1997-98 Term
Supreme Court Cases Related to Indian Law
Six Indian law-related cases were granted.
Petition for certiorari was denied in 26 Indian law-related cases.
Cert Granted
Subjects: United States. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act; Indian Country (U.S.) -- Defined; Dependent Indian communities -- Defined; Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Arctic Village and Village of Venetie) -- Government relations -- United States.
*Issues: (1) Did Ninth
Circuit correctly hold--in conflict with clear intent of Congress in enacting
ANCSA, decisions of Alaska Supreme Court, and interpretation of federal agency
charged with implementing ANCSA--that ANCSA land may constitute Indian country
within Section 1151(b)? (2) If so, did Ninth Circuit correctly hold--in conflict
with decisions of this court and other federal circuits--that determination whether
land is Indian country within Section 1151(b) should depend upon ad hoc, six-part
balancing test incapable of producing predictable results?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme Court, Justice Thomas,
held that:
(1) term “dependent Indian communities,” as used in
statute defining “Indian country,” refers to limited
category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments,
and that have been set aside by Federal Government for use of Indians
as Indian land, and are under federal superintendence, and
(2) land
transferred to private corporations consisting of Indian shareholders,
in fee simple without restrictions, and subsequently reconveyed
to tribe was not “Indian country,” and tribe consequently
lacked authority to impose tax on business activities conducted
on land.
Reversed.
History: Petition for Certiorari filed April
4, 1997. Petition for Certiorari granted June 23, 1997. Oral Argument on for December
10, 1997. Decision February 25, 1998.
*Holding below: State
of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Government, 101
F.3d 1286, 9th Cir. Test for determining whether Native American
tribe constitutes ''dependent Indian community'' within meaning
of 18
USC 1151(b), defining ''Indian country,'' requires showing of
federal set aside and federal superintendence, such requirements
to be construed broadly and informed by consideration of (1) nature
of area; (2) relationship of area inhabitants to Indian tribes and
federal government; (3) established practice of government agencies
toward that area; (4) degree of federal ownership of and control
over area; (5) degree of cohesiveness of area inhabitants; and (6)
extent to which area was set aside for use, occupancy, and protection
of dependent Indians; under that test, Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act neither eliminated federal set aside for Alaska Natives, as
such, nor terminated federal superintendence over Alaska Natives,
notwithstanding its transfer of title to settlement lands to Native
corporations that were empowered to opt out of supervisory controls,
and thus Indian country may still exist in Alaska; although Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government is no longer reservation owned
or controlled by federal government, it meets all other factors
above, in that Venetie has special use and occupancy relationship
to its land, its inhabitants maintain significant contacts and relationships
with numerous federal agencies, federal government continues to
be involved in affairs of Natives, high degree of cohesiveness among
its inhabitants indicates that Venetie is strong and distinct Native
community, and reunification of Venetie with its former reservation
land via statutory mechanism provided by Congress demonstrates that
land has been set aside for Indians, as such; accordingly, Venetie
is dependent Indian community whose territory qualifies as Indian
country.
Subjects: United States. General Allotment Act
(1887); Real property tax -- Minnesota; Real property tax -- Cass County (Minn.);
Real property -- Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians; Indian land transfers
-- Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians; Ad valorem tax -- Minnesota; Ad valorem
tax -- Cass County (Minn.).
*Issues: Under Yakima
County v. Yakima Indian Nation, is land originally patented
by U.S. government, and subsequently reacquired in fee simple by
Indian band, subject to state and local government taxation if it
remains freely alienable, irrespective of statute or treaty under
which it was originally conveyed?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme Court, Justice Thomas, held that
when Congress makes Indian reservation land freely alienable, it
manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render the land subject
to state and local taxation, and the repurchase of the land by an
Indian tribe does not cause the land to reassume tax-exempt status.
Judgment reversed.
History: Petition for Certiorari filed July 8, 1997. Petition for Certiorari granted
October 31, 1997. Decision June 8, 1998.
*Holding below: Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, Minn., 108
F.3d 820, 8th Cir. Sections 4, 5, and 6 of 1889 Nelson Act,
pursuant to which eight lots of Indian reservation land were sold
as pine lands or distributed as homestead lands, do not evince unmistakably
clear intent, required under Yakima
County v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502
U.S. 251 (1992), to allow state ad valorem taxes on such land
following its reacquisition by Indian tribe in fee, and thus Indian
tribe enjoys immunity from county ad valorem taxes on such reacquired
land; Section 3 of Nelson Act, which allotted certain land on reservation
by incorporating mechanisms of General Allotment Act at issue in
Yakima, evinced unmistakably clear intent required by Yakima to
allow state ad valorem taxes on lands patented in fee after enactment
of Burke Act proviso in 1906 (which amended GAA to make clear that
allottees would be subject to state law only after expiration of
trust period and issuance of patent in fee simple), but not if patented
before 1906, and thus Section 3 land that was patented after 1906
and later reacquired by tribe is taxable.
Subjects: Water rights -- Coeur D'Alene Reservation, Idaho -- Coeur d'Alene Lake (Idaho); Submerged lands -- Coeur d'Alene Lake (Idaho); Navigable waters -- Coeur d'Alene Lake (Idaho); Indian title -- Coeur D'Alene Reservation, Idaho; Quiet title actions -- Coeur D'Alene Reservation, Idaho; Equal footing doctrine; United States. Constitution. 11th Amendment; Conveyancing; United States. President -- Powers and duties.
*Issues: (1) May federal court hear action against
state officers for injunctive and declaratory relief when such relief requires
adjudication of states title and will deprive state of all practical benefits
of ownership of disputed waters and submerged lands? (2) Can president, acting
without express congressional authority, convey title of beds and banks of navigable
waters to Indian tribe, thereby defeating states entitlement to such lands under
equal footing doctrine of Constitution?
Holding: (from Westlaw) Certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy, held that action, which was functional equivalent
of quiet title action, did not come within doctrine of Ex parte
Young and was barred by Eleventh Amendment.
Reversed and remanded.
History: Petition for certiorari filed April 3, 1996. Petition granted April 15, 1996.
Oral argument October 16, 1996. Decision June 23, 1997.
