23 NICS App. 8, FLINT v. SNOQUALMIE (June 2025)
IN THE SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
SNOQUALMIE INDIAN RESERVATION
SNOQUALMIE, WASHINGTON
Jim Flint, Appellant
v.
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, Appellee.
SNO-CIV-0024-0618 (June 16, 2025)
Before: Eric Nielsen, Chief Judge; Daniel A. Raas, Judge; Joshua L. Heath, Judge.
Appearances:Benjamin P. Compton, for Appellant; Rachel Saimons, for Appellee.
OPINION
Nielsen, C.J.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2024, Appellant, Jim Flint, filed a complaint in the Snoqualmie Tribal Court naming the Snoqualmie Entertainment Authority d/b/a Snoqualmie Casino (“Authority”) the defendant.
In his complaint, Mr. Flint asserted that on September 24, 2023, he and his wife had dinner at the Snoqualmie Casino, which is located on the Snoqualmie Indian Reservation and operated by the Authority, an entity of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe. While Mr. Flint was walking to his car, which was parked in the Casino’s parking lot, he tripped over a curb and fell to the ground, sustaining injuries. The complaint alleged that the Authority negligently failed to inspect the premises for unsafe conditions and to warn of unsafe areas and hidden dangers.
The Appellee, the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe (“Tribe”), has enacted a Tort Claims Act (Act). Snoqualmie Tribal Code (STC) Title 8, Chapter 7. The Act provides for a limited waiver of the Tribes’ sovereign immunity from negligence suits for “Injuries proximately caused by the negligent acts and/or omissions of the Tribe, its agents, employees or officers” and for “Injuries proximately caused by the condition of any Snoqualmie Tribal Facility, provided the claimant establishes that the facility was in a dangerous condition.” STC 8.7 § 6.0(d) (1)-(2). The Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity is conditioned on a claimant complying with the written notice requirements in SCT 8.7 § 10 before filing a complaint in the Tribal Court. Mr. Flint asserted he met all those notice requirements, which is not contested in the record before us.
On August 16, 2024, the Authority moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.) 12 (b)(1) on the grounds that the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It claimed the Act requires a complaint to explicitly name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant. Because Mr. Flint named the Authority as the defendant, he failed to comply with the Act, and that failure deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 5, 2025, before the court ruled on the Authority’s motion, Mr. Flint amended his complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), substituting the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant and served the amended complaint on the Tribe, which accepted service.
On September 19, 2024, the Tribe then moved to dismiss the amended complaint. It asserted that because Mr. Flint failed to name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in his original complaint, he therefore did not comply with Section 3.0 of the Act, and because the Act does not mention amended complaints, his amended complaint was ineffective to invoke the Act’s limited waiver of immunity. Thus, under Section 12.0(e) of the Act, his suit was forever barred.
On September 30, 2024, the Tribe also filed a motion to strike the Authority’s August 16th motion to dismiss the initial complaint. Although it was the Authority who filed the August 16th motion to dismiss, the Tribe’s motion to strike identified the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in the caption and was entitled DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE ITS PREVIOUSLY FILED MOTION TO DISMISS. The Tribe asserted that because the amended complaint replaced the original complaint, and it filed a renewed motion to dismiss the amended complaint, it “now seeks to strike its first Motion to Dismiss filed on August 16, 2024.” Motion to Strike at 2 (emphasis added). That same day, the trial court granted the motion.
On November 19, 2024, the Trial Court granted the Tribe’s second motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice at 4 (“Dismissal Order”). It ruled that the Act’s Section 3.0 required naming the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as a defendant in the initial complaint he filed. Dismissal Order at 3 (¶ 10). It ruled the amended complaint did not cure that alleged deficiency because the Act does not have “a procedure for curing the initial mistake of failing to name the Tribe as a Defendant,” thus, pursuant to Section 12.0(e), his claim was barred. Id. (¶ 11).
Mr. Flint timely appealed the dismissal Order. He raises two issues in this appeal:
First, he asserts that because the Act defines “Tribe” as including any “instrumentality” of the Tribe, “Tribe” and “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” are therefore interchangeable, and his original complaint naming the Authority as the defendant complied with the Act. The second issue raised by Mr. Flint-in the alternative-is that even if a complaint filed under the Act must name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant, his timely amended complaint cured the deficiency of not naming the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” in his original complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of subject matter jurisdiction, tribal sovereign immunity, and dismissal of a complaint is de novo. Kempf v. Snoqualmie Tribe, 14 NICS App. 1, 4 (Snoqualmie Ct. App., 2014). The Trial Court granted the dismissal, finding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Our review of the trial court’s order dismissing the case is therefore de novo.
