549 Fed.Appx. 643
(Cite as: 549 Fed.Appx. 643)
This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Michael JACKSON, Petitioner || Appellant,


Randy TRACY, Acting Chief Administrator, Gila River Indian Community Department of
Rehabilitation and Supervision and Gila River Indian Community Court,
Respondents || Appellees.

No. 12 || 17179.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 5, 2013.

Filed Dec. 11, 2013.

*644 Keith J. Hilzendeger, Daniel L. Kaplan, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Federal Public Defender's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Linus Everling, Esquire, Thomas Laurence Murphy, Senior Counsel, Rebecca Hall,
Gila River Indian Community Pima Maricopa Tribe Law Office, Sacaton, AZ, for

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
Frederick J. Martone, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.

Before: REINHARDT and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK, District Judge.FN*

FN* The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.


FN** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

[1] 1. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) guarantees a criminal defendant's
right "at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 25
U.S.C. s 1302(a)(6). We need not decide whether this provision guarantees the
right to effective assistance of retained counsel, because Jackson did not retain
counsel. Nor did he accept the offer of free counsel from the Gila River Indian
Community Defense Services Office. He instead hired a lay tribal advocate, who
was not admitted to the bar of any State. The plain meaning of the term
"counsel" as used in the ICRA is "licensed attorney." See Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The ICRA does
not protect a criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance of a tribal
advocate who is not admitted to the bar.

[2] 2. For the same reason, we need not decide whether the ICRA's guarantee of
the right to due process, 25 U.S.C. s 1302(a)(8), sets minimum constitutional
standards for effective representation by attorneys. Cf. Brubaker v. Dickson,
310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir.1962). Even if those standards apply here, they govern
only the conduct of licensed attorneys, not lay tribal advocates.