IN THE QUILEUTE TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
QUILEUTE INDIAN RESERVATION
LA PUSH, WASHINGTON
Quileute Nation, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Justin Rio Jamie, Naomi Rose Jacobson, and Crystal Lyons, Defendants/Appellees.
NO. 16-C-0044 (June 6, 2017)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court dismissed criminal complaint brought against three councilpersons based on doctrine of legislative immunity. Court of Appeals found that the acts underlying the criminal charges were performed by the three councilpersons in their official capacity as members of the tribal council and therefore, the doctrine of legislative immunity shielded them from criminal prosecution for those acts. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order dismissing complaint.
Before: Lisa L. Atkinson, Chief Judge; John E. Gibson, Judge; Gregory M. Silverman, Judge.Appearances:Tim Rybka, Northwest Intertribal Court System, for appellant; Lori J. Guevara, Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville and Richard L. Davies, for appellees.
OPINION
Silverman, J.:
This matter is an appeal from a lower court order dismissing a criminal complaint brought against three members of the Quileute Tribal Council. The lower court dismissed the criminal complaint based on the legislative immunity enjoyed by members of the Tribal Council. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the lower court’s order dismissing the complaint.
I. The Facts
The events leading up to and underlying the criminal charges brought against the three members of the Quileute Tribal Council are well-known to the Quileute people. This is the
second appeal in as many years from court proceedings arising out of these events. For the uninitiated, we will briefly sketch these events and direct those desiring further details to our opinion in Woodruff v. Jacobson et. al., 13 NICS App.65 (December 2015) available online at: http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/NICS/.
Charles Woodruff was elected to the Quileute Tribal Council by the General Council of the Quileute Tribe on January 16th, 2015. Following the election, the Tribal Council elected Mr. Woodruff chairman and Ms. Naomi Rose Jacobson vice chairman of the Tribal Council. On February 19th, 2015, a tribal member submitted a petition to the Tribal Council to reopen the 2015 election based upon certain incorrect names on the ballot. After this petition was rejected by the Tribal Council, Councilperson Rio Jaime moved to request the Quileute Tribal Chairman to hold a special meeting to address concerns regarding the 2015 election. The motion passed with only two of the five members of the Tribal Council voting for it—of the other three, one failed to vote and two abstained.
Chairman Woodruff granted the request and convened a special General Council meeting of the Quileute Tribe on March 6th, 2015. At the special General Council meeting, the General Council voted to conduct a re-vote on the candidates listed on the January 16, 2015 ballot immediately following the meeting. The Quileute Election Board conducted the re-vote and Mr. Woodruff came in third, losing his seat on the Tribal Council. Ms. Jacobson, who had also been elected to the Tribal Council in January, was reelected and subsequently made Chair of the Tribal Council.
On April 13th, 2015, Mr. Woodruff filed a petition with the Election Board, requesting that it declare the March 6th re-vote void because it was unconstitutional. On June 25th, 2015, the Election Board issued its decision that the re-vote was unconstitutional and void, declaring that Mr. Woodruff “was validly elected as a member of the Quileute Tribal Council at the annual General Council meeting Tribal Council election on January 16, 2015, pursuant to the Quileute Constitution, Election Ordinance, and Board Election Rules.” The Election Board further stated that the “purported March 6, 2015 “new” or “re-vote” election . . . did not remove Charles ‘Chas’ Woodruff from his elected office as a Tribal Council member, and he continues to serve in his office as Quileute Tribal Council member as a matter of law.” We agreed with the conclusions of the Quileute Election Board in our opinion in Woodruff v. Jacobson, supra.
