2006-07 Term
Supreme Court Cases Related to Indian Law
Three Indian law-related cases were granted.
Petition for certiorari was denied in 25 Indian law-related cases.
Two cases were dismissed.
Cert Granted
Subjects: Zuni (N.M.). School District;
Gallup-McKinley County Schools; Zuni Tribe of the Zuni Reservation,
New Mexico; New Mexico; Government aid to education -- United States;
Zuni Public School District 89; Gallup-McKinley County Public School
District No. 1; Educational equalization -- New Mexico; Schools
-- Finance -- New Mexico; Impact aid -- New Mexico; United States.
Dept. of Education -- Officials and employees -- Powers and duties.
*Issues: (1) Does secretary of education
have authority to create and impose his equalization formula under
federal impact aid program over one prescribed by Congress and
through this process certify New Mexico's operational funding for
fiscal year 1999-2000 as "equalized," thereby diverting
impact aid subsidies to state? (2) Is this one of rare cases in
which this court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to
correct plain error that affects all state school districts that
educate federally connected children?
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 5/24/2006. Petition was granted on 9/26/06. Argument was
heard on 1/10/07. Decided 4/17/07.
*Holding below: Zuni
Public School District No. 89. v. United States Department of
Education, (en banc 437
F.3d 1289, en banc or 393
F.3d 1158 for previous), 10th Cir. Equally divided court
affirms secretary of education's decision that State of New Mexico's
funding for its public schools was "equalized" for
year in question under 20
U.S.C. § 7709(b) and corresponding regulations at 34
C.F.R. § 222.162(a), thereby permitting state to offset
its contributions to local school districts by at least part
of federal grants to those districts under federal impact aid
program.
Related News Stories: Funding
challenge: School districts lose case (NewMexican)
4/19/07. Supreme Court rejects school districts' suit. (4KOBTV)
4/17/07. Statement
about case from Tribal Education Departments National Assembly
Subjects: United States. Environmental
Protection Agency -- Powers and duties; Massachusetts; United States.
Clean Air Act; Automobiles -- Motors -- Exhaust gas.
*Issues: (1) May EPA administrator decline
to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy
considerations not enumerated in Section 202(a)(1)? (2) Does EPA
administrator have authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other
air pollutants associated with climate change under Section 202(a)(1)?
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 3/02/2006. Petition was granted on 6/26/06. Argument was
heard on 11/29/06. Decided 4/02/07.
*Holding below: Massachusetts
v. EPA, D.C. Circuit, 415
F.3d 50 Under Section 202(a)(1) of Clean Air Act, which directs
Environmental Protection Agency administrator to regulate emissions
that "in his judgment" "may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare," administrator properly
exercised his discretion in denying petition by several states
calling for rulemaking to regulate carbon dioxide and three other
greenhouse gas emissions--methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons--from
new motor vehicles.
Related News Stories: High
Court faults EPA inaction on emissions (Washington
Post) 4/3/07.
Subjects: Oil and gas leases -- Payment;
Oil and gas leases -- Law and legislation -- United States; United
States. Dept. of the Interior; Amoco Production Company; Coalbed
methane; United States. Administrative Procedure Act; Limitation
of actions.
*Issues: Does limitations
period in 28
U.S.C. § 2415(a) apply to federal agency
orders requiring payment of money claimed under
lease or other agreement?
Holding: (from USLW) Administrative
payment orders issued by the Interior Department's
Minerals Management Service assessing royalty underpayments
on oil and gas leases are not covered by the general
six-year statute of limitations for government contract
actions set out in 28
U.S.C. § 2415(a).
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 11/22/2005. Petition was granted on 4/17/06. Argument was heard
on 10/4/06. Decided 12/11/06.
*Holding below: Amoco
Production Co. v. Watson, D.C. Cir., 410
F.3d 722, D.C. Cir. Department of Interior reasonably interpreted
Mineral Leasing Act and its own regulations when it adopted rules
for valuation, for royalty computation purposes, of natural gas
extracted by lessees from government property that obligate lessees
to put gas in "marketable condition at no cost to" government
by, inter alia, removing impurities from gas, including removal
of excess carbon dioxide from coalbed methane gas, thereby forbidding
producers who remove excess carbon dioxide from deducting cost of
doing so from gross proceeds on which royalties are based, and requiring
producers selling untreated methane at lower price to add to their
gross proceeds costs incurred by purchasers of methane at wellhead
in removing excess carbon dioxide after transporting it to treatment
plant; government agency's administrative compliance order demanding
additional royalties owed under Mineral Leasing Act and its regulations,
defiance of which incurs notice of noncompliance and subsequent
civil penalties, is not "action for money damages" initiated
by filing "complaint," and thus limitations period of
28
U.S.C. § 2415(a) is inapplicable.
Back to Top
Cert Denied
LeBeau v. United States
Docket
No. 06-1427
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: United States. Mississippi
Sioux Tribes Judgment Fund Distribution Act of 1998; Judgments;
United States. "Little" Tucker Act; Breach of trust --
United States.
*Issues:(1) Does General
Savings Statute, 1
U.S.C. § 109, permit circuit court to affirm
liability under federal statute but deny damages
based upon subsequent amendment of liability statute?
(2) May circuit court refuse to apply General Savings
Statute and prior opinions of this court when refusal
denies breach of trust damages to class of Native
Americans?