*Holding below: Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. State of Idaho, 42
F.3d 1244, 9th Cir. Indian tribe´s action against state,
state agencies, and state officials for quiet title to all beds,
banks, and waters of navigable waterways within its reservation,
as well as tribe´s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
against state and state agencies only, are barred by Eleventh Amendment;
however, to extent that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
against state officials seek only to preclude officials´ future
violations of federal law, they are not barred by Eleventh Amendment
even if relief ordered by court puts plaintiff in possession of
property also claimed by state; because tribe has arguable claim
to ownership of property at issue, based on 1873 executive order,
district court´s dismissal of tribe´s complaint for
failure to state claim is reversed; state´s contention that
president may not convey title to submerged lands by executive order
without express congressional authorization is rejected.
Subjects: Promissory notes; Business enterprises
-- Off Indian reservations -- Oklahoma; Sovereign immunity -- Kiowa Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma; Jurisdiction -- Oklahoma; Debtor and creditor -- Oklahoma;
United States. Indian commerce clause.
*Issues: (1) Under Indian Commerce Clause, is federally recognized Indian tribe that
has not waived its sovereign immunity subject to ''inherent jurisdiction'' of
state court because commerce from which suit arises took place, in part, outside
tribal territory? (2) Under Indian Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause, can state
jurisdiction over Indian tribes be limited solely by explicit ''ouster'' of that
jurisdiction by Congress?
Holding: (from Westlaw) Following grant of certiorari, the Supreme
Court, Justice Kennedy, held that tribe was entitled to sovereign
immunity from suit on promissory note which it had signed, regardless
of whether note was signed on or off the reservation, and notwithstanding
that note allegedly related to its commercial activities.
Reversed.
History: Petition for Certiorari filed December 23, 1996. Petition for Certiorari
granted June 27, 1997. Oral argument February 23, 1998. Decision May 26, 1998.
*Holding below: (Okla CtCivApp DivI, 6/28/96, unpublished)
State court has jurisdiction over lawsuit, filed against federally recognized
Indian tribe to collect on delinquent promissory note, that has not been expressly
prohibited by Congress and that does not infringe on tribal self-government.
Subjects: Taxation -- Law and legislation -- Montana; Taxation -- Law and legislation -- Crow Tribe of Montana; Mining leases -- Crow Tribe of Montana; Coal -- Taxation -- Montana; Big Horn County (Mont.).
*Issues: May Indian tribe, or United States
on tribe's behalf, recover in quasi-contract from state and county taxes paid
pursuant to state law by third-party taxpayer that has waived any entitlement
to refund?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg, held
that the tribe was not entitled to disgorgement of taxes improperly
assessed against mineral lessee.
Reversed and remanded.
History: Petitition for Certiorari filed May 16, 1997. Petition for Certiorari granted
October 14, 1997. Oral Argument February 24, 1998. Decision May 18, 1998.
*Holding below:
Crow Tribe of Indians v. State of Mont., 98
F.3d 1194, 9th Cir. District court's ruling that, even though
state and county taxes had been imposed illegally on coal mined
on Indian land by company leasing rights from tribe, tribe and lessee
lacked privity and therefore tribe was not entitled to restitution
from state on theories of assumpsit or constructive trust, as well
as its ruling that state did not act with wrongful intent, its minimalization
of tribe's interest in raising revenue from its mineral resources,
and its consideration of fact that tribe did not show it would have
collected taxes from lessee if state had not taxed coal, were contrary
to law of case established in three prior appeals, and case is therefore
remanded for entry of order directing state and county to disgorge
improperly collected taxes.
Subjects: Fills (Earthwork) -- On Indian reservations -- Yankton Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota -- Tribal supervision; Indian allotments -- Yankton Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota; United States. General Allotment Act (1887);
Indian Country (U.S.) -- Defined; Diminished Indian reservations -- Yankton
Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Conveyancing; Disestablished Indian reservations
-- Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota; Boundaries -- Yankton Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota -- Defined.
*Issues:
Has Yankton Sioux reservation been disestablished or diminished by virtue
of 1894 act adopting ''cession and sum certain'' agreement between Yankton Sioux
Tribe and United States and by virtue of its century long treatment as disestablished
or diminished?
Holding: (from Westlaw) On certiorari, the Supreme Court,
Justice O'Connor, held that land surplus act which ratified agreement
pursuant to which unallotted reservation lands that were opened
for settlement by non-Indians were ceded to the United States in
return for payment of sum certain did not preserve opened tracts'
reservation status, but resulted in diminishment of reservation,
such that the State of South Dakota ultimately acquired primary
jurisdiction over tracts in question, and waste site constructed
on such nonreservation land was subject to environmental laws of
South Dakota.
Reversed and remanded.
History: Petition for Certiorari filed April 7, 1997. Petition for Certiorari granted
June 9, 1997. Argument set for December 8, 1997. Decision January 26, 1998.
*Holding below: Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management District, 99
F.3d 1439, 8th Cir. Court affirms district court's ruling that landfill site
over which state claims jurisdiction is, though owned by non-Indian, still part
of Yankton Sioux reservation, so that federal environmental laws apply, but that
tribe, which did not establish exception to general rule that Indian tribes cannot
regulate activities of non-Indians, even on reservation, does not have regulatory
authority over landfill project or authority to approve it; state's claim to jurisdiction
over site on basis that reservation, which had been established by 1858 treaty,
had been disestablished or diminished by 1894 statute that incorporated 1892 agreement
between tribe and United States under which federal government bought 200,000
acres of unallotted land within reservation for sale to non-Indian settlers, is
rejected; neither 1894 statute nor its legislative history indicates that Congress
intended that boundaries established by 1858 treaty be disestablished or diminished,
and facts that area did not lose its ''Indian character'' and that Indian population
and influence in area are increasing defeat argument that ''de facto'' diminishment
took place, even in absence of congressional intent.
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Cert Denied
Albuquerque, N.M. v. Browner
Docket No. 96-1587
Subjects:
Water -- Pollution -- Law and legislation -- Pueblo of Isleta,
New Mexico; Water quality -- Tribal supervision -- Pueblo of Isleta, New Mexico;
Sewage disposal plants --
Albuquerque (N.M.); Rio Grande River (Tex.); United States. Environmental Protection
Agency -- Powers and duties; United States. Constitution. Establishment clause;
Freedom of religion -- Pueblo of Isleta, New Mexico.
*Issues: (1) Can EPA approve and enforce Indian pueblo water quality standards beyond
pueblo boundaries when those standards have no scientific or rational basis? (2)
Is EPA action that forces city of Albuquerque to spend taxpayer money to protect
Indian pueblo religious uses of river water allowable under Establishment Clause?