We come now to the events underlying the criminal charges that were brought against the three councilpersons. On June 29th, 2015 Naomi Jacobson convened a special meeting of the Tribal Council off the reservation in the neighboring town of Forks, Washington. That meeting was attended by the three councilpersons against whom the criminal charges were brought as well as by a fourth member of the Tribal Council, the then-secretary of the Tribal Council, who was not charged with any crime. At that meeting, the Tribal Council voted to reject the decision of the Election Board finding the re-vote unconstitutional. In addition, the Tribal Council wrote a letter to the members of the Quileute Tribe announcing their rejection of the Election Board’s decision. In Woodruff v. Jacobson, supra, we found that Tribal Council’s rejection of the Election Board’s decision violated both the Quileute Constitution and the Quileute Election Ordinance. Following this special meeting, the Tribal Council had the letter distributed to the members of the Tribe.
II. The Criminal Charges
The criminal charges brought against the three councilpersons were Criminal Conspiracy under section 13.5.3 and Official Misconduct under section 13.6.2 of the Quileute Tribal Code, Article XIII, Crimes.1 The legal theory under which the prosecutions were brought amounted to the claim that by convening a special meeting of the Tribal Council off the reservation, voting to reject the Election Board’s decision, writing a letter to the Tribe announcing their rejection of the Election Board’s decision, and causing that letter to be distributed on the reservation, the three councilpersons were participating in a criminal conspiracy to commit official misconduct and did in fact commit official misconduct.
In their defense to these two criminal charges, the three councilpersons argued that as members of the Quileute Tribal Council, they enjoyed legislative immunity and could not be criminally prosecuted for any actions that they took in discharging the duties of their office as
members of the Tribal Council. The lower court agreed and dismissed the criminal complaint brought against them.
We agree with the lower court that the three councilpersons enjoyed legislative immunity from criminal prosecution for the actions underlying the criminal charges, for the reasons set forth below.
III. Analysis
The Quileute are a sovereign people—a nation, a tribal nation, a “domestically dependent nation”—to borrow a phrase from federal Indian law—but a nation just the same. The key characteristic of a sovereign people and nation is their sovereignty. Sovereignty is the principal attribute of all self-governing people. A political concept, sovereignty denotes the supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power by which any independent nation is governed. In a democratic nation, it is the absolute power and right of the people to govern themselves. It is the ultimate source of all public authority and every power by which a sovereign people govern themselves, such as the power and authority to make, execute and apply the laws, to punish their transgression, to impose and collect taxes, to enter treaties and make contracts, to name but a few.
The powers of a sovereign people include the power to create and delegate their sovereign authority to a political body charged with the sacred obligation of carrying out the daily tasks of self-government. Among Indian nations, this political body is often called the Tribal Council. The Tribal Council acts for the people and is accountable only to the people. Acting under and exercising the sovereign authority of the people, the power, right and authority of the Tribal Council is superior to all others except the people themselves. While a people may place limits on the powers delegated to the Tribal Council, only the people can enforce those limits.
The absolute and uncontrollable power of a sovereign people to govern themselves grounds the judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity. The judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity simply codifies in law the political reality that there is no legal authority within a nation to which a sovereign people is accountable. While a sovereign people may voluntarily submit to the inferior power of its own courts to facilitate the redress of injuries suffered by the citizens of the nation as well as others, without its consent a sovereign people cannot be sued or otherwise held accountable in a court of law.
This legal immunity of a sovereign people is a necessary concomitant of their sovereign authority. As such, when a sovereign people create and delegate their sovereign authority to a Tribal Council, the Tribal Council also enjoys this sovereign immunity. Moreover, as the Tribal Council develops the administrative structure of governmental departments and offices needed for efficient self-governance, these subordinate departments and offices exercising the sovereign authority of the people in the discharge of their duties will also enjoy the sovereign immunity of the people, subject only to limitations under applicable statutory and case law.
An individual serving on the Tribal Council does not exercise the sovereign authority of the tribe, only the Tribal Council itself does. Accordingly, the individual members of the Tribal
Council are not protected by the sovereign immunity of the people. At the same time, however, the Tribal Council, like any corporate body, can only act through the actions of its members. For example, a Tribal Council can only enact an ordinance, adopt a resolution and pass a motion through the voting of its members. It can only conduct an inquiry through investigations conducted by its members. It can only issue reports and communicate with the citizens of the tribe if its members draft and distribute those reports and communications. It can only negotiate a contract if its members sit down and negotiate that contract with the other parties. Every action by a Tribal Council is carried out through the acts of its members. Accordingly, if the members of the Tribal Council are to carry out the sacred duties of self-governance entrusted to the Tribal Council with the unwavering independence and alacrity expected of them, they must be free from any fear of reprisals and the burdensome costs, in time, energy and money, of responding to and defending civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions brought by those unhappy with the manner in which they have discharged their duties as members of the Tribal Council.