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 4/24/2007. Petition was denied on 6/25/07.
*Holding below: LeBeau
v. United States 474
F.3d 1334, Although government breached trust responsibility,
created in 1972 Distribution Act, between United States and lineal
descendants of Indian tribe who were eligible to share in Mississippi
Sioux Tribes Judgment Fund by unreasonably delaying partial distribution
in 1982, and full distribution in 1987, of lineal descendants'
share of judgment fund, plaintiff lineal descendants are not
entitled to recover damages for this breach because Congress,
acting within its proper authority before any distribution to
lineal descendants occurred, reallocated lineal descendants'
share of fund when it enacted 1998 Mississippi Sioux Tribes Judgment
Fund Distribution Act, and thereby extinguished government liability
for its breach of trust; although each lineal descendant had
right to timely distribution of per capita share of judgment
fund, such right was not vested and was always subject to modification
by Congress until distribution of shares occurred.
Murphy v. Oklahoma
Docket
No. 05-10787
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Criminal jurisdiction -- Oklahoma;
Servitudes -- Defined -- Indian Country (Okla.); Indian Country
(Okla.) -- Defined; Indian allotments -- Oklahoma; Muscogee (Creek)
Nation, Oklahoma -- Boundaries; Offenders with mental disabilities
-- Oklahoma.
*Issues: not available from USLW
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 5/03/2006. Petition was denied on 6/4/07.
*Holding below: Murphy
v. State of Oklahoma , 124
P.3d 1198, Corut of Criminal Appeals, Oklahoma. (from
Westlaw) The Court of Criminal Appeals, Lumpkin, V.P.J.,
held that:
(1) state's interest in road where murder occurred on land allotted
to Indian was an easement or right-of-way, not fee simple, for
purposes of determining whether the murder occurred in Indian country
and state had criminal jurisdiction;
(2) as a matter of first impression, one-twelfth interest that
Indian citizen owned in mineral estate did not qualify the property
as an Indian allotment;
(3) the road was not shown to be part of a Creek Nation reservation
or a dependent Indian community; and
(4) defendant provided sufficient evidence to raise a fact question
on mental retardation claim.
Application granted in part and denied in part; case remanded.
Questions answered.
Davidson v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority
Docket
No. 06-9344
Subjects: Employees, Dismissal of --
Mohegan Indian Tribe of Connecticut; Sovereign immunity -- Mohegan
Indian Tribe of Connecticut; Indian gaming -- Mohegan Indian Tribe
of Connecticut; Mohegan Indian Tribe of Connecticut. Mohegan Discriminatory
Employment Practices Ordinance; Jurisdiction -- New Haven (Conn.).
*Issues: not yet available
from USLW
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 2/03/2007. Petition was denied on 4/16/07.
*Holding below: (from Westlaw) Davidson
v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, 903
A.2d 228, Apellate Court of CT. The Appellate Court held
that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over action.
Affirmed.
Cobell v. Kampthorne
Docket
No. 06-868
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Individual Indian monies (IIM)
accounts; United States. Dept. of the Interior; United States. Dept.
of the Treasury; Trusts and trustees -- Accounting; Fiduciary accountability
-- United States. Dept. of the Interior.
*Issues: Did court
of appeals err in holding--in conflict with Liteky v. United States
and decisions of other circuits--that it could order district judge
recused and case reassigned under 28
U.S.C. §§ 455(a) and 2106 based on its reversal of
some of district judge's rulings in this case?
History: Petitions for certiorari was
filed on 12/19/2006. Petitions were denied on 3/26/07.
*Holding below: Cobell
v. Kempthorne, 455
F.3d 317. DC Cir. Eight reversals of district court's rulings
in nearly decade-old Indian land trust litigation, when combined
with district judge's issuing of orders without hearings, participating
in evidence-gathering, and leveling of serious charges against defendant
Department of Interior and its officials that not only are unrelated
to issue before court but go beyond criticizing Interior Department
for its serious failures as trustee and condemn department as institution,
warrant reassignment of case to another judge on ground that current
judge's hostility to department is so extreme as to display clear
inability to render fair judgment within meaning of Liteky
v. United States, 510
U.S. 540 (1994).
Cobell v. Kampthorne
Docket
No. 06-867
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Individual Indian monies (IIM)
accounts; United States. Dept. of the Interior; United States. Dept.
of the Treasury; Trusts and trustees -- Accounting; Fiduciary accountability
-- United States. Dept. of the Interior.
*Issues: (1) Did
court of appeals, contrary to principles recently reaffirmed in
Purcell
v. Gonzalez, 127
S.Ct. 5 (U.S. 2006), fail properly to accord deference to factual
findings made by district court in granting petitioners' motion
for injunctive relief? (2) Did court of appeals err when it held
that injunction should issue only when movant "would necessarily
suffer harm" without injunction, when this court and other
circuits have required movant to show only likelihood that harm
would result in absence of injunction? (3) Did court of appeals
err in holding, contrary to decisions of this court and other circuits,
that district court was required to defer to respondents' decisions
with respect to if, how, and when to comply with their unconditional
fiduciary obligations?
History: Petitions for certiorari was
filed on 12/19/2006. Petitions were denied on 3/26/07.