III. ANALYSIS
It is an uncontroversial and centuries-old doctrine that Indian tribes have inherent “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Comty., 572 U.S. 782, 788, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014); Kempf, 14 NICS App at 5. This is true even for a tribe’s commercial activities. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 790. North Sea Products, LTD. v. Clipper Seafoods Co., 92 Wn.2d 236, 595 P.2d 938 (1979) 1
Under that doctrine, courts, including tribal courts, may not entertain suits against a tribe unless Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity. Kempf, 14 NICS App at 5 (citing Pendergrass v. Sauk-Suiattle Tribe, 11 NICS App. 52, 55 (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. App. 2013); Olson v. Nooksack, 6 NICS App. 49, 51 (Nooksack Tribe Ct. App. 2001)). There is a strong presumption against waiving tribal sovereign immunity, and any congressional or tribal waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear, explicit, and cannot be implied. Id. (citations omitted). Waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted. Holster v. Hoopa Valley Tribe 10 NICS App. 14, 16 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App. 2011).
The Act is an express limited waiver of the Tribe’s immunity from suit for “Injuries proximately caused by the negligent acts and/or omissions of the Tribe, its agents, employees or officers,” or “Injuries proximately caused by the condition of any Snoqualmie Tribal Facility, provided the claimant establishes that the facility was in a dangerous condition.” STC 8.7 § 6.0(d) (1)-(2) (emphasis added). The Act defines “Tribe” as “the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, including but not limited to any office, department, agency, commission, authority, instrumentality, enterprise, corporation, or other entity of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.” STC 8.7 § 4.0.
This limited waiver of sovereign immunity is “conditioned upon the claimant's full and complete compliance with all of” its procedures. STC 8.7 § 3.0. Those procedures are prescribed in STC 8.7 § 10.0. Section 3.0 states the Act “shall apply to any and all tort claims in which the named defendant is the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, or a person acting in an official capacity as an agent, employee, or officer of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.” STC 8.7 § 3.0. 2
Issue 1Did Mr. Flint’s original complaint naming the Authority as the defendant comply with the Act?
The original complaint named the Authority as the defendant. The Authority is a “governmental instrumentality of the Tribe” authorized to exercise the “Tribe’s ownership, management, and supervision of the Tribes gaming business and assets.” STC 8.2 § 3.0(c). The Snoqualmie Tribe’s gaming business includes the Snoqualmie Casino. STC 8.2 § 4.0.
Mr. Flint asserts that because the Act defines “Tribe” as including any “office, department, agency, commission, authority, instrumentality, enterprise, corporation, or other entity” of the Tribe, therefore “Tribe” and “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” are synonymous, and his original complaint naming the Authority, a “governmental instrumentality” of the Tribe, as the defendant complied with the Act. He claims that if the Tribal Council had intended that the limited waiver of immunity be conditioned on a claimant naming the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe as the defendant, then the Act’s Section 10.0, which prescribes the requisite procedures for invoking the Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity, would have included that as a requirement in the written notice. It does not.
The Tribe contends that the paragraph in the Act’s Section 3.0 stating the Act “…shall apply to any and all tort claims in which the named defendant is the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe…” required Mr. Flint to name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in his original complaint. It argues that because Mr. Flint’s original complaint named the Authority as the defendant and not the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe,” his complaint failed to invoke the Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
There is no Snoqualmie authority on point, but courts have ruled that a properly served amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, rendering it without legal effect. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir.2010) (under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the amended complaint supersedes the original) 3; Skidmore v. Pacific Creditors, 18 Wn.2d 157, 160 138 P.2d 664 (1943) (the filing of an amended complaint constitutes an abandonment of the original complaint, and the action rests on the amended complaint); Propp v. Long, 313 Or. 218, 222–23, 831 P.2d 685 (1992) (the effect of filing the amended complaint is to supersede the original pleading). Logically, the filing of an amended complaint is akin to a voluntary dismissal of the original complaint. See 8 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 41.21[2] (3d ed. 2005). The reasoning supporting this rule is persuasive, and we hold it applies to suits filed in the Snoqualmie Tribal Court. 4
Mr. Flint filed and properly served the amended complaint naming the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant. Applying the above rule, we find that the issue regarding whether naming the Authority in the original complaint complied with the Act is therefore moot. 5 We leave for another day the question whether a complaint must always name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant or whether naming the tribal entity the complaint alleges negligently caused an injury is sufficient to invoke the Act’s limited waiver of immunity and the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction. 6
Issue 2If a complaint filed under the Act must always name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant, despite an allegation an injury was caused by the negligence of an entity of the Tribe whose immunity is waived under the Act, did Mr. Flint’s timely amended complaint substituting the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the named defendant for the Authority comply with the Act and thereby invoke the Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity?