(3) Does EPA's unreasonable consequences resolution process comply with Clean
Water Act mandate when it is not binding and denies standing to affected parties?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed April
7, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied November 10, 1997.
*Holding below: City
of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97
F.3d 415, 10th Cir. Environmental Protection Agency's
interpretation of Clean Water Act provision that grants Indian tribes
power to regulate water resources in same manner as states as authorizing
adoption of water quality standards more stringent than those required
by EPA and enforcement of such standards against upstream dischargers
outside tribal boundaries is reasonable; EPA's approval of Indian
pueblo's use of Rio Grande River for religious or traditional purposes
as designated use of river within reservation boundaries does not
violate Establishment Clause, because EPA's approval serves secular
purpose of promoting goals of Clean Water Act, does not promote
religion, and does not require any governmental involvement in tribe's
religious practices; EPA's regulations for resolving unreasonable
consequences arising from differing state and tribal water quality
standards on common body of water, which prescribe mediation and
non-binding arbitration and permit only states and Indian tribes
to initiate such process, are consistent with Clean Water Act's
requirement that EPA encourage cooperative activities among states
and are entitled to deference.
Burlington
Northern Railroad Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf
504 U.S. 648
Docket No.
96-1853
Subjects: Civil jurisdiction -- Crow Tribe of Montana;
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad; Railroad accidents -- On Indian reservations
-- Crow Tribe of Montana; Liability for railroad accidents; Jurisdiction --
Crow Tribe of Montana; Jurisdiction -- United States; Wrongful death; Exhaustion
of tribal remedies -- Crow Tribe of Montana.
*Issues: Did court of appeals err, in
light of this court's recent decision in Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (April 28, 1997), in concluding that exhaustion of tribal
court remedies is mandatory and that district court therefore had
no discretion to issue preliminary injunction to protect Burlington
Northern's interstate rail assets from being seized by Crow Tribal
Court to satisfy $250 million personal injury award entered by that
court?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed May 16, 1997. Summary action - Judgment vacated
on October 6, 1997.
*Holding below: Burlington
RR v. Red Wolf, 106
F.3d 868, 9th Cir. Federal district court erred in issuing preliminary
injunction against execution or enforcement of $250 million tribal
court wrongful death judgment against railroad before railroad had
exhausted tribal court remedies or established that any exception
to exhaustion requirement applied; futility exception, applicable
when exhaustion would be futile because of lack of adequate opportunity
to challenge court's jurisdiction, was inapplicable because judgment
creditors agreed to condition supersedeas bond required by tribal
court upon completion of all available federal review, and federal
review of tribal court jurisdiction is assured.
Campbell v. Campbell
Docket No. 97-776
Subjects: Jurisdiction -- Minnesota; Divorce suits
-- Minnesota; Child support -- Minnesota; Tribal members -- Minnesota; Non-Indians.
*Issues: (1) Should Minnesota district court retain jurisdiction over post-dissolution
matters involving parent and children who are enrolled members of Indian tribe
when one parent has legal domicile on Indian reservation and other parent now
has legal domicile in state other than Minnesota? (2) Should person be held in
contempt for his failure to obtain tribal court order for child support withholding
when Minnesota district court entering order declines to allow tribal court itself
to entertain matter or to follow tribal law and when spouse asking for contempt
order has declined to request relief for herself in tribal court? (3) Does either
comity or U.S. Supreme Court precedent oblige state court to allow tribal court
to assert jurisdiction over family law matter when tribe has drafted family law
code and established competent tribal court system since date of state court dissolution
of marriage?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed November 3, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
January 20, 1998.
*Holding below:
(Minn CtApp, 6/3/97, unpublished) State court is not divested of jurisdiction
to find former husband in contempt of its order that he increase child support
that he pays to his ex-wife by (i) fact that dispute is between Indian (former
husband) and non-Indian (former wife), (ii) former husband's relocation to reservation
following divorce, or (iii) former wife's relocation to another state; district
court did not err by ordering former husband to obtain tribal court order requiring
child support payments to be automatically withheld from his income.
Centex Bateson Construction Co. v. N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dept.
Docket No. 97-99
Subjects: Contractors -- United States -- On Indian
reservations -- Taxation -- New Mexico; United States. Dept. of Health and
Human Services; Hospitals -- Design and construction -- On Indian reservations
-- New Mexico; Preemption of state law -- New Mexico.
*Issues:
Does federal Indian preemption analysis apply to state taxation of proceeds of
contract between contractor and federal Indian agency for construction project
on Indian reservation for exclusive benefit of members of federally recognized
Indian tribes?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed July 15, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
October 6, 1997.
*Holding below:
(NM CtApp, 3/14/97) Indian preemption doctrine is inapplicable to, and
thus does not exempt from state taxation, proceeds of contract under which builder
contracted directly with federal agency, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
rather than with Indian tribe or tribal members, to build hospital on Indian reservation.
Charles v. Charles
Docket No. 97-1336
Subjects: Jurisdiction -- Connecticut; Divorce suits
-- Connecticut; Jurisdiction -- Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut; Divorce
suits -- Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut; United States. Connecticut
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act.
*Issues: (1) Under Section 6 of Connecticut Indian
Land Claims Settlement Act, 25
USC 1755, has Connecticut validly assumed civil jurisdiction
over Mashantucket Pequot Reservation even though state took no formal
action to manifest its intent to assume such jurisdiction (in contrast
to what state has done to assume jurisdiction over another reservation
within state), and tribe did not formally consent to state's assumption
of such jurisdiction? (2) In this divorce and custody case, did
Connecticut courts err in failing to abstain in favor of parallel
proceedings before Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court when (a) tribal
court has jurisdiction to decide matter; (b) defendant is enrolled
member of tribe who lives on tribal reservation, child is enrolled
member of tribe, and plaintiff is not Connecticut resident; and
(c) terms of Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, even
if construed to vest state with concurrent jurisdiction, would still
require state to apply principles of tribal law that do not conflict
with state law?
History: Petition for certiorari filed February 17, 1998. Certiorari denied May 25
1998.
*Holding below: Charles
v. Charles, 701
A.2d 650, 2nd Cir. Section 6 of Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims
Settlement Act, 25
USC 1755, which provides that ''notwithstanding the provision
relating to a special election in [25
USC 1326], the reservation of the Tribe is declared to be Indian
country subject to State jurisdiction to the maximum extent provided
in [25
USC 1321-1326],'' had effect of subjecting residents of Mashantucket
Pequot reservation to Connecticut courts' civil and criminal jurisdiction
without need for consent of tribal members expressed in vote as
provided in 25
USC 1326, and thus member of tribe residing on reservation was
resident of Connecticut for purposes of statute giving superior
court jurisdiction of divorce actions involving at least one party
who has been state resident for 12 months.