*Holding below: District court abused
its discretion when it ordered injunctive relief requiring Department
of Interior to disconnect many of its computer systems from Internet
and internal computer networks to protect integrity of individual
Indian trust data residing on Interior's computers, given Native
American plaintiffs' failure to show that they would necessarily
suffer harm without injunction, district court's seeming disregard
of harm injunction would cause to Interior Department and those
relying on its services, and district court's failure to explain
how extensive hobbling of Interior Department's information technology
system would further public interest.
Jones v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
Docket
No. 06-966
Subjects: Standing
to sue; United States. Constitution.
11th Amendment; Sovereignty
-- Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community of the Salt
River Reservation, Arizona.
*Issues: (1) Are federally
recognized tribes sovereign? (2) Can elected officials be held accountable
for enacting unconstitutional legislation? (3) Do service of complaint
by registered mail and service of summons by certified mail satisfy
constitutional protections?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 1/9/2007. Petition was denied on 3/19/07.
*Holding below: Jones
v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, 9th. Cir. Court
of Appeals (unpublished). District court properly dismissed former
tribal employee's complaint against various federal defendants for
lack of standing, against state defendants because his claims are
barred by 11th Amendment, and against tribal defendants because
he failed to serve complaint and summons in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P.
4.
New Mexico v. Del E. Romero
Docket
No. 06-765
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Assault and battery -- New
Mexico; Taos (N.M.); Indian Country (New Mexico) -- Defined; Jurisdiction
-- New Mexico; Tribal members -- Pueblo of Taos, New Mexico; Jurisdiction
-- New Mexico.
*Issues:(1) Did New Mexico Supreme Court
misinterpret and misapply exclusive federal definition of dependent
Indian community in 18
U.S.C. § 1151(b) and interpreted
in unanimous opinion, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 522
U.S. 520 (1998), for purposes of determining federal
criminal jurisdiction, when New Mexico Supreme Court concluded:
(a) alleged crimes committed by Indian on private, fee simple lands
within original exterior boundaries of Pueblo land grant in which
all Indian and United States title had been extinguished pursuant
to 1924 Pueblo Lands Act satisfied federal set-aside requirement
of land for use and enjoyment of Indian community; and, (b) federal
superintendence requirement of Venetie was satisfied because
alleged crimes occurred on lands located within original exterior
boundaries of Pueblo land grant even though no evidence of federal
superintendence over lands was established? (2) Did New Mexico
Supreme Court create intolerable jurisdictional quagmire when no
federal or state criminal jurisdiction may be invoked because certain
lands within original exterior boundaries of Pueblo land grant
are effectively prosecution-free zones?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 11/28/2006. Petition was denied on 3/5/07.
*Holding below: New
Mexico v. Romero, 140
N.M. 299, NM Supreme Court. Privately owned lands
within exterior boundaries of Indian pueblos are "dependent
Indian communities," and are thus Indian country, within meaning
of 18
U.S.C. § 1151(b), and therefore state does not have
jurisdiction to prosecute alleged crimes that occurred there.
Related News Stories: State
denied jurisdiction in Indian Country (Free
New Mexican) 3/5/07
In re Jones
Docket
No. 06-810
Subjects: United States. Constitution;
Employees, Dismissal of -- Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community of the Salt River
Reservation, Arizona; United States. Indian Citizenship Act; United States. Indian Reorganization Act; United States. Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) -- Workload.
*Issues: Do internal integrity and national
security of U.S. Constitution, United States, and states of union
take precedence over Ninth Circuit's workload?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 12/28/2006. Petition denied on 2/20/07.
*Holding below: (unpublished,
D. Ariz.) Action by employee who lost his job with Indian tribe,
against members of U.S. House and Senate representing Arizona, state
of Arizona, and governor of Arizona, alleging violation of employee's
constitutional rights, in manner not ascertainable from complaint
but apparently due to effect of certain laws, including Indian Citizenship
Act and Indian Reorganization Act, allegedly enacted by House and
Senate defendants, is dismissed for lack of standing and on basis
of speech or debate clause, absolute immunity, and sovereign immunity;
employee's motion for summary judgment against defendant Indian
tribe and certain tribal members is denied because no such defendant
was properly served with complaint.
DuMarce v. Kempthorne
Docket
No. 06-908
Subjects: Trusts and trustees -- United
States; United States. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Act of 1984; Conveyancing
-- Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation, South Dakota -- Members; United States. Little Tucker Act.
*Issues: (1) Does government acting as
trustee to protect Indian lands from improvident disposition have
fiduciary duties equivalent to those of other trustees as imposed
by common law? (2) Does consolidation of cases permit appellate
court to bind appellee to disposition of appeal when appellant failed
to appeal decision as to that appellee and failed to raise appealed
argument in appellee's action at district court level?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 12/28/2006. Petition denied on 2/20/07.
*Holding below: DuMarce
v. Scarlett, 446
F.3d 1294, Fed. Cir. Claim that provision of 1984 Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Act, barring tribal members' conveyance of small tracts of
land by devise or intestacy, effected taking of Indian land without
just compensation is barred by six-year statute of limitations of
Little Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2401(a), claim having been filed 14 years after
its accrual; although district court's denial of government's motion
for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds was rendered
prior to consolidation of one plaintiff's case with that of her
sister, district court's decision pertains not only to plaintiff
but, following consolidation, to her sister as well; United States
fulfilled its fiduciary duty to tribal member when, upon 1987 death
of her father, it informed her that, under Section 5 of 1984 Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Act, her father's land would escheat to tribe because it was
less than two and one-half acres, and government's failure to inform
tribal member of potential cause of action for Fifth Amendment taking
did not breach its fiduciary duty.