Courts do not legislate. The Court’s duty and responsibility is to interpret and construe the Snoqualmie Constitution and its laws. STC 3.1 § 6.0(a); CONST. Art. X § 3; Kempf, 14 NICS App. at 5. In construing or interpreting the Snoqualmie Tribe’s laws, the focus is on the intent of the drafters. Kempf, 14 NICS App. at 5. The language of a code provision and its ordinary meaning is the most reliable evidence of the drafter’s intent. Id.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedures in the Snoqualmie Tribal Court in “all suits of a civil nature” without any exceptions. STC 3.2 § 5.0. A suit brought under the Act alleging negligence is a suit of a “civil nature.”
Mr. Flint filed his amended complaint on September 5, 2024, naming the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant, less than 21 days from the Authority’s August 16, 2024 Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Under Fed.R.Civ.P.15(a)(1)(B), a party is allowed to “amend its pleading once as a matter of course” if the amendment is made within “21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)” (emphasis added). Allowing an amendment as a matter of course guarantees a plaintiff an absolute right to amend the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B) once within the limits specified in that Rule. James v. HursonAssocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The Tribe does not dispute that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to civil actions in the Snoqualmie Tribal Court, nor does it dispute that Mr. Flint’s amended complaint complies with Rule 15. Rather, it asserts that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to suits brought under the Act because “If the Tribal Council had wanted to allow for an amended complaint (or the applicability of the Federal Rules), they would have said so in the Act.” Appellee’s Brief at 14. It reasons, therefore, that the rule conflicts with the Act. 7 It contends that because the original complaint named the Authority and not the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant, Mr. Flint failed to meet the Act’s procedural requirements. 8 Id. at 15. Therefore, his claim was forever barred under Section 12.0(e) 9 of the Act which states that a “tort claim for monetary damages against the Tribe shall be forever barred unless written notice of the claim has been given pursuant to the requirements” in the Act and is “commenced in Tribal Court in accordance with the provisions of” the Act. 10 Id.
We find the Tribe’s assertion that if the Tribal Council allowed for an amended complaint or for the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “they would have said so in the Act” is meritless. If the Tribal Council intended to exempt application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general or even only Rule 15 governing amended complaints in particular, it would have expressly done so in the Act, or in STC 3.2 § 5.0. It did not.
There is no language in the Act that even suggests the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs “all suits of a civil nature” litigated in the Tribal Court, do not apply to suits brought under the Act. To read the Act to prohibit the filing of an amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 would require adding such prohibitory language to the Act. We will not add language to a code that is not there under the guise of interpreting a code. In Re Guardianship of J.A.A., Jr. & S.A., 22 NICS App. 10, 12 (Tulalip Tribes Ct. App. 2024); see Coughlin v. City of Seattle, 18 Wn.App. 285, 289, 567 P.2d 262 (1977) (“Courts cannot read into a statute words which are not there.”).
STC 3.2 § 5.0 mandates the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in civil cases brought in the Tribal Court. That provision was codified on October 21, 2008. Id. The Act was subsequently codified on April 3, 2009. STC 8.7. We, like other courts, will presume that the legislative body enacts laws “with full knowledge of existing laws.” Thurston County v. Gorton, 85 Wn.2d 133, 138, 530 P.2d 309 (1975); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 896, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (1988). The Tribal Council enacted the Act without limiting in any way the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that it previously adopted in STC 3.2 § 5.0.
We like other courts will also harmonize codes to maintain the integrity of each. State v. Bernhard, 108 Wn.2d 527, 533, 741 P.2d 1 (1987); Pineda v. Williams–Sonoma Stores, Inc., 51 Cal.4th 524, 529–30, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 246 P.3d 612 (2011); See 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51:3 n.7 (7th ed. 2024) (citing several state and federal cases for the proposition that courts have a duty to construe statutes harmoniously). In other words, courts should interpret statutes to give meaning to all statutes, and not have one nullify another. Maxwell v. Cumberland Life Ins. Co., 748 P.2d 392, 398 (Idaho 1987). Given the absence of any language in the Act that evinces the Tribal Council’s intent to preclude the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applying Rule 15 to suits brought under the Act maintains the integrity of both STC 3.2 § 5.0 (which expressly adopts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in civil cases) and STC 8.7, and does not nullify STC 3.2 § 5.0 in cases under the Act.
Furthermore, the Tribe’s argument is disingenuous. Both the Authority’s August 16th motion to dismiss the initial complaint and the Tribe’s September 30th motion to strike the Authority’s motion to dismiss the initial complaint cite Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 in support of the respective motions. 11 This shows the Tribe itself believes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to suits brought under the Act.
