element of any such offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefore that the defendant did not know the age of the child or believed such age to be the same as or greater than that specified in the statute.


206. EFFECT OF INTOXICATION UPON LIABILITY

Intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge; but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged.


PARTIES TO OFFENSES AND LIABILITY THROUGH ACCESSORIAL CONDUCT


207. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER

When one defendant engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another defendant is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.


208. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER; NO DEFENSE

In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to Section 207, it is no defense that:

1. Such other person is not guilty of the offense in question owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense in question; or

2. Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question, or has previously been acquitted thereof, or has legal immunity from prosecution therefor; or

3. The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.


209. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER; EXEMPTION

Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 207 and 208, a person is not criminally liable for conduct of another person constituting an offense when his own conduct, though causing or aiding the commission of such offense, is of a kind that is necessarily incidental thereto. If such conduct constitutes a related but separate offense upon the part of the actor, he is liable for that offense only and not for the conduct or offense committed by the other person.


210. CONVICTIONS FOR DIFFERENT DEGREES OF OFFENSE

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this code, when, pursuant to Section 207, two or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each person is guilty of such degree as is compatible with his own culpable mental state and with his own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.


211. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS

1. As used in this section:

A. "Agent" means any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.

B. "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.

2. A corporation is guilty of an offense when:

A. The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or

B. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation; or

C. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation, and the offense is (i) a misdemeanor or a violation or (ii) one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation.


212. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR CORPORATE CONDUCT

A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.


Chapter 3 - DEFENSES


301. DEFENSES; BURDEN OF PROOF

1. When a "defense," other than an "affirmative defense," defined by statute is raised at a trial, the Nation has the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. When a defense declared by statute to be an "affirmative defense" is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.


302. INFANCY

1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section, a person less than thirteen years old is not criminally responsible for conduct.

2. In any prosecution for an offense, lack of criminal responsibility by reason of infancy, as defined in this section, is a defense.


303. JUSTIFICATION; A DEFENSE

In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in Section 304 through 308, is a defense.


304. JUSTIFICATION; GENERALLY

Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this chapter defining justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:

1. Such conduct is required or authorized by law or by a judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions; or

2. Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.


305. JUSTIFICATION; USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE GENERALLY

The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:

1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of eighteen or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of eighteen for a special purpose, may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person.

2. A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his direction, may use physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order, but he may use deadly physical force only when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.

3. A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself may use physical force upon such person to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to thwart such result.

4. A duly licensed physician, or a person acting under his direction, may use physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient if (a) the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is under the age of eighteen years or an incompetent person, with the consent of his parent, guardian or other person entrusted with his care and supervision, or (b) the treatment is administered in an emergency when the physician reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

5. A person may, pursuant to the ensuing provisions of this Code, use physical force upon another person in defense of himself or a third person, or in defense of premises, or in order to prevent larceny of or criminal mischief to property, or in order to effect an arrest or prevent an escape from custody. Whenever a person is authorized by any such provision to use deadly physical force in any given circumstance, nothing contained in any other such provision may be deemed to negate or qualify such authorization.


306. JUSTIFICATION; USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE OF A PERSON

1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision (2), use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, unless:

A. The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor himself with intent to cause physical injury to another person; or

B. The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his use of physical force is nevertheless justifiable if he has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force; or

C. The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.

2. A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless:

A. He reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that he is under no duty to retreat if he is:

(i) in his dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or

(ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer; or

B. He reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy or robbery; or

C. He reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by law.


307. JUSTIFICATION; USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PREMISES AND IN DEFENSE OF A PERSON IN THE COURSE OF BURGLARY

1. Any person may use physical force upon another person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a crime involving damage to premises. He may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and he may use deadly physical force if he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson.

2. A person in possession or control of any premise, or a person licensed or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon another person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a criminal trespass upon such premises. He may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and he may use deadly physical force in order to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson, as prescribed in subdivision one, or in the course of a burglary or attempted burglary, as prescribed in subdivision three.

3. A person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, a dwelling or an occupied building, who reasonably believes that another person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling or building, may use deadly physical force upon such other person when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of such burglary.