Allen v. Gold County Casino
Docket
No. 06-8562
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Employees, Dismissal of --
Gold Country Casino (Calif.); Sovereign immunity -- Berry Creek
Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California; Sovereign immunity --
Gold Country Casino (Calif.); Government agencies -- Tribes -- Defined.
*Issues: not yet available
from USLW
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 12/22/2006. Petition was denied on 2/20/07.
*Holding below: (from Westlaw)
Allen
v. Gold Country Casino,
464
F.3d 1044, 9th Cir. The Court of Appeals, Canby, Circuit Judge,
held that:
(1) casino acted as arm of tribe, and thus was entitled to tribal
sovereign immunity, and (2) casino did not waive tribal sovereign
immunity. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Burgess v. Watters
Docket
No. 06-8943
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Sex offenders -- Members --
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of the Lac
du Flambeau Reservation of Wisconsin; Criminal actions arising on
Indian reservations -- Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians of the Lac du Flambeau Reservation of Wisconsin; United
States. Public Law 280; Habeas corpus; Jurisdiction -- Wisconsin.
*Issues: not yet available
from USLW
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 1/17/2007. Petition was denied on 2/20/07.
*Holding below: (from Westlaw)
Burgess
v. Watters, 467
F.3d 676, 9th Cir. The Court of Appeals, Wood, Circuit Judge,
held that Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly
established federal law in determining that State had power to involuntarily
commit enrolled member of Indian tribe as sexually violent person
under civil jurisdiction conferred by Congress on States. Affirmed.
Subjects:
Farms -- On Indian reservations -- Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico;
Sovereign immunity -- Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico -- Officials
and employees; Leases -- Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico;
Race discrimination -- Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico.
*Issues: Did Tenth Circuit properly dismiss
Pueblo of Santa Ana based on tribal sovereign immunity?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 11/21/2006. Petition denied on 1/16/07.
*Holding below: Burrell
v. Armijo, 456
F.3d 1159, 10th Cir. Indian tribe is entitled to sovereign immunity
from suit by non-Indian lessees of tribal farmland who sued both
tribe and individual tribal officials who allegedly ran lessees
off their farm, stole their crops, terminated their lease, and discriminated
against them on account of their race; accepting allegations in
complaint as true, lessees have sufficiently pled that individual
tribal officials acted outside their official authority and thus
such officials are not entitled to sovereign immunity from lessees'
claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985.
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe
Docket
No. 06-333
Subjects: Water rights -- San Carlos
Apache Tribe of the San Carlos Reservation, Arizona; Gila River
(N.M. and Ariz.); San Carlos Indian Irrigation Project (U.S.); Water
rights -- Arizona.
*Issues: Did Arizona Supreme Court err
when it found that claim preclusion did not bar San Carlos Apache
Tribe from seeking additional rights to waters from Gila River's
tributaries when tributaries were within geographic scope of Globe
Equity adjudication in which United States sought determination
of all of tribe's rights to waters of tributaries and when Globe
Equity parties did not split their claims to tributaries through
express and clear statement in consent decree?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 9/05/2006. Petition denied 1/8/07.
*Holding below: In
re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River
System and Source, 212
Ariz. 64, Supreme Court of Arizona. Claims advanced by San Carlos
Apache Tribe in interlocutory appeal from order issued in Gila River
general stream adjudication are precluded, to extent that tribe
claims additional water from Gila River mainstream, by consent decree
entered in 1935 by federal district court in Arizona, but claims
to water from Gila tributaries are not precluded.
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona
Docket
No. 06-173
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Water rights -- San Carlos
Apache Tribe of the San Carlos Reservation, Arizona; Gila River
(N.M. and Ariz.); San Carlos Indian Irrigation Project (U.S.); Water
rights -- Arizona.
*Issues: (1) When United States, as trustee
for San Carlos Apache Tribe, and Apache Tribe, on its own behalf,
were required by this court to adjudicate all tribe's federal reserved,
aboriginal, and other water rights in Arizona's general stream adjudication
under McCarran Amendment, 43
U.S.C. § 666, and when opposing claimants in general stream
adjudication raised affirmative defense of res judicata in motions
for summary judgment, arguing that previous federal consent decree
on Gila River precluded United States and tribe from adjudicating
water rights to Gila River mainstream for Apache Reservation, did
Arizona Supreme Court err when it assumed existence of privity and
affirmed trial court's decision on res judicata grounds, concluding
as "matter of federal law" that comity compelled Apache
Tribe to present its defense to res judicata in federal district
court that entered prior consent decree? (2) Does it violate due
process and equal protection clauses of Fifth and 14th Amendments
to apply affirmative defense of res judicata to preclude United
States, as trustee for federally recognized Indian tribe, and tribe,
on its own behalf, from adjudicating certain federal reserved, aboriginal.
and other water rights in state general stream adjudication conducted
under McCarran Amendment, without allowing Indian tribe to present
its defenses to res judicata in state forum in which it was raised?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 8/01/2006. Petition denied 1/8/07.