Citizen
Potawatomi Nation v. C&L Enterprises, Inc.
Docket No. 96-1721
Subjects:
Breach of contract -- Citizen Potawatomi Nation, Oklahoma; Sovereign immunity
-- Citizen Potawatomi Nation, Oklahoma; United States. Constitution. Supremacy
clause; United States. Indian commerce clause; Contracts -- Citizen Potawatomi
Nation, Oklahoma; Real property -- Off Indian reservations -- Citizen Potawatomi
Nation, Oklahoma.
*Issues:
(1) Do state courts violate Indian Commerce and Supremacy Clauses by rejecting
federal decisional law that Indian tribes are immune from suit in state courts
even for actions on contracts executed outside of Indian country? (2) Does state
court violate Indian Commerce and Supremacy Clauses by ignoring Supreme Court
decisions to enter money judgments against Indian tribe for unperformed contract
to build roof on building located on land owned by tribe when tribe has not waived
sovereign immunity and contract is not endorsed by secretary of interior?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed April
25, 1997. Judgment vacated June 1, 1998.
*Holding below:
(Okla CtCivApp 2dDiv, 11/5/96) Indian tribe is not
immune from suit in state court by non-Indian contractor for tribe's alleged breach
of contract for construction of roof on building built by tribe on non-trust,
off-reservation property.
Cohen v. Little Six, Inc.
Docket No. 96-1962
Subjects: Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota Prior Lake; Little Six,
Inc.; Sovereign immunity -- Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota Prior Lake; Personal
injuries; Casinos -- Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota Prior Lake.
*Issues: (1) Does Adarand
Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, (1995), limit or overrule Morton
v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974), by requiring strict level of scrutiny for statutory
schemes benefiting Indian tribes and/or tribal businesses as racially
distinct groups? (2) Is operation of for-profit gambling casino
''governmental'' purpose that entitles corporation chartered by
Indian tribe to assert sovereign immunity as defense to tort claims
arising from casino's normal business operations?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed June 9, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
June 1, 1998.
*Holding below: Cohen
v. Little Six, Inc., 543
N.W.2d 376, 8th Cir. Court affirms state court of appeals decision
that sovereign immunity bars lawsuit for personal injury sustained
in casino located on Indian reservation and owned and operated by
corporation created under tribal ordinance, owned and controlled
by federally recognized tribe, and operated for governmental purposes
of raising and distributing revenue for welfare of tribe.
Comenout
v. Wash. Dept. of Community Development
Docket No. 97-1138
Subjects:
Fireworks -- Law and legislation -- Washington (State) -- Application -- On trust
lands; Fireworks -- Sales --
Puyallup (Wash.); Jurisdiction --
Puyallup (Wash.); Jurisdiction -- Washington (State); Fireworks -- Sales -- On
trust lands -- Washington (State).
*Issues:
(1) Does state of Washington have jurisdiction to enforce its fireworks law,
RCW 70.77, on treaty Indians doing business on off-reservation Indian trust land?
(2) Does City of Puyallup have jurisdiction to enforce its municipal fireworks
law on treaty Indian doing business on off-reservation Indian trust land?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed January
5, 1998. Petition for Certiorari denied February 2, 1998.
*Holding
below: (Wash CtApp Div2, 5/9/97) Superior court
has jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting sale of
fireworks without state license and city permit on land held in trust for Indians
outside formal boundaries of established reservation.
Confederated
Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. U.S.
Docket No. 97-449
Subjects:
Constitutional law -- United States; Separation of powers; Governors -- Oregon
-- Rights and responsibilities; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act;
Indian gaming -- Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Reservation, Oregon; Gambling
on Indian reservations -- Oregon.
*Issues: (1) Does federal statute, 25
USC 2719(b)(1)(A), which requires state governor to enact or
administer federal scheme under IGRA to regulate proposed gaming
establishment on newly acquired trust land, violate dual sovereignty
principles articulated in Constitution? (2) Has Congress unconstitutionally
diminished power of executive branch to execute laws of United States
by giving state governors power to veto administrative determination
of federal officer made pursuant to standards established by Congress
in Section 20 of IGRA, 25 USC 2719(b)(1)(A)? (3) Is 25 USC 2719(b)(1)(A),
which requires state governor to concur in secretary of interior's
legislatively established determination that proposed Indian gaming
establishment is in best interest of tribe and is not detrimental
to surrounding community, contingent legislation, and if so, is
Congress' delegation of this federal policy decision to state official
unconstitutional? (4) Is 25 USC 2719(b)(1)(A), which requires state
governor to concur in secretary of interior's determination that
proposed Indian gaming establishment is in best interest of Indian
tribe and its members and is not detrimental to surrounding community,
when no state law authority authorizes governor to make such determination,
exercise of state authority, and if so, is such congressional delegation
unconstitutional?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed September
9, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied December 15, 1997.
*Holding below: Confederated
Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. U.S., 110
F.3d 688, 9th Cir. Neither Appointments Clause nor separation
of powers principles of Constitution are violated by provision of
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
USC 2719(b)(1)(A), that forbids most forms of gaming on land
acquired in trust for Indian tribe after 1988 unless governor of
state concurs in determination by secretary of interior that gaming
is in best interests of tribe and not detrimental to surrounding
community.
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana
Docket No. 96-1984
Subjects: Taxation -- Law and legislation -- Montana;
Mining leases --
Crow Tribe of Montana; Coal -- Sales -- Taxation -- Montana; Sovereignty --
Crow Tribe of Montana.
*Issues: Should doubts be resolved against wrongdoer
and appropriate equitable relief be fashioned to remedy violation of statutory
and sovereign rights of Crow tribe by imposition of Montana's invalid 30 percent
taxes on tribe's coal resources based on courts' finding that illegal taxes ''impair[ed]
the tribe's ability to negotiate leases with Shell Oil and other coal companies''?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed June
13, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied October 6, 1997.