4. As used in this section, the following terms have the following meanings:

A. The terms "premises," "building" and "dwelling" have the meanings prescribed in Section 487;

B. Persons "licensed or privileged" to be in buildings or upon other premises include, but are not limited to, police officers or peace officers acting in the performance of their duties.


308. JUSTIFICATION; USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE TO PREVENT OR TERMINATE LARCENY OR CRIMINAL MISCHIEF

A person may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of larceny or of criminal mischief with respect to property other than premises.


309. DURESS

1. In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

2. The defense of duress as defined in subdivision one of this section is not available when a person intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.


310. ENTRAPMENT

In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means active inducement or encouragement. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.


311. RENUNCIATION

1. In any prosecution for an offense, other than an attempt to commit a crime, in which the defendant's guilt depends upon his criminal liability for the conduct of another person pursuant to Section 207, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant withdrew from participation in such offense prior to the commission thereof and made a substantial effort to prevent the commission thereof.

2. In any prosecution for criminal facilitation it is an affirmative defense that, prior to the commission of the felony which he facilitated, the defendant made a substantial effort to prevent the commission of such felony.

3. In any prosecution pursuant to Section 418 for an attempt to commit a crime, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal effort and, if mere abandonment was insufficient to accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirmative steps which prevented the commission thereof.

4. In any prosecution for criminal solicitation pursuant to Section 401-407 or for conspiracy pursuant to Section 408-417 in which the crime solicited or the crime contemplated by the conspiracy was not in fact committed, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose the defendant prevented the commission of such crime.

5. A renunciation is not "voluntary and complete" within the meaning of this section if it is motivated in whole or in part by:

A. a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose, or

B. a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but similar objective.


312. MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT

In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either:

1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or

2. That such conduct was wrong.


Chapter 4 - SPECIFIC OFFENSES


A. ANTICIPATORY OFFENSES


401. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION IN THE FIFTH DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal solicitation in the fifth degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree is a violation.


402. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION IN THE FOURTH DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal solicitation in the fourth degree when:

1. with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct; or

2. being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor.


403. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal solicitation in the third degree when, being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct. Criminal solicitation in the third degree is a felony.


404. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal solicitation in the second degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

Criminal solicitation in the second degree is a felony.


405. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal solicitation in the first degree when, being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.

Criminal solicitation in the first degree is a felony.


406. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION; NO DEFENSE

It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal solicitation that the person solicited could not be guilty of the crime solicited owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the crime in question.


407. CRIMINAL SOLICITATION; EXEMPTION

A Native American is not guilty of criminal solicitation when his solicitation constitutes conduct of a kind that is necessarily incidental to the commission of the crime solicited. When under such circumstances the solicitation constitutes an offense other than criminal solicitation which is related to but separate from the crime solicited, the actor is guilty of such related and separate offense only and not of criminal solicitation.


B. CONSPIRACY


408. CONSPIRACY IN THE SIXTH DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of conspiracy in the sixth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

Conspiracy in the sixth degree is a misdemeanor.


409. CONSPIRACY IN THE FIFTH DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of conspiracy in the fifth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting:

1. a felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct; or

2. a crime be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

Conspiracy in the fifth degree is a misdemeanor.


410. CONSPIRACY IN THE FOURTH DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of conspiracy in the fourth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting:

1. a felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct; or

2. a felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

Conspiracy in the fourth degree is a felony.


411. CONSPIRACY IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of conspiracy in the third degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

Conspiracy in the third degree is a felony.


412. CONSPIRACY IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

Conspiracy in the second degree is a felony.


413. CONSPIRACY IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of conspiracy in the first degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.

Conspiracy in the first degree is a felony.


414. CONSPIRACY; PLEADING AND PROOF; NECESSITY OF OVERT ACT

A Native American shall not be convicted of conspiracy unless an overt act is alleged and proved to have been committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.


415. CONSPIRACY; JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. A Native American may be prosecuted for conspiracy in the county in which he entered into such conspiracy or in any county in which an overt act in furtherance thereof was committed.

2. An agreement made within the territorial jurisdiction of the Oneida Indian Nation to engage in or cause the performance of conduct in another jurisdiction is punishable herein as a conspiracy only when such conduct would constitute a crime both under the laws of the Nation if performed herein and under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.