*Holding below:
In re the General Adjudication of all Rights to use Water in the
Gila River System
, 212
Ariz. 64, Supreme Court of Arizona. Claims advanced by San Carlos
Apache Tribe in interlocutory appeal from order issued in Gila River
general stream adjudication are precluded, to extent that tribe
claims additional water from Gila River mainstream, by consent decree
entered in 1935 by federal district court in Arizona, but claims
to water from Gila tributaries are not precluded.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Peterman
Docket
No. 06-470
Subjects: Indian gaming -- Oneida Nation of New
York; Gambling on Indian reservations -- New York (State); Sovereign immunity
-- Oneida Nation of New York; New York (State). Governor -- Powers and duties;
Intergovernmental agreements -- Oneida Nation of New York; Parties to actions.
*Issues: Is rule adopted by New York
courts, that they may adjudicate Indian tribe's interests in its
federally approved gaming compact in tribe's absence because tribe
could waive sovereign immunity and appear as party in suit, preempted
by federal law because it conflicts both with federally protected
sovereign immunity and with federal interest in tribal economic
development and self-sufficiency through regulated tribal gaming.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 10/02/2006. Petition was denied on 12/4/06.
*Holding below: Peterman
v. Pataki, 21
A.D.3d 1387, N.Y. Apellate Div. In taxpayers' action challenging
authority of governor to execute, without legislative authorization,
compact with Native American tribe that permits tribe to operate
casinos under federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, lower court's
denial of tribe's motion to dismiss complaint is affirmed for reasons
stated by that court, which held (i) that tribe, which entered special
appearance solely to contest court's jurisdiction, is not indispensable
party, (ii) that, even assuming that tribe has standing to raise
issue of justiciability, case clearly presents justiciable controversy,
and (iii) that, because governor's action clearly violated separation
of powers recognized by state constitution, compact is invalid.
Naftaly v. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community
Docket
No. 06-429
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Keweenaw Bay Indian Community,
Michigan; Real property -- Taxation -- Michigan; Michigan. General
Property Tax Act.
*Issues: (1) Does 1854
Treaty with Chippewa at LaPointe show necessary congressional
intent to make lands freely alienable? (2) Do Indian treaty canons
of construction allow courts to resolve on summary judgment factual
issues about which experts disagree?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 9/21/2006. Petition was denied on 11/27/06.
*Holding below: Keweenaw
Bay Indian Community v. Naftaly, 452
F.3d 514, 6th Cir. Provision of Treaty
with Chippewa, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109, stating that Indians
"shall not be required to remove from the homes hereby set
apart for them," although ambiguous, must be read in favor
of tribe and its members, against backdrop of Indian sovereignty
doctrine and notion that American Indian tribes enjoy quasi-sovereignty,
and in favor of inference that supports treaty's purpose of providing
permanent home for Chippewa Indians--purpose that would be weakened
by state's interpretation sanctioning involuntary alienation of
tribe's or members' land through tax sales--and thus treaty is properly
interpreted as preventing involuntary alienation of, and thus taxation
of, reservation lands held in fee simple by tribe or its members;
treaty is not federal statute or act of Congress and thus cannot
furnish requisite unmistakably clear congressional intent to allow
state taxation of reservation lands; state waived any argument that
1854 statute authorizing president to negotiate with Chippewa evidenced
such intent, and no reservation land at issue was ever allotted
under Dawes Act or 1922 statute authorizing secretary of interior
to allot reservation lands under treaties when president had such
power, thus eliminating those statutes as source of such intent.
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island
Docket
No. 06-414
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Sales tax -- Rhode Island;
Use tax -- Rhode Island; Cigarette sellers -- Narragansett Indian
Tribe of Rhode Island; Jurisdiction -- United States; District courts
-- United States; Sovereignty -- Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode
Island; Warrants (Law) -- On Indian reservations; Searches and seizures
-- Rhode Island.
*Issues: Did First Circuit err in holding,
in divided en banc opinion and in direct conflict with precedents
of this court, other federal courts of appeals, and state supreme
courts, that federal statute's conferral of "jurisdiction"
over Indian lands, but not over tribe as sovereign, impliedly abrogates
tribal government's sovereign immunity and thus empowers state judge
to authorize state police to execute search warrant against tribe,
seize funds and property belonging to tribal government, and arrest
tribal officials acting in their official capacities?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 9/21/2006. Petition was denied on 11/27/06.
*Holding below: Narragansett
Indian Tribe v. State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
et al., 449
F.3d 16, 1st Cir. Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act,
25
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716, which declared, consistent with
underlying settlement agreement, that certain land returned to tribe
in settlement of its land claims "shall be subject to the civil
and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island,"
abrogated tribe's sovereign immunity from enforcement of state law
and thus authorized state law enforcement officers, acting under
otherwise valid search warrant, to enter such tribal land, seize
tribe's inventory of unstamped, untaxed cigarettes, and arrest tribal
members involved in operating tribal smoke shop in violation of
state law.
Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania
Docket
No. 06-364
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Delaware Indians; Extinguishment
of Indian title -- Delaware Indians; Pennsylvania; Bucks County
(Pa.); Delaware Nation, Oklahoma (formerly the Delaware Tribe of
Western Oklahoma); Land tenure -- Delaware Indians.
*Issues: (1) Does 1799 Indian Non-Intercourse
Act apply to land held in fee by federally recognized Indian tribe?
(2) Was court of appeals' finding of waiver as to petitioner's aboriginal
rights claim improper and in contravention of important rules of
pleading and of federal law and policy that protect federally recognized
Indian tribes asserting claims to tribal land?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 9/12/2006. Petition was denied on 11/27/06.