*Holding below: Crow
Tribe of Indians v. State of Mont., 98
F.3d 1194, 9th Cir. District court did not err in rejecting
Indian tribe's claim that high taxes imposed by Montana on sale
and severance of tribe's coal made it impossible for tribe to renegotiate
its 1972 lease with Shell Oil Co., thereby interfering with contract
and allegedly causing tribe to lose its lease with Shell; although
taxes may have impaired tribe's ability to lease its coal, they
were only one factor in failure of lease negotiations with Shell,
and other factors, including tribal repudiation of 1972 lease before
state taxes were imposed and successful 1976 suit by tribe to invalidate
lease on ground that Interior Department had approved it without
making certain findings required by law, were clearly more influential,
and thus district court did not err in refusing to impose constructive
trust on taxes collected by Montana on sales of tribal coal.
Duchesne County,
Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe
Docket No. 97-570
Subjects: Land tenure -- History -- Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, Utah;
Uncompahgre Reservation (Utah)
-- History; Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, Utah -- Boundaries; Diminished Indian reservations -- Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, Utah; Disestablished Indian reservations
-- Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, Utah;
Duchesne County (Utah).
*Issues: (1) Has Hagen
v. Utah been misconstrued to preserve historic reservation boundaries
in Utah that encompass hundreds of thousands of acres of fee lands,
contrary to: (i) 20 years of express representations by parties
and amici in Ute Indian Tribe and Hagen litigation, which conceded
that reservation would consist of only trust lands if public domain
language of acts was implemented, (ii) 35 years of express representations
by parties and amici in all other related litigation, which similarly
conceded that other affected reservation areas would also consist
of only trust lands if reservation areas were, in fact, diminished,
(iii) any practical consideration when respondent tribe has conceded
that implementation will be completely unworkable and unprecedented,
and (iv) any consideration of comity because injunction will be
said to preclude Utah Supreme Court (and parties and all others)
from expressing their views on Hagen, in spite of fact that Utah
Supreme Court was affirmed in Hagen? (2) Has precedential scope
of Hagen v. Utah been improperly restricted on ''finality'' principles
by court of appeals, which summarily precluded any further consideration,
in light of Hagen, of status of original Uncompahgre reservation
and national forest, which were issues in pari materia in Ute Indian
Tribe litigation: (i) when district court expressly stated that
it did ''not reach any question'' regarding status of these areas,
and (ii) when United States specifically conceded that, in its view,
historic Uncompahgre reservation no longer exists (and it is no
longer inhabited by any tribal member), and when injunction precludes
comity considerations?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed September
29, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied February 23, 1998.
*Holding below: Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. State of Utah,
114
F.3d 1513, 10th Cir. Decision in Ute
Indian Tribe v. Utah, 935
F.Supp. 1473 (CA10 (en banc) 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 994 (1986), that Uintah Valley Reservation had been neither
diminished nor disestablished by 1902-1905 allotment legislation,
that 1905 withdrawal of national forest lands did not diminish Uintah
Valley Reservation, and that 1894 and 1897 allotment legislation
did not disestablish Uncompahgre Reservation, is modified, even
though time for rehearing has passed, but only to extent that it
directly conflicts with Hagen
v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399 (1994), which affirmed Utah Supreme Court decision
that opening of unallotted Uintah Valley Reservation lands to settlement
by 1902-1905 allotment legislation diminished Uintah Valley Reservation;
accordingly, lands within original Uintah Valley Reservation boundaries
that were unallotted, opened to non-Indian settlement under 1902-1905
legislation, and not thereafter returned to tribal ownership are,
in light of Hagen, no longer part of reservation, but, contrary
to contention by state and local parties, reservation boundaries
are otherwise unaffected by decision in Hagen even though result
is checkerboard allocation of jurisdiction between tribe and state.
Feezor v. Babbitt
Docket No. 96-1733
Subjects:
United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; Indian gaming -- Shakopee Mdewakanton
Sioux Community of Minnesota; Revenue sharing -- Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux
Community of Minnesota; Tribal membership disputes -- Shakopee Mdewakanton
Sioux Community of Minnesota; Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota
-- Membership; Exclusive jurisdiction -- Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community
of Minnesota; Jurisdiction -- United States; Sovereign immunity -- Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota.
*Issues:
(1) May qualified members of federally recognized Indian tribe, as only persons
intended by Congress to benefit from that tribe's gaming operations, seek declaratory
and injunctive relief in federal court to halt distributions of net gaming revenues
to acknowledged non-members of tribe in violation of IGRA? (2) Does federally
recognized Indian tribe, by engaging in federally regulated gaming activities,
waive its right to claim sovereign immunity from enforcement of IGRA?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed April
28, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied October 6, 1997.
*Holding below:
Smith
v. Babbitt, 100
F.3d 556, 8th Cir. Claim that tribe's distribution of
gaming proceeds violates provision of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
that limits distribution to tribal members would require review
of tribe's membership determinations, which are intra-tribal disputes
within exclusive jurisdiction of tribal authorities, and thus precludes
federal court jurisdiction.
Gayle v. Little Six
Docket No. 96-1215
Subjects:
Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota Prior Lake; Little Six,
Inc.; Sovereign immunity -- Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota Prior Lake; Indian business
enterprises -- Off Indian reservations; Sovereign immunity -- Little Six,
Inc.; Torts; Casinos -- Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota
Prior Lake.
*Issues:
(1) Does defense of tribal sovereign immunity apply to Native American owned
corporation, which is separate and distinct from tribe, when it conducts business
off reservation? (2) Does Native American owned corporation waive tribal sovereign
immunity defense when it appoints agent for service of process and irrevocably
consents to be sued in Minnesota courts for purposes of voluntarily obtaining
certificate of authority to transact business in Minnesota?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed January
29, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied June 1, 1997.
*Holding below: Gavle
v. Little Six, Inc., 555
N.W.2d 284, 8th Cir. Tribal business entity, organized for general
benefit of federally recognized Indian tribe and closely linked
to tribe's governing structure, is entitled to sovereign immunity
from civil action in state court, and thus sovereign immunity bars
state court action by former employee, alleging tortious conduct
both within and outside of Indian country, against tribal business
entity that is incorporated under tribal ordinance, has issued one
share of stock owned by all voting members of tribe, and is registered
with state as foreign corporation transacting for-profit business
within state; tribal entity's registration with state as foreign
corporation and its attendant irrevocable consent to service of
process did not waive its sovereign immunity.
Hale v. Secakuku
Docket No. 97-1022
Subjects:
Joint-use land -- Hopi Tribe of Arizona; Joint-use land -- Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Grazing; Damages -- Hopi Tribe of Arizona; United States. Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974; Evidence, Expert.