In the case of a tribe, the individual tribal members who form the Tribal Council enjoy legal immunity to civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions for acts done in fulfilling their duties as members of the Tribal Council. In other aspects of their lives, the members of the Tribal Council are subject to civil and criminal liability just like any other citizen or person. Accordingly, when a tribal councilperson is sued or prosecuted for a crime, a court must first determine whether the acts giving rise to the civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution were acts done by the councilperson in fulfilling his or her duties as a member of the Tribal Council. If the acts were done in fulfillment of the councilperson’s duties as a member of the Tribal Council, then the Councilperson enjoys sovereign immunity and the civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution must be dismissed. If the acts were not done in fulfillment of his or her duties as a councilperson, then the lawsuit or prosecution may proceed.
Members of a legislative body enjoy this absolute immunity, even if an illegal purpose motivated some of their actions. See Pelfresne v. Stephens, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Moreover, this doctrine applies to public officials performing a legislative function at every level of government—federal, state, regional or local. See Joe v. Two 30 Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004).
The doctrine of legislative immunity has been recognized as applying to members of a Tribal Council by several tribal courts. For example, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court has held that
the doctrine of legislative immunity for legislators and for their aides is applicable to individual Tribal Council members and their aides, acting within the sphere of their legitimate functions. The legislative immunity, herein recognized as tribal law, is an absolute bar to any litigatory proceedings against individual Tribal Council members, civil and criminal, and regardless of whether
Council members are parties or non-parties. The maintenance of legislative independence, and the protection of Tribal Councilors engaged in legislative functions from the time and energy entailed in defending and responding to litigation, warrant adoption of the privilege of legislative immunity as tribal law.
Hayward v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Council(Mashantucket Pequot Trib. Ct. 2003) quoting Shea v. Brown, MPTC- EA- 94- 100, Orders, December 28, 1994, at page 17-18. The doctrine has also been recognized by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Court of Appeals, see Smith v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 1996 ML 151 (Mont. CS&KT Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1996) (“The members of the Tribal Council enjoy legislative immunity for all actions taken within the scope of their legislative duties.”), and by the Hopi Appellate Court, see In re Nuvumsa, 7 Am. Tribal Law 305 (Hopi Appellate Court, May 17, 2007).
This doctrine of legislative immunity may be traced to a bill of rights formally declared by the English Parliament and assented to by the Crown following the revolution of 1688. There in it was declared “that the freedom of speech, and debates, and proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.” W.&M., st. 2, c. 2; see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Referring to the immunity enjoyed by the members of Parliament, Lord Denman wrote
For speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity. For every paper signed by the speaker by order of the House, though to the last degree calumnious, or even if it brought personal suffering upon individuals, the speaker cannot be arraigned in a court of justice.
Id. quoting Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1. During the American Revolution, this same immunity was incorporated into the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts of 1780 using the following language:
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either House of the legislature is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action, or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.
Mass. Const., Dec. of Rights, art. XXI. In 1808, in a case that the United States Supreme Court has characterized as the “the most authoritative case in this country on the construction of the provision in regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies,” Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed that the “high immunity and privilege” secured by the twenty-first article of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution
is not so much the privilege of the house [i.e., legislature], as an organized body, as of each individual member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people, expressed in the
constitution, which is paramount to the will of either or both branches of the legislature.
Coffin v Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). The Chief Justice continued that this legal immunity is recognized not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution, for everything said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules. I do not confine the member to his place in the house; and I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled to this privilege, when not within the walls of the representatives' chamber. . . . He ought, therefore, to be protected from civil or criminal prosecutions for everything said or done by him in the exercise of his functions, as a representative.