*Holding below:
Deleware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446
F.3d 410, 3rd. Cir. Although Thomas Penn's 1737 extinguishment
of any aboriginal rights held by Delaware Nation to certain land
in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, was fraudulent, it is not justiciable
because it was accomplished by sovereign authority; Delaware Nation
waived contention that Penn lacked sovereign authority, and thus
could not extinguish tribe's aboriginal title, by failing to raise
it before district court; although sovereign issued two land patents
for such land to tribal chief subsequent to 1737 extinguishment
of aboriginal title, such grant of land was to chief in his individual
capacity, and not as representative of tribe, and thus did not confer
on tribe fee title to land.
Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo
Docket
No. 06-361
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Dealers (Retail trade) -- Licenses;
Non-Indians; Sovereign immunity -- Pueblo of Tesuque, New Mexico;
Jurisdiction -- United States; United States. Indian Civil Rights
Act; Tesuque Pueblo Flea Market.
*Issues: (1) Does Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez preclude federal review, other than
habeas review pursuant to 25
U.S.C. § 1303, of deprivations without due process of law
by Indian tribes of liberty or property of non-tribal persons? (2)
On Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) challenge to habeas jurisdiction under
Section 1303, may hotly disputed facts be resolved against party
opposing challenge absent fact inquiry? (3) Are provisions of ISDEAA
(i) that require waiver of sovereignty defenses in insurance coverage
for benefit of third parties aggrieved by ISDEAA-funded agencies,
(ii) that require laws, policies, and procedures of contractor to
provide for administrative due process or its equivalent, and (iii)
that require forum for grievances brought by program beneficiaries,
operative?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 9/11/2006. Petition was denied on 11/13/06.
*Holding below: Walton
v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443
F.3d. 1274, 10th Cir. Under Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978), which held that Indian Civil Rights Act neither
authorizes maintenance of suits against Indian tribe nor constitutes
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, district court lacked jurisdiction
over non-habeas corpus claims against tribe by non-Indian individual
who alleged that tribe violated state and federal law when it revoked
his flea market vendor's permit; because plaintiff has not demonstrated
unavailability of tribal forum to hear his dispute regarding revocation
of his vendor's permit, exception to Santa Clara Pueblo created
by Dry
Creek Lodge v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623
F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), is inapplicable; although federal
courts do have jurisdiction under ICRA to entertain habeas corpus
proceedings, 25
U.S.C. § 1303, plaintiff's expulsion from tribal land does
not constitute "detention" as that term is used in Section
1303, and thus district court properly dismissed plaintiff's habeas
claim; although tribe waives its sovereign immunity with respect
to suits arising out of its performance of contractual duties under
self-determination contracts entered into under Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act, plaintiff was not party to self-determination
contract and his claims do not arise from any such contract, and
thus ISDEAA is not source of jurisdiction for his claims.
Means v. Navajo Nation
Docket
No. 05-1614
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine
Ridge Reservation, South Dakota -- Members; Law -- Navajo Nation,
Arizona, New Mexico & Utah -- Application -- Non-members of
a tribe; Equality before the law -- United States; Due proecess
of law -- United States; Criminal jurisdiction -- Navajo Nation,
Arizona, New Mexico & Utah -- Application -- Non-members of
a tribe.
*Issues: (1) Can Congress lawfully vest
Indian Nations, which are not subject to U.S. Constitution, with
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who are citizens of
United States--but not over nonmember non-Indians--without violating
equal protection and due process clauses of Fifth Amendment? (2)
Can Indian tribes exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers,
but only as long as they are Indians, without violating equal protection
and due process provisions of Indian Civil Rights Act? (3) Can Indian
tribes exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, who
are citizens of United States, outside of Constitution without violating
due process of law? (4) Did Congress, by amending Indian Civil Rights
Act to provide Indian tribes with criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, abrogate Navajo Treaty of 1868, which explicitly provides
for federal jurisdiction over intertribal offenses? (5) Does Congress
possess power to grant criminal jurisdiction to Indian tribes over
nonmembers under Indian commerce clause, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3,
even though tribes are not bound by Constitution?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 6/16/2006. Petition was denied on 10/10/06.
*Holding below: Means
v. Navajo Nation, 432
F.3d 924, 9th Cir. Under 1990 amendments to Indian Civil Rights
Act, Indian tribe may exercise its inherent sovereign judicial power
in criminal cases, for crimes committed on tribe's reservation,
against anyone of Indian ancestry who is also Indian by political
affiliation, which at very least includes anyone who is enrolled
member of any tribe but does not include anyone who is merely racially
Indian; equal protection clause is not violated by permitting tribe
to prosecute its own members and members of other tribes, but not
anyone else, for crimes committed on reservation, because Indian
tribal identity is political rather than racial, and recognizing
criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts over Indians enrolled in
other tribes, who might not otherwise be subject to any criminal
jurisdiction, is rationally related to Indian self-government in
area in which rapid and effective tribal response may be needed;
facial due process challenge has no force in this case, because
Indian Civil Rights Act and Navajo Bill of Rights confer on defendant
in this case all rights that he would enjoy under U.S. Constitution;
conditions of 1868 treaty between Navajo Nation and United States
for rendition of "bad" person have not been fulfilled
in this case, and thus tribe need not turn over to United States
for prosecution Indian defendant who is enrolled member of different
tribe.