*Issues: (1) Should this court resolve circuit conflict
as to whether standards governing admissibility of expert testimony
set forth in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. are applicable to all expert
testimony and not just expert testimony based upon ''novel scientific
theory''? (2) Under 1974 Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act, does federal
government's liability for damages to Hopi Partitioned Land depend
on whether or not government's failure to perform its legal duty
to protect HPL was unreasonable? (3) Under 1974 Navajo-Hopi Settlement
Act, should Navajo Nation be liable to Hopi Tribe for monetary damages
to lands in absence of any proof that Hopi suffered any monetary
loss?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed December 16, 1997. Petition for Certiorari
denied February 23, 1998.
*Holding below: Masayesva
v. Hale, 118
F.3d 1371, 9th Cir. In suit under 1974 Navajo-Hopi Settlement
Act to adjudicate Hopi claims of Navajo overgrazing of joint use
area of reservation, district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting expert testimony of professor of range economics whose
appraisal of fair value of Navajo grazing derived from his relatively
straightforward application of range economics, rather than from
novel scientific theory, and thus did not contravene test for expert
scientific testimony of Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993); United States' liability under 1974 Act for
damages to land if it fails ''to provide protection where such protection
is or was required by law or by the demands of the trust relationship,''
25
USC 640d-5(d), should be measured by reasonableness standard
derived from government's trust obligations, which require that
it take those protective measures that reasonable or prudent trustee
would take, and thus district court's finding that damage to Hopi
land was not shown to have been caused by unreasonable government
action or inaction, precluding government liability, is affirmed;
Hopi were entitled to recover damages for lost grazing opportunity
on land that could have been used for grazing but was left fallow
to accelerate restoration process.
Kawerak
Reindeer Herders Ass'n Inc . v. Williams
Docket No. 97-1280
Subjects: United States. Reindeer Industry Act of
1937; Reindeer industry -- Alaska -- Federal supervision; Equality before the
law; Due process of law; United States. Constitution. 5th Amendment; Constitutional
law.
*Issues: (1) In light of Adarand
Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995), does rational basis standard of review adopted
in Morton
v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974), continue to apply to constitutional equal protection
challenges to congressional enactments singling out Native Americans
for special treatment? (2) If so, is application of Mancari standard
of equal protection review of Indian classifications restricted
to those addressing ''uniquely Indian interests''? (3) Is Reindeer
Industry Act, as construed by secretary of interior to prohibit
non-natives from competing in industry, constitutional under equal
protection component of Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed February
5, 1998. Petition for Certiorari denied May 18, 1998.
*Holding below: Williams
v. Babbitt, 115
F.3d 657, 9th Cir. Although Interior Board of Indian Appeals'
interpretation of 1937 Reindeer Act to prohibit entry of reindeer
industry in Alaska by persons who are not Alaska Natives raises
grave constitutional questions that implicate entire title of U.S.
Code, it is unnecessary to resolve them in light of interpretation
of Reindeer Act, adopted herein, as not precluding non-natives from
owning, importing, or selling reindeer in Alaska.
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
v. Aircraft Equipment Co.
Docket No. 97-216
Subjects: Promissory notes; Business enterprises
-- Off Indian reservations -- Oklahoma; Sovereign immunity -- Kiowa Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma; Jurisdiction -- Oklahoma; Debtor and creditor -- Oklahoma;
Tribal self-determination -- Kiowa Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma.
*Issues:
(1) Does seizure of federally recognized Indian tribe's tribal revenue by
use of state court post-judgment remedies: (a) violate tribe's sovereign immunity,
or (b) infringe upon tribe's right to self-government and Congress' goal of tribal
self-determination? (2) Does state court injunction that prohibits federally recognized
Indian tribe from enforcing its tribal tax laws on Indian country under tribe's
jurisdiction: (a) violate tribe's sovereign immunity, or (b) infringe upon tribe's
right to self-government and Congress' goal of tribal self-determination?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed July
30, 1997. Judgement vacated June 1, 1998.
*Holding below: Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 939
P.2d 1143, 10th Cir. Doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does
not bar enforcement, via creditor's bill directed against tribe's
tax collector and taxpayers, of non-Indian contractor's state court
judgment against Indian tribe that ventured outside Indian country,
engaged in commercial activity for economic gain, and created contract
controversy that was ultimately settled in state court of competent
jurisdiction by money judgment sought to be enforced.
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
v. Cass County, Minn.
Docket
No. 97-235
Subjects: United States. General Allotment Act
(1887); Real property tax -- Minnesota; Real property tax -- Cass County (Minn.);
Real property -- Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians; Indian land transfers
-- Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians; Ad valorem tax -- Minnesota; Ad valorem
tax -- Cass County (Minn.).
*Issues:
Was inherent tax immunity of tribal governments extinguished with unmistakable
clarity by provisions in 1887 General Allotment Act permitting land to be patented
in fee to individual Indians?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed August 7, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
November 3, 1997.
*Holding below: Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, Minn., 108
F.3d 820, 8th Cir. Section 3 of 1889 Nelson Act, which allotted
certain land on reservation by incorporating mechanisms of 1887
General Allotment Act at issue in Yakima
County v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502
U.S. 251 (1992), evinced unmistakably clear intent required
by Yakima to allow state ad valorem taxes on lands patented in fee
after enactment of Burke Act proviso in 1906 (which amended GAA
to make clear that allottees would be subject to state law only
after expiration of trust period and issuance of patent in fee simple),
but not if patented before 1906, and thus Section 3 land that was
patented after 1906 and later reacquired by tribe is taxable.
Lower
Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota
Docket No. 96-1928
Subjects: Hunting -- On Indian reservations -- Lower
Brule Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule Reservation, South Dakota -- State supervision
-- South Dakota; Fishing -- On Indian reservations -- Lower Brule Sioux Tribe
of the Lower Brule Reservation, South Dakota -- State supervision -- South
Dakota; Sovereignty -- Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule Reservation,
South Dakota; Hunting rights -- Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule
Reservation, South Dakota; Fishing rights -- Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of the
Lower Brule Reservation, South Dakota; Exclusive jurisdiction -- South Dakota;
Law -- South Dakota -- Application -- On Indian reservations -- Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe of the Lower Brule Reservation, South Dakota.
*Issues: (1) Should certiorari be granted
to determine whether Congress may empower South Dakota to exercise
independent jurisdiction over recreational activities within taken
areas, including its jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-members?