Coffin v Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27-28. Following the American Revolution, this same immunity was considered so essential to the proper functioning of a legislative body that it was incorporated into the original Articles of Confederation (Article V), as well as into the United States Constitution, see U.S. Const., art. 1, sec. 6, and the constitutions of the several States.2
Recognizing the necessity and prudence of insulating from vexatious litigation the members of a legislative body charged with carrying out the duties of self-governance of a sovereign people, we hold that a member of the Quileute Tribal Council enjoys legislative immunity to civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions for any acts performed in his or her official capacity as a member of the Tribal Council. While the doctrine of legislative immunity is not yet codified in the Quileute Tribal Code, we adopt this doctrine into the law of the Quileute people under the authority of section 13.26 of the Quileute Tribal Code.2
We turn now to the central issue of the appeal. Did the lower court err in dismissing the criminal complaint brought against the three members of the Quileute Tribal Council? The method for answering this question involves two steps. First, we must identify the alleged criminal acts committed by the three councilpersons. Second, we must determine whether these acts were performed by the three councilpersons in their official capacity as members of the Quileute Tribal Council. If we find that the alleged criminal acts were performed by the councilperson in their official capacity as members of the Quileute Tribal Council, then the doctrine of legislative immunity applies and the lower court was correct in dismissing the criminal complaint against the councilpersons. If we find that the acts were not performed by the councilpersons in their official capacity, then the doctrine of legislative immunity does not apply and the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint based on legislative immunity.
We may identify four alleged criminal acts underlying the criminal charges brought against the councilperson. These were:
1. On June 29th, 2015 Naomi Jacobson convened a special meeting of the Tribal Council off the reservation;
2. At that meeting, the three members of the Tribal Council voted to reject the decision of the Election Board finding the re-vote unconstitutional;
3. Following the vote at that meeting, the three members of the Tribal Council drafted a letter to the members of the Quileute Tribe in which they announced their rejection of the Election Board’s decision and their reason for doing so; and
4. Finally, the three members of the Tribal Council arranged to have the letter distributed to the Tribe.
We consider each of these acts in turn.
On June 29th, 2015 Naomi Jacobson convened a special meeting of the Tribal Council off the reservation. Was this an action she took in her official capacity as a member of the Quileute Tribal Council? At the time she convened the special meeting of the Quileute Tribal Council, Naomi Jacobson was the presiding officer—either the chairperson or vice chairperson—of the Tribal Council. Ms. Jacobson was elected vice chairperson of the Quileute Tribal Council following her election to the Tribal Council in January 2015. She assumed the position of chairperson of the Tribal Council following the unconstitutional removal of Mr. Woodruff from the Tribal Council. Due to the unconstitutional removal of the duly elected chairperson of the Tribal Council, there is a legitimate question whether Ms. Jacobson was the chairperson or the
vice chairperson at the time she acted. Fortunately, for present purposes, we need not resolve this
question.
Under Article V, Section 2 of the Bylaws of the Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation, “[s]pecial meetings may be called by the Chairman . . . and when so called, the Tribal Council shall have power to transact business as in regular meetings.” This provision gives discretionary authority to the chairperson of the Tribal Council to call special meetings. Significantly, unlike Section 1 of Article V which restricts the location of regular meetings of the Tribal Council to La Push, Washington, Section 2 does not contain any geographic restrictions on where special meetings may be held. Clearly, the drafters of the Bylaws recognized that the chairperson of the Tribal Council needed the flexibility to call special meetings whenever and wherever they are required to transact the business of the Tribe. From this provision, it is clear that when a chairperson of the Tribal Council calls a special meeting, the chairperson is acting in his or her official capacity as chairperson of the Tribal Council. As the chairperson of the Tribal Council is also a member of the Tribal Council, it follows that the chairperson in convening a special meeting is acting in his official capacity as a member of the Tribal Council as well.