Related news stories: Supreme
Court move settles tribal authority cases. (Indianz.com)
10/11/06.
Subjects: Criminal jurisdiction -- Salish
& Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Confederated Tribes
of, Montana -- Application -- Non-members of a tribe; Automobile
driving -- On Indian reservations -- Salish & Kootenai Tribes of
the Flathead Reservation, Confederated Tribes of, Montana; Criminal
actions arising on Indian reservations -- Salish & Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation, Confederated Tribes of, Montana; Traffic
violations -- Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
Confederated Tribes of, Montana; Leech Lake Band (Minn.) -- Members;
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe -- Members; United States. Indian Civil
Rights Act; Due process of law -- United States.
*Issues: (1) Does 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) violate fundamental constitutional right
of American Indians, who are citizens of United States, to equal
protection guaranteed by Fifth Amendment by subjecting nonmember
Indians, but no other similarly situated nonmembers of different
race, to criminal prosecution and punishment by Indian tribes whose
judicial proceedings are not constrained by Constitution? (2) Does
same statute violate fundamental right of U.S. citizens to due process
guaranteed by Fifth Amendment by subjecting them to criminal prosecution
and punishment by extra-constitutional sovereigns, Indian tribes,
within borders of United States but unconstrained by Constitution,
which sovereigns, because of their racially and ethnically exclusive
nature, deny them right of full and equal participation in their
political life?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 4/6/2006. Petition was denied on 10/10/06.
*Holding below: Morris
v. Tanner, 160
Fed.Appx. 600, 9th. Cir. Indian Civil Rights Act's 1990 amendments,
under which tribal court jurisdiction in criminal cases extends
to all Indians who are enrolled members of federally recognized
tribe, and not just Indians who are members of prosecuting tribe,
do not violate equal protection or due process principles, and thus
district court properly entered summary judgment for Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes in whose tribal court criminal speeding
charges are pending against enrolled member of Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe who challenged constitutionality of 1990 amendments.
Related news stories: Supreme
Court move settles tribal authority cases. (Indianz.com)
10/11/06.
Bruner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission
Docket
No. 05-1470
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Mines and mineral resources
-- Taxation -- Oklahoma; Mines and mineral resources -- Indian Country
(Oklahoma); Indian allotments; Restricted lands; Five Civilized
Tribes; Due process of law; United States. Constitution; Law --
United States.
*Issues: (1) Is federal law that subjects
minerals produced on restricted allotted lands of Five Civilized
Tribes after April 26, 1931, to all taxes, state and federal, unconstitutional
in context of case at bar? (2) How could Oklahoma and lower federal
courts totally and without explanation ignore solemn contract between
Miller Bruner, full-blood Creek Indian, and United States? (3) Is
statute of limitations tolled as to restricted (non-competent) Indians
as determined by Oklahoma Court of Appeals but denied by Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Bruner
v. United States, on Dec. 21, 2005, but not decided in U.S.
District Court for Northern District of Oklahoma?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 5/15/2006. Petition was denied on 10/2/06.
*Holding below: Bruner
v. State of Oklahoma, 130
P.3d 767, Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Tax exemption granted
to Indian tribes by original agreements between Creek Nation and
United States provided exemption for only 21-year period, which
expired by time Congress passed Act of May 10, 1928, which declared
that "all minerals, including oil and gas, produced on or after
April 26, 1931, from restricted allotted lands of members of the
Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, or from inherited restricted
lands of full-blood Indian heirs or devisees of such lands, shall
be subject to all State and Federal taxes of every kind and character
the same as those produced from lands owned by other citizens of
the State of Oklahoma," and thus taxpayer, although his grandfather
was full-blood Creek Indian, is not entitled to refund of gross
production and petroleum excise taxes paid to Oklahoma for 1989
through 1994; in any event, taxpayer's refund application filed
with Oklahoma Tax Commission is time-barred.
Dark-Eyes v. Connecticut Commissioner of Revenue
Services
Docket
No. 05-1464
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Income tax -- Connecticut;
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut -- Members -- Taxation
-- Connecticut; United States. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims
Settlement Act; Indian Country (U.S.) -- Defined; Dependent Indian
communities -- Defined..
*Issues: Were lands identified as "private
settlement lands" in Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement
Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760, set aside in that act for Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Nation, and did they become Indian country upon purchase
by Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 5/15/2006. Petition was denied on 10/2/06.
*Holding below: Dark-Eyes
v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 887
A.2d 848 , Supreme Court of CT. Enrolled member of federally
recognized Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was properly subjected to state
income tax on income she derived from sources within tribe's reservation
in 1996-98 while living on property that was owned by tribe and
designated as "private settlement lands" by Mashantucket
Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, but that was not part of reservation,
had not been set aside for use by Indians as Indian land within
meaning of claims settlement act (because it had not been purchased
with "settlement funds" appropriated under act to buy
settlement lands but had instead been purchased by tribe with nonsettlement
funds), and thus was not Indian country until taken into trust by
federal government in August, 1998.
South Dakota v. Dept. of Interior
Docket
No. 05-1428
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Oacoma (S.D.); Lyman County
(S.D.); South Dakota; Trust lands -- Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of
the Lower Brule Reservation, South Dakota; United States. Dept.
of the Interior; United States. Indian Reorganization Act; Acquisition
of property -- South Dakota; Delegation of powers.