(2) Should certiorari be granted to clarify Montana
v. U.S., 450
U.S. 544 (1981), exceptions that are to be applied to activities
of general public within taken areas within Lower Brule Sioux Reservation
that has not been opened under homestead laws? (3) Should certiorari
be granted to clarify effects on jurisdiction of tribe when allotted
Indian sells his or her lands to non-Indian or non-member Indian
within exterior boundaries of reservation? (4) Should certiorari
be granted to clarify circumstances when summary judgment is appropriate
for Indian jurisdiction cases that must be decided by making particularized
inquiries into numerous and complex facts?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed June 3, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
October 6, 1997.
*Holding below: Lower
Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of S.D., 104
F.3d 1017, 8th Cir. Indian tribe lacked inherent sovereignty
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on non-member-owned
fee lands because state's regulation of that conduct did not threaten
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of
tribe, given relatively insignificant revenue from licensing and
lack of evidence that significant number of tribal members depend
on wild game for sustenance; Congress, in 1944 Flood Control Act
and two statutes taking land in reservation, gave Army Corps of
Engineers regulatory control over taken areas, but did not preempt
state law, expressly barring in 16
USC 460d any use of taken land ''inconsistent with the laws
for the protection of fish and game of the State in which such area
is situated,'' and thus South Dakota has exclusive regulatory jurisdiction
over activities at issue.
Murdock v. U.S.
Docket No. 97-1575
Subjects: United States. Ute Partition
and Termination Act; Ex members -- Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, Utah -- Mixed descent; Hunting rights -- Ex members
-- Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, Utah;
Fishing rights -- Ex members -- Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, Utah; Equality before the law.
*Issues: In contravention of this court's
precedent and in conflict with another circuit court of appeals,
did Tenth Circuit err in holding that ''Indian termination legislation,''
now largely repealed, may nevertheless be read to dismember Indian
tribe and deprive tribal descendants of ancestral treaty rights
in violation of their rights of association and equal protection?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed
March 23, 1998. Vacated June 15, 1998.
*Holding below: U.S.
v. Von Murdock, 132
F.3d 534, 10th Cir. Ute Termination Act specifically ended tribal
membership of mixed-bloods once they received their share of tribal
assets, and also recognized tribe's right thereafter to determine
new members; act's distinction between full-bloods and mixed-bloods
is not improper racial classification and does not violate due process
or equal protection under Fifth Amendment; nor does act violate
First Amendment by preventing defendant, child of mixed-blood Utes
accused of unlawfully hunting on tribal land, from expressing his
right to identify with tribe and to vote in tribal elections; accordingly,
defendant, whose parents, mixed-blood Utes, were not members of
tribe when he was born in 1968 and who has not subsequently met
tribe's requirements for membership, did not inherit tribal right
of user in Ute tribe's hunting and fishing rights; nor is defendant's
contention that he enjoys such rights by virtue of membership in
Uintah Band, which joined other bands to form Ute tribe, persuasive,
inasmuch as Uintah Band ceased to exist separately outside Ute Tribe
in 1937, after which jurisdiction over what was formerly Uintah
Band's territory was to be exercised by Ute Tribe and rights formerly
vested in Uintah Band were to be defined by Ute constitution and
exercised by Ute Tribe; even if Uintah Band continues to maintain
its own identity, it does so, under Ute constitution, only within
context of Ute tribe; district court's denial of defendant's motion
to dismiss charge against him alleging violation of 18
USC 1165, which bans hunting on land belonging to Indian tribe
without lawful authority or permission, is therefore affirmed.
Patch
v. U.S.
Docket No. 97-684
Subjects: Jurisdiction -- Arizona -- On Indian reservations
-- Colorado River Indian Tribes of the Colorado River Indian Reservation, Arizona
and California; Traffic violations -- On Indian reservations -- Colorado River
Indian Tribes of the Colorado River Indian Reservation, Arizona and California.
*Issues: (1) Did court of
appeals err in finding that state law enforcement officers have law enforcement
authority over Native American members of Indian reservation for traffic violations
occurring exclusively within that reservation? (2) Did court of appeals err in
denying de novo review of suppression motion and in summarily affirming lower
court's disposition premised on state law enforcement officers' authority to detain
or arrest Native American member of Indian reservation for traffic offense occurring
on that reservation while said member stood in doorway of his residence on his
reservation? (3) Did court of appeals err in summarily affirming assault conviction
notwithstanding defendant's uncontested good-faith mistake defense that his actions
were based on his belief that state law enforcement officer had no authority to
detain or arrest him?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed August 25, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
November 17, 1997.
*Holding below: U.S.
v. Patch, 114
F.3d 131, 9th Cir. Rationale of Terry
v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), justified attempted stop of motorist whom officer
observed commit traffic violation, in order to determine whether
motorist was non-member of Indian tribe, in which case officer would
have jurisdiction over him; doctrine of hot pursuit justified officer
in following motorist from highway, where officer had jurisdiction,
to house located on Indian reservation, where officer had no jurisdiction;
officer was performing his lawful duties and was not trespasser
on porch of house as he continued his pursuit of motorist whom he
had not yet identified, and, therefore, federal conviction of motorist,
who is member of Indian tribe, of assaulting officer during confrontation
on porch of defendant's home is affirmed.
Penobscot
Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine
Docket No. 97-219
Subjects: United States. Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act; Fee simple -- Penobscot Tribe of Maine; Trust lands.
*Issues: Should 25
USC 81, enacted for benefit of Indian tribes in 1872, be judicially
construed to reflect modern trends and practices and, thus, to limit
words ''Indian lands'' to mean only ''Indian trust lands'' and not
lands held by Indians in fee simple for investment purposes?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed August 4, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
October 14, 1997.
*Holding below: Penobscot
Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112
F.3d 538, 1st Cir. Agreement made by Indian tribe concerning
land that it owns in fee simple for investment purposes is not agreement
''relative to [Indian] lands'' that must be approved by secretary
of interior pursuant to 25
USC 81.
Prescott Convention Center, Inc. v. Scott
Docket No. 97-788
Subjects: Taxation -- Arizona; Law -- Arizona --
Application -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation, Arizona;
Hotels -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation, Arizona; Tribal
business enterprises -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation,
Arizona. Sovereignty -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation,
Arizona; Economic development -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation,
Arizona.
*Issues:
(1) Can Arizona tax operations of hotel that is owned and regulated by Indian
tribe and that was specifically designed and federally funded to promote tribe's
economic development? (2) In assessing whether federal law preempts state's attempt
to tax tribally owned hotel, do separation-of-powers concerns allow federal court
to second-guess executive branch's determination that hotel advances significant
federal and tribal interests? (3) When Indian tribe's use of non-Indian assistance
is federally required and advances federal and tribal interests, does that involvement
nonetheless diminish federal and tribal interests to be considered in determining
whether state can tax project?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed November 10, 1997. Petition for Certiorari
denied January 20, 1998.