Article I, Section 2 of the Bylaws of the Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation states that “[i]n the absence of the Chairman, [the Vice-Chairman] shall preside” and that “[w]hen so presiding, he shall have all the rights, privileges, duties and responsibilities of the Chairman.” This provision names the vice chairperson of the Tribal Council as presiding officer in the absence of the chairperson and while the vice chairpersons is the presiding officer confers on the vice chairperson all the powers of the chairperson. These powers include the discretionary authority to call and convene special meetings of the Tribal Council. Given that the duly elected chairperson of the Tribal Council had been unconstitutionally removed from office at the time that Ms. Jacobson called and convened the special meeting of the Tribal Council on June 29th, Ms. Jacobson was either the chairperson of the Tribal Council or she was the vice chairperson acting with the powers of the chairperson in his absence. In either case, Ms. Jacobson was clearly acting in her official capacity as a member and the presiding officer of the Tribal Council when she called and convened the special meeting of the Tribal Council on June 29th, 2015.
At that meeting, the three members of the Tribal Council voted to reject the decision of the Election Board finding the re-vote unconstitutional. Were the acts of casting votes at the meeting acts taken by the three councilpersons in their official capacity? It is beyond debate that members of a legislative body cast votes in performing the duties of their office. Section 4 of Article V of the Bylaws of the Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation expressly states that “[i]n all ordinances, resolution and motions, the Tribal Council may act by majority vote”. It also states that “all matters of importance shall be fully discussed and a reasonable attempt shall be made to secure unanimous agreement.” As the letter written to the Tribe reports, all the members of the Tribal Council at the special meeting concurred in rejecting the decision of the Election Board. Accordingly, from the evidence of the record we may infer that there was a discussion and vote that resulted in a unanimous decision to reject the Election Board’s finding that the re-vote was unconstitutional. While we held that the rejection of the Election Board’s finding was itself unconstitutional in Woodruff v. Jacobson, the unconstitutionality of the Tribal Council’s rejection of the Election Board’s finding does not alter the fact that the votes cast by each of the councilpersons at the special meeting were acts done in their official capacity as members of the Tribal Council.
Conclusion
Following the vote at that meeting, the three members of the Tribal Council drafted a letter to the members of the Quileute Tribe in which they announced their rejection of the Election Board’s decision and their reason for doing so. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Coffin v. Coffincharacterized “the making of a written report” as an act done in execution of the duties of a member of a legislative body. Clearly, it is a general expectation that legislators will periodically report their actions to the people that they represent. Only on the basis of such reports, whether conveyed directly to the people or through the press, will the sovereign people have the information that they need for deciding whether to reelect their representatives to another term in office. Section 1 of Article VI of the Bylaws of the Quileute Tribe of the Quileute Reservation expressly acknowledges the importance such reports when it states that “[i]t shall also be the duty of the Chairperson to make a report of the activities of the Council throughout the year”. Accordingly, we find that when the three councilpersons drafted their letter to the Tribe reporting and explaining their decision to reject the Election Board’s finding, they did so in their official capacity as members of the Tribal Council.
Finally, the three members of the Tribal Council arranged to have the letter distributed to the Tribe. We need hardly comment that there is little point in members of the Tribal Council drafting a report to the Tribe if they do not also arrange for that report to be distributed to the Tribe. This is implicitly acknowledged in Section 1 of Article VI of the Bylaws when it requires the Chairman “to make a report” of Tribal Council’s activities throughout the year. “To make a report” means not only to compose a report, but to deliver it as well. Indeed, the reporting duties of a representative of the sovereign people are not fully performed until the report is delivered. Accordingly, we find that when the three councilpersons arranged to have the letter distributed to the Tribe, they were acting in their official capacity and fulfilling their duties as members of the Tribal Council.
Based upon the preceding analysis, we conclude that the each of the acts underlying the criminal charges were performed by the three councilpersons in their official capacity as members of the Quileute Tribal Council and, therefore, that the doctrine of legislative immunity shields them from criminal prosecution for these acts. Accordingly, the lower court did not err in ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint based on legislative immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, the order granting the motion to dismiss the criminal complaint against the Respondents is affirmed.