For the above reasons, we hold that Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 is not in conflict with the Act, but instead, by the express terms in STC 3.2 § 5.0, it applies explicitly to suits brought pursuant to the Act. We therefore conclude Rule 15 entitled Mr. Flint to amend his complaint to name the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe as the defendant.
In Sheker v. Leno, 2000 Grand Ronde Trib. LEXIS 6, *3 -*4 (2000) the court held Rule 15 “provides for relation back of an amendment to the date of the original pleading when the claim or defense is the same, or, when the name of the party is changed, the claim is the same and the party to be named by amendment has had notice, is not prejudiced in defending the claim, and knew or should have known that the claim was being brought.” See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986) (same). We find the holding in Leno persuasive and consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1). 12
Mr. Flint’s amended complaint does not allege a new cause of action. See Tajildeen v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 1 Mash. 14, 15 (1993) (unless the amended complaint alleges a new cause of action, it relates back to the date of the claim). It only varies from the original complaint in one respect: by naming the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” in place of the Authority as the defendant in the caption. Pursuant to Mr. Flint’s written notice of his claim, the Tribe knew the claim was for “[i]njuries proximately caused by the condition of any Snoqualmie Tribal Facility [the Snoqualmie Casino]” for which immunity is waived under the Act. 13 His original complaint identified the Authority, which operates the Casino, as the defendant, and the Authority is a “governmental instrumentality” which is defined as the “Tribe” in the Act. 14
Furthermore, the Tribe has made no claims that it was unaware that Mr. Flint’s claim was being brought or that his failure to name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” in his first complaint prejudiced the Tribe in any way. Indeed, it was the Tribe itself that filed the September 30th motion to strike the Authority’s motion to dismiss the initial complaint, and its motion named the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as defendant, not the Authority. Under these facts, there is no conceivable prejudice to the Tribe by the amended complaint merely naming the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in the caption in place of the Authority. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1) the amended complaint related back to the date of the original claim.
Nonetheless, the Tribe argues that because Mr. Flint did not name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in his original complaint, his suit was “forever barred” under Section 12.0(e), notwithstanding his subsequent amended complaint. It asserts that, despite Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1), Mr. Flint’s amended complaint cannot relate back to the date of his original complaint because “forever barred” means “that a claimant does not get a second bite at the apple if they err when initiating suit.” Appellee’s Brief at 14. The Tribe misreads Section 12.0(e) and its argument is likewise meritless.
Under Section 12.0(e), a tort claim is only “forever barred” unless written notice of the claim has been given pursuant to the requirements of the Act and is commenced in Tribal Court in accordance with the provisions of the Act. STC 8.7 § 12.0(e). There is no dispute before us that Mr. Flint complied with all the Act’s written notice requirements. Those requirements do not require the notice to identify the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant. STC 8.7 § 10.0.
The Act does not define “commenced.” We will construe the word “commenced” in its normal, ordinary meaning, which is commonly understood as a synonym of “begin.” See Oxford English Dictionary, available at http://dictionary.oed.com (defining “commence” as “To begin (an action); to enter upon; esp. in legal use, to commence an action, a suit, proceedings, etc.”) A lawsuit is deemed to “commence” on the date the complaint is filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”).
Mr. Flint commenced his suit when he filed his original complaint. There is no language in Section 12.0 that suggests that a suit under the Act is not commenced (filed with the court) “in accordance with” the Act if the complaint does not name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant. Thus, his suit “commenced in Tribal Court in accordance with the provisions” of the Act.
Moreover, it defies logic that the Tribal Council used the words “forever barred” to signify its intent that either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general or Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1) in particular not apply to suits under the Act. If that were its intent, then it would not have been so opaque but would have used language clearly expressing that intent.
Assuming Mr. Flint was required to name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant to invoke the Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity, his amended complaint did just that, and under Rule 15, his amended complaint related back to the date his original complaint was filed. 15 His suit is not barred because he did not name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in his initial complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Appellant complied with the Act’s notice requirements and timely amended his complaint to name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant. Assuming without deciding that the Act requires a complaint name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant, his suit was not “forever barred” merely because he did not name the “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” as the defendant in his original complaint.
The trial court’s dismissal Order is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
1 Consistent with the common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, “The Snoqualmie Tribe, its enterprises, agencies and officers are entitled to protection under the doctrine of sovereign immunity for any acts related to tort claims that may be made due to events that may occur on Snoqualmie Tribal lands.” STC 8.7 § 6.0(a).
2 Section 3.0--PURPOSE; SCOPE; FINDINGS OF FACT
The purpose of this