*Issues: Is 25
U.S.C. § 465, which allows secretary of interior to acquire,
in trust, "in his discretion," any amount of "lands"
at any location in nation, on or off reservation, for purpose of
"providing land for Indians," unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 5/08/2006. Petition was denied on 10/2/06.
*Holding below: State
of South Dakota v. United States Department of the Interior,
423
F.3d 790, 8th. Cir. Provision of Indian Reorganization Act that
authorizes secretary of interior, "in his discretion,"
to acquire "any interest in lands ... within or without existing
reservations ... for the purpose of providing land for Indians,"
25
U.S.C. § 465, is not unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority when viewed in light of statutory aims and legislative
history of IRA, whose goals of providing lands sufficient to enable
Indians to achieve self-support and ameliorating damage resulting
from prior government policy sufficiently narrow delegation and
guide secretary's discretion in deciding when to take land into
trust for Indians.
Utah v. Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians
Docket
No. 05-1160
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Jurisdiction -- United States;
United States. Bureau of Indian Affairs; Leases -- Shivwits Band
of Paiutes; Police power -- Utah; Trust lands -- Shivwits Band of
Paiutes; Land use -- Shivwits Band of Paiutes.
*Issues: Is Congress's standardless grant
of complete discretion to executive branch officer to acquire land
"for Indians" unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 3/09/2006. Petition was denied on 10/2/06.
*Holding below: Shivwits
Band of Paiute Indians v. State of Utah, 428
F.3d 966, 10th Cir. Under binding circuit precedent, United
States v. Roberts,
185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1999), Section 465 of Indian Reorganization
Act,
25 U.S.C. § 465, which authorizes secretary of interior
"to acquire ... any interest in lands ... for the purpose of
providing land for Indians," such land to be held "in
trust" for tribe or individual "for which the land is
acquired," provides standards for exercise of secretary's discretion
and thus is not unconstitutionally standardless delegation of legislative
power.
Related News Story: Third court
decision favors land-into-trust process (Indianz.com)
11/11/05.
Back to Top
Cases Dismissed
Wright v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corporation
Docket
No. 06-1229
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Race discrimination -- Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Washington; Non-Indians; Sovereign
immunity -- Corporations, Government -- Officials and employees
-- Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Washington;
Colville Tribal Enterprise Corporation; Colville Tribal Services
Corporation.
*Issues:Does tribal sovereignty
immunize for-profit corporations created under tribal law from
liability for state law torts committed outside tribe's reservation?
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 3/07/2007. Rule 46 Dismissal on 5/11/2007.
*Holding below: Wright
v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corporation
147
P.3d 1275, Supreme Court of Washington. Absent express waiver
of immunity by tribe or congressional abrogation, tribal sovereign
immunity immunizes tribal corporation and its employees in their
official capacity from suit if corporation is owned by tribe
and was created under tribal laws, and thus corporation created
under tribal law and owned entirely by tribe, its wholly owned
subsidiary, and their agent, acting in his official capacity,
are immune from suit, alleging racial discrimination and other
causes of action, brought against them by employee who worked
on off-reservation project.
Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop
Estate
Docket
No. 06-1202
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Native Hawaiian students.;
Discrimination in education -- Hawaii; Kamehameha Schools -- Admission;
Affirmative action programs; Private schools -- Hawaii; Equality
before the law -- United States; Civil rights -- United States.
*Issues:(1) Is respondents'
racially exclusionary admissions policy subject to same strict
scrutiny applied under Title VI of 1964 Civil Rights Act, or instead
subject to marginally less demanding scrutiny applied under Title
VII of that statute? (2) Does respondents' racially exclusionary
admissions policy satisfy any level of scrutiny when children of
wrong race are foreclosed from all consideration, such that policy
acts as absolute and perpetual bar to admission of those children?
(3) Could Congress, without changing text of Section 1981 or otherwise
indicating by legislation that it has repudiated "fundamental
national public policy" against racial discrimination in private
education, be said to have specifically intended to authorize respondents
to operate system of racially segregated schools?
History: Petition for certiorari was
filed on 3/01/2007. Rule 46 Dismissal on 5/11/2007.
*Holding below: Doe
v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470
F.3d. 827 9th. Cir. Private, nonsectarian school's admissions
preference for children with native Hawaiian ancestry, which
is alleged to be racially discriminatory in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981,
is evaluated under test for assessing validity of affirmative
action employment plans under Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights
Act, adjusted to take into account school's focus on broad goals
of society as whole to assure that traditionally underachieving
groups of every race and ethnicity will be prepared for citizenship
and for workplace; preference, which effectively bars virtually
all children with no Hawaiian ancestry, seeks to redress native
Hawaiians' lower academic achievement compared to other ethnic
groups, does not unnecessarily tread on rights of other groups,
who have ample alternative academic opportunities, and will remain
in place only as long as necessary to remedy current educational
effects of past private and government-sponsored discrimination
and social and economic deprivation, and thus is valid affirmative
action measure; also supporting preference is Congress's pronouncement
of "special relationship" between United States and
Hawaii, as well as various statutes specifically affirming need
for special educational opportunities for native Hawaiian students.
* "Issues" and
"Holding below" reproduced with permission from The United States
Law Week on the Internet and print at: http://www.bna.com
Copyright 2000-2006 by The Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033)
Back
to Top