3. An agreement made in another jurisdiction to engage in or cause the performance of conduct within this state, which would constitute a crime herein, is punishable herein only when an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy is committed within this state. Under such circumstances, it is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that the conduct which is the objective of the conspiracy would not constitute a crime under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.


416. CONSPIRACY; NO DEFENSE

It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that, owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the agreement or the object conduct or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of conspiracy or the object crime, one or more of the defendant's co-conspirators could not be guilty of conspiracy or the object crime.


417. CONSPIRACY; ENTERPRISE CORRUPTION; APPLICABILITY

For the purposes of this code, conspiracy to commit the crime of enterprise corruption shall not constitute an offense.


C. ATTEMPT


418. ATTEMPT TO COMMIT A CRIME

A Native American is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.


419. ATTEMPT TO COMMIT A CRIME; PUNISHMENT

An attempt to commit a crime is a:

1. A felony when the crime attempted is a felony.

2. A misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a misdemeanor.


420. ATTEMPT TO COMMIT A CRIME; NO DEFENSE

If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendance circumstances been as such person believed them to be.


421. CRIMINAL FACILITATION IN THE FOURTH DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid:

1. to a Native American who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony; or

2. to a Native American under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct which would constitute a crime, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a crime.

Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor.


422. CRIMINAL FACILITATION IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal facilitation in the third degree, when believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony.

Criminal facilitation in the third degree is a felony.


423. CRIMINAL FACILITATION IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal facilitation in the second degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a class A felony, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such class A felony.

Criminal facilitation in the second degree is a felony.


424. CRIMINAL FACILITATION IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of criminal facilitation in the first degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such a class A felony.

Criminal facilitation in the first degree is a felony.


425. CRIMINAL FACILITATION; NO DEFENSE

It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal facilitation that:

1. The Native American facilitated was not guilty of the underlying felony owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of such felony; or

2. The Native American person facilitated has not been prosecuted for or convicted of the underlying felony, or has previously been acquitted thereof; or

3. The defendant himself is not guilty of the felony which he facilitated because he did not act with the intent or other culpable mental state required for the commission thereof.


426. CRIMINAL FACILITATION; CORROBORATION

A Native American shall not be convicted of criminal facilitation upon the testimony of a person who has committed the felony charged to have been facilitated unless such testimony be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with such facilitation.


D. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON INVOLVING PHYSICAL INJURY, SEXUAL CONDUCT, RESTRAINT AND INTIMIDATION


427. ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of assault in the third degree when:

1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or

3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.

Assault in the third degree is a misdemeanor.


428. VEHICULAR ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of vehicular assault in the second degree when:

1. With criminal negligence he causes serious physical injury to another person and either

2. causes such serious physical injury by operation of a vehicle while intoxicated.

Vehicular assault in the second degree is a felony.


429. VEHICULAR ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of vehicular assault in the first degree when he:

1. commits the crime of vehicular assault in the second degree as defined in section 428, and

2. commits such crime while knowing or having reason to know that his license or his privilege of operating a motor vehicle or his privilege of obtaining a license is suspended or revoked.

Vehicular assault in the first degree is a felony.


430. ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of assault in the second degree when:

1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

2. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or

3. With intent to prevent a peace officer, police officer, a fireman, including a fireman acting as a paramedic or emergency medical technician administering first aid in the course of performance of duty as such fireman, or an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician, from performing a lawful duty, he causes physical injury to such peace officer, police officer, fireman, paramedic or technician; or

4. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or

5. For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or

6. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony, he or another participant if there be any, causes physical injury to a person other than one of the participants; or

7. Having been charged with or convicted of a crime and while confined in a correctional facility, pursuant to such charge or conviction, with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

8. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly causes serious physical injury to such person.

Assault in the second degree is a felony.


431. ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of assault in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause serious injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or

2. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or

4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person other than one of the participants.

Assault in the first degree is a felony.


432. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT UPON A POLICE OFFICER OR A PEACE OFFICER

A Native American is guilty of aggravate assault upon a police officer or a peace officer when, with intent to cause serious physical injury to a person whom he knows or reasonably should know to be a police officer engaged in the course of performing his official duties, he causes such injury by means of a deadly weapon when such weapon is a firearm.

Aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer is a felony.


433. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT UPON A PERSON LESS THAN ELEVEN YEARS OLD

A Native American is guilty of aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old when being eighteen years old or more the defendant commits the crime of assault in the third degree upon a person less than eleven years old and has been previously convicted of such crime upon a person less than eleven years old within the preceding three years.

Aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old is a felony.


434. MENACING IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of menacing in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of menacing in the second degree and has been previously convicted of the crime of menacing in the second degree within the preceding ten years.

Menacing in the first degree is a felony.


435. MENACING IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of menacing in the second degree when:

1. He or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or

2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death.

Menacing in the second degree is a misdemeanor.


436. MENACING IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.

Menacing in the third degree is a misdemeanor.


437. HAZING IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of hazing in the first degree when, in the course of another person's initiation into or affiliation with any organization, he intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such other person or a third person and thereby causes such injury.

Hazing in the first degree is a misdemeanor.


438. HAZING IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of hazing in the second degree when, in the course of another person's initiation or affiliation with any organization, he intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such other person or a third person.

Hazing in the second degree is a violation.


439. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person .

Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a misdemeanor.


440. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.

Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a felony.


441. PROMOTING A SUICIDE ATTEMPT

A Native American is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.

Promoting a suicide attempt is a felony.


442. PROMOTING A SUICIDE ATTEMPT; WHEN PUNISHABLE AS ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MURDER

A Native American who engages in conduct constituting both the offense of promoting a suicide attempt and the offense of attempt to commit murder may not be convicted on attempt to commit murder unless he causes or aids the suicide attempt by the use of duress or deception.


443. HOMICIDE DEFINED

Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree.


444. HOMICIDE, ABORTION AND RELATED OFFENSES; DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following definitions are applicable to this article:

1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive.

2. "Abortional act" means an act committed upon or with respect to a female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she is pregnant or not, whether directly upon her body or by the administering, taking or prescription of drugs or in any other manner, with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female.

3. "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy.


445. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

A Native American is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.

Criminally negligent homicide is a felony.


446. VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he:

1. commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 445, and either

2. causes the death of such other person by operation of a vehicle, or by operation of a vessel.

3. causes the death of such other person by operation of a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than eighteen thousand pounds which contains flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such death, by operation of a snowmobile, or by operation of a all terrain vehicle.

Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree is a felony.


447. VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree when he:

1. commits a the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 446, and

2. commits such crime while knowing or having reason to know that his license or his privilege of operating a motor vehicle or his privilege of obtaining a license is suspended or revoked.

Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree is a felony.


448. MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:

1. He recklessly causes the death of another person; or

2. He commits upon a female an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 444; or

3. He intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.

Manslaughter in the second degree is a felony.


449. MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or

2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined paragraph (a) of subdivision one of Section 450. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision; or

3. He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her death unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three to Section 444; or

4. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such person and thereby causes the death of such person.

Manslaughter in the first degree is a felony.


458. MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of murder in the second degree when:

1. With intent to cause death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:

A. The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; or

B. The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime; or

2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person; or

3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

A. Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and

B. Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and

C. Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and

D. Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury; or

4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the death of such person.

Murder in the second degree is a felony.


451. MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of murder in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person; and

A. Either:

(i) the victim was a police officer who was killed in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a police officer; or

(ii) the victim was an employee of a correctional facility who was killed in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was an employee of a correctional facility; or

B. The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative defense that:

A. The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or

B. The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.

Murder in the first degree is a felony.


452. ABORTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of abortion in the second degree when he commits an abortional act upon a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of Section 444.

Abortion in the second degree is a felony.


453. ABORTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of abortion in the first degree when he commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes the miscarriage of such female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of Section 444.

Abortion in the first degree is a felony.


454. SELF-ABORTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American female is guilty of self-abortion in the second degree when, being pregnant, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of Section 444.

Self-abortion in the second degree is a misdemeanor.


455. SELF-ABORTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American female is guilty of self-abortion in the first degree when, being pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself which causes her miscarriage, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of Section 444.

Self-abortion in the first degree is a misdemeanor.


456. ISSUING ABORTIONAL ARTICLES

A Native American is guilty of issuing abortional articles when he manufactures, sells or delivers any instrument, article, medicine, drug or substance with intent that the same be used in unlawfully procuring the miscarriage of a female.

Issuing abortional articles is a misdemeanor.