*Holding below: Yavapai-Prescott
Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117
F.3d 1107, 9th Cir. State taxation of room rentals and food
and beverage sales to non-Indians by non-Indian lessee of hotel
that is owned by tribe, located on reservation, and leased to non-Indian
party with tribe having residual interest in lease is not preempted,
because tribal and federal interest in hotel's operation is outweighed
by state interest, inasmuch as no tribal member is employed by hotel
(although hotel agreed to prefer tribal members in hiring), bulk
of construction costs came from non-tribal and non-federal sources,
tribal contribution to quality of food served at hotel is minimal
(two or three inspections annually), hotel guarantees tribe only
114 percent of its gross revenue (and record does not reveal what
tribe has received in terms of 20 percent of net revenue to which
it is entitled), tribe has no active role in business of hotel (although
it operates slot machines and automated poker games on premises),
and hotel is subject to state's criminal, labor, and lien laws.
Pueblo
of Santa Ana v. Kelly
Docket
No. 97-1617
Subjects: United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act; Intergovernmental agreements -- New Mexico; Intergovernmental agreements -- Pueblo
of Santa Ana, New Mexico; Indian gaming -- Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico; Gambling on Indian reservations
-- New Mexico; Governors -- New Mexico -- Powers and duties.
*Issues:
(1) Under IGRA, may post hoc challenge to validity of state's agreement to approved
tribal-state gaming compact be adjudicated directly in courts, or must it first
be made to secretary of interior? (2) Under IGRA, may tribal-state compact that
has been approved by secretary of interior and that is in effect be judicially
invalidated on basis of subsequent court determination that there was state law
defect in state's agreement to compact?
History:
Petition for Certiorari filed April 10, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied
October 6, 1997.
*Holding below: Pueblo
of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104
F.3d 1546, 10th Cir. Tribal-state compacts permitting reservation
gambling, void from their inception because governor who signed
them lacked authority under state law to do so, cannot be rendered
valid by their subsequent approval by secretary of interior through
process outlined in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
South Dakota v. U.S.
Docket No. 97-276
Subjects:
Motor vehicles -- Sales -- Taxation -- South Dakota; Law -- South Dakota -- Application
-- Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of the Cheyenne River Reservation, South Dakota
-- Members; Jurisdiction -- South Dakota; Excise tax -- South Dakota.
*Issues: May South
Dakota's one-time 3 percent excise tax imposed in lieu of sales and use taxes
upon motor vehicles ''purchased or acquired for use'' within state, and which
is virtually identical to taxes imposed upon sale of motor vehicles in other states,
be applied to Cheyenne River Sioux tribal members residing on their reservation
who purchase motor vehicles outside their reservation but within South Dakota?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed August
11, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied November 17, 1997.
*Holding below: U.S.
on Behalf of Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. State of S.D., 105
F.3d 1552, 8th Cir. South Dakota's excise tax on value of any
motor vehicle purchased or acquired for use in state and required
to be registered there, which is collected only when vehicle is
first licensed in state, operates essentially as tax on ownership
of motor vehicle, which is sort of on-reservation activity that
state may not tax without express congressional authorization, rather
than as tax on off-reservation sales transaction, and thus state
lacks jurisdiction to impose excise tax on tribal members residing
on reservation.
Wilson v. Marchington
Docket No. 97-1348
Subjects: Traffic accidents -- On Indian reservations
-- Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana; Law -- Blackfeet
Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana -- Application -- Non-members
of a tribe; Jurisdiction -- Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation
of Montana.
*Issues: (1) If non-Indians have interest in highway
on reservation, should tribal interest in protecting its members
be sufficient to exercise civil jurisdiction? (2) Did Blackfeet
Tribal Court have jurisdiction over this case involving motor vehicle
collision that occurred on Indian reservation between tribal member
and non-tribal member? (3) Did Ninth Circuit err in applying holding
of Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, based on presumptions that facts of two cases
are similar?
History: Petition for certiorari filed February
17, 1998. Petition for certiorari denied April 20, 1998.
*Holding below: Wilson
v. Marchington, 127
F.3d 805, 9th Cir. Principles of comity, not full faith and
credit, govern whether federal district court should recognize and
enforce tribal court judgments, and require federal court to refuse
to recognize tribal court judgment in tribal member's suit against
non-Indian over traffic accident on state highway, within reservation,
over which tribe lacked jurisdiction under rule announced in Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (US SupCt 1997).
Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott
Docket No. 97-796
Subjects: Taxation -- Arizona; Law -- Arizona --
Application -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation, Arizona;
Hotels -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation, Arizona; Tribal
business enterprises -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation,
Arizona. Sovereignty -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation,
Arizona; Economic development -- Yavapai-Prescott Tribe of the Yavapai Reservation,
Arizona.
*Issues:
(1) Are state's attempts to tax operation of tribally owned hotel on Indian
reservation discriminatory--and therefore preempted--especially when state refuses
to provide hotel basic government services it provides to off-reservation entities,
and when tribe provides those services at its own expense? (2) Does tribal economic
development project that combines Indian and non-Indian capital to attract customers
to hotel on reservation represent sovereignty interest of tribal government that
furthers federal policy and preempts state taxation?
History: Petition for Certiorari filed November
10, 1997. Petition for Certiorari denied January 20, 1998.
*Holding below: Yavapai-Prescott
Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117
F.3d 1107, 9th Cir. State taxation of room rentals and food
and beverage sales to non-Indians by non-Indian lessee of hotel
that is owned by tribe, located on reservation, and leased to non-Indian
party with tribe having residual interest in lease is not preempted,
because tribal and federal interest in hotel's operation is outweighed
by state interest, inasmuch as no tribal member is employed by hotel
(although hotel agreed to prefer tribal members in hiring), bulk
of construction costs came from non-tribal and non-federal sources,
tribal contribution to quality of food served at hotel is minimal
(two or three inspections annually), hotel guarantees tribe only
114 percent of its gross revenue (and record does not reveal what
tribe has received in terms of 20 percent of net revenue to which
it is entitled), tribe has no active role in business of hotel (although
it operates slot machines and automated poker games on premises),
and hotel is subject to state's criminal, labor, and lien laws.
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