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*
* The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
1
The text of section 13.5.3, Criminal Conspiracy, is as follows:
13.5.3. Criminal Conspiracy
A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees, with one or more persons, to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of those persons takes a substantial step in pursuance of such agreement.
It shall not be a defense to criminal conspiracy that the person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:
(1) has not been prosecuted or convicted; or
(2) has been convicted of a different crime; or
(3) is not amenable to Justice; or
(4) has been acquitted; or
(5) lacked the capacity to commit a crime.
Criminal conspiracy is a felony if the object of the conspiracy is a felony, a gross misdemeanor if the object of the conspiracy is a gross misdemeanor, and a misdemeanor if the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor.
The text of section 13.16.2, Official Misconduct, is as follows:
13.16.2. Official Misconduct
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if with intent to obtain pecuniary or other benefit for himself or another, or deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege the public servant:
(1) offers, confers, requests, accepts, or otherwise agrees to an agreement or understanding with another person that his vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action, with intent thereby, to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in an official matter; or
(2) requests, accepts, or agrees to accept compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing a bill, contract, claim, or transaction in which the public servant is likely to have an official discretion to exercise; or
(3) knowingly offers, pays, or agrees to pay compensation to another public servant for advice or other assistance in preparing or promoting a bill, contract, claim, or other transaction in which the public servant is likely to have an official discretion to exercise;
(4) willfully commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or
(5) willfully refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law.
It is no defense to a prosecution under this Section that the public servant sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired way, whether because he had not yet assumed office, lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.
Official misconduct is a felony.
2
See, e.g., Ala.Const. Art. IV, s 56; Ariz.Const. Art. IV (ii), s 7; Ark.Const. Art. V, s 15; Colo.Const. Art. V, s 16; Conn.Const. Art. III, s 10; Del.Const. Art. II, s 13; Ga.Const. Art. III, s vii, par. 3; Idaho Const. Art. III, s 7; Ill.Const. Art. IV, s 14; Ind.Const. Art. IV, s 8; Kans.Const. Art. II, s 22; Ky.Const. s 43; La.Const. Art. III, s 13; Me.Const. Art. IV(iii), s 8; Md.D.R. 10, Art. III, s 18; Mass. Pt. I, Art. 21; Mich.Const. Art. V, s 8; Minn.Const. Art. IV, s 8; Mo.Const. Art. III, s 19; Mont.Const. Art. V, s 15; Nebr.Const. Art. III, s 26; N.H.Const. Pt. I, Art. 30; N.J.Const. Art. IV, s iv, par. 8; N.M.Const. Art. IV, s 13; N.Y.Const. Art. III, s 11; N.D.Const. Art. II, s 42; Ohio Const. Art. II, s 12; Okla.Const. Art. V, s 22; Ore.Const. Art. IV, s 9; Pa.Const. Art. II, s 15; R.I.Const. Art. IV, s 5; S.D.Const. Art. III, s 11; Tenn.Const. Art. II, s 13; Tex.Const. Art. III, s 21; Utah Const. Art. VI, s 8; Vt.Const. ch. I, Art. 14; Va.Const. Art. IV, s 48; Wash.Const. Art. II, s 17; W.Va.Const. Art. VI, s 17; Wis.Const., Art. IV, s 16; Wyo.Const. Art. III, s 16. See also, Calif.Const. Art. IV, s 11; Iowa Const. Art. III, s 11; Miss.Const. Art. IV, s 48; Nev.Const., Art. IV, s 11; S.C.Const. Art. III, s 14 (freedom from arrest).
3
The text of section 13.5.3, Criminal Conspiracy, is as follows:
13.26. Other Law
As to any matters that are not covered by the traditional customs and usages of the Quileute Tribe, or by-laws, codes, ordinances and resolutions of the Tribal Council, or by applicable federal laws and regulations, the tribal court may be guided by common law as developed by state and federal courts.