457. SEX OFFENSES; DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:

1. "Sexual intercourse" has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight.

2. "Deviate sexual intercourse" means sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the vulva.

3. "Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing.

4. "Female" means any female person who is not married to the actor. For the purposes of this chapter "not married" means:

A. the lack of an existing relationship of husband and wife between the female and the actor which is recognized by law, or

B. the existence of the relationship of husband and wife between the actor and the female which is recognized by law at the time the actor commits an offense proscribed by this chapter by means of forcible compulsion against the female, and the female and actor are living apart at such time pursuant to a valid and effective:

(i) order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction which by its terms or in its effect requires such living apart or

(ii) decree or judgment of separation, or

(iii) written agreement of separation subscribed by them and acknowledged in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded which contains provisions specifically indicating that the actor may be guilty of the commission of a crime for engaging in conduct which constitutes an offense proscribed by this chapter against and without the consent of the female.

5. "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct.

6. "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct owing to the influence of a narcotic or intoxicating substance administered to him without his consent, or to any other act committed upon him without his consent

7. "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act.

8. "Forcible compulsion" means to compel by either:

A. use of physical force; or

B. a threat, express or implied, which places a person in fear of immediate death or physical injury to himself, herself or another person, or in fear that he, she or another person will immediately be kidnapped.

9. "Foreign object" means any instrument or article which, when inserted in the vagina, urethra, penis or rectum, is capable of causing physical injury.


458. SEX OFFENSES; LACK OF CONSENT

1. Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this article, except the offense of consensual sodomy, that the sexual act was committed without consent of the victim.

2. Lack of consent results from:

A. Forcible compulsion; or

B. Incapacity to consent; or

C. Where the offense charged is sexual abuse, any circumstances, in addition to forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent, in which the victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor's conduct.

3. A person is deemed incapable of consent when he is:

A. less than seventeen years old; or

B. mentally defective; or

C. mentally incapacitated; or

D. physically helpless.


459. SEX OFFENSES; DEFENSE

In any prosecution under this Code in which the victim's lack of consent is based solely upon his capacity to consent because he was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of the facts or conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent.


460. SEX OFFENSES; CORROBORATION

A Native American shall not be convicted of consensual sodomy, or an attempt to commit the same, or of any offense defined in this chapter of which lack of consent is an element but results solely from incapacity to consent because of the victim's mental defect, or mental incapacity, or an attempt to commit the same, solely on the testimony of the victim, unsupported by other evidence tending to:

1. Establish that an attempt was made to engage the victim in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual contact, as the case may be, at the time of the occurrence; and

2. Connect the defendant with the commission of the offense or attempted offense.


461. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT

A Native American is guilty of sexual misconduct when:

1. Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her consent; or

2. He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's consent; or

3. He engages in sexual conduct with an animal or a dead human body.

Sexual misconduct is a misdemeanor.


462. RAPE IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of rape in the third degree when:

1. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person to whom the actor is not married who is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old; or

2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person to whom the actor is not married less than seventeen years old.

Rape in the third degree is a felony.


463. RAPE IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of rape in the second degree when, being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person to whom the actor is not married less than fourteen years old.

Rape in the second degree is a felony.


464. RAPE IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a female:

1. By forcible compulsion; or

2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or

3. Who is less than eleven years old.

Rape in the first degree is a felony.


466. SODOMY IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of sodomy in the third degree when:

1. He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a person who is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old; or

2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a person less than seventeen years old.

Sodomy in the third degree is a felony.


467. SODOMY IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of sodomy in the second degree when, being eighteen years old or more, he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person less than fourteen years old.

Sodomy in the second degree is a felony.


468. SODOMY IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person:

1. By forcible compulsion; or

2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or

3. Who is less than eleven years old.

Sodomy in the first degree is a felony.


469. SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE THIRD DEGREE

A Native American in guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent; except that in any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense that (a) such other person's lack of consent was due solely to incapacity to consent by reason of being less than seventeen years old, and (b) such other person was more than fourteen years old, and (c) the defendant was less than five years older than such other person.

Sexual abuse in the third degree is a misdemeanor.


470. SEXUAL ABUSER IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree when he subjects another person to sexual contact and when such other person is:

1. Incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old; or

2. Less than fourteen years old.

Sexual abuse in the second degree is a misdemeanor.


471. SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when he subjects another person to sexual contact:

1. By forcible compulsion; or

2. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or

3. When the other person is less than eleven years old.

Sexual abuse in the first degree is a felony.


472. AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE SECOND DEGREE

1. A Native American is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree when he inserts a finger in the vagina, urethra, penis, or rectum of another person causing physical injury to such person:

A. By forcible compulsion; or

B. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or

C. When the other person is less than eleven years old.

2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the provisions of this section.

Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree is a felony.


473. AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE FIRST DEGREE

1. A Native American is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree when he inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, or rectum of another person causing physical injury to such person:

A. By forcible compulsion; or

B. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or

C. When the other person is less than eleven years old.

2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the provisions of this section.

Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree is a felony.


474. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT, KIDNAPPING AND CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE; DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:

1. "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined "without consent" when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement of confinement.

2. "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly physical force.

3. "Relative" means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.


475. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree when he restrains another person.

Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.


476. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose the latter to a risk of serious physical injury.

Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree is a class E felony.


477. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT; DEFENSE

In any prosecution for unlawful imprisonment, it is an affirmative defense that (a) the person restrained was a child less than sixteen years old, and (b) the defendant was a relative of such child, and (c) his sole purpose was to assume control of such child.


478. KIDNAPPING IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.

Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony.


479. KIDNAPPING IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and when:

1. His intent is to compel a third person to pay or deliver money or property as ransom, or to engage in other particular conduct, or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or

2. He restrains the person abducted for a period of more than twelve hours with in tent to:

A. Inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or

B. Accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or

C. Terrorize him or a third person; or

D. Interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function; or

3 . The person abducted dies during the abduction or before he is able to return or to be returned to safety. Such death shall be presumed, in a case where such person was less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person at the time of the abduction, from evidence that his parents, guardians or other lawful custodians did not see or hear from him following the termination of the abduction and prior to trial and received no reliable information during such period persuasively indicating that he was alive. In all other cases, such death shall be presumed from evidence that a person whom the person abducted would have been extremely likely to visit or communicate with during the specified period were he alive and free to d o so did not see or hear from him during such period and received no reliable information during such period persuasively indicating that he was alive.

Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A-1 felony.


480. KIDNAPPING; DEFENSE

In any prosecution for kidnapping, it is an affirmative defense that (a) the defendant was a relative of the person abducted, and (b) his sole purpose was to assume control of such person.


481. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when:

1. Being a relative of a child less than sixteen years old, intending to hold such child permanently or for a protracted period, and knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; or

2. Knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person or other person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution.

Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.


482. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of custodian inference in the first degree when he commits the crime of custodial interference in the second degree.

1. With intent to permanently remove the victim from Nation jurisdiction, he removes such person from the jurisdiction of the Nation; or

2. Under circumstances which expose the victim to a risk that his safety will be endangered or his health materially impaired.

It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subdivision one of this section that the victim had been abandoned or that the taking was necessary in an emergency to protect the victim because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.

Custodial interference in the first degree is a class E felony.


483. COERCION IN THE SECOND DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which he has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will:

1. Cause physical injury to a person; or

2. Cause damage to property; or

3. Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or

4. Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or

5. Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or

6. Cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or

7. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

8. Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or

9. Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

Coercion in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.


484. COERCION IN THE FIRST DEGREE

A Native American is guilty of coercion in the first degree when he commits the crime of coercion in the second degree, and when:

1. He commits such crime by instilling in the victim a fear that he will cause physical injury to a person or cause damage to property; or

2. He thereby compels or induces the victim to:

A. Commit or attempt to commit a felony; or

B. Cause or attempt to cause physical injury to a person; or

C. Violate his duty as a public servant.

Coercion in the first degree is a class D felony.


485. COERCION; NO DEFENSE

The crimes of (a) coercion and attempt to commit coercion, and (b) bribe receiving by a labor official and bribe receiving by a public servant are not mutually exclusive, and it is no defense to a prosecution for coercion or an attempt to commit coercion that, by reason of the same conduct, the defendant also committed one of such specified crimes of bribe receiving.


486. COERCION; DEFENSE

In any prosecution for coercion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge.

 

5/1/1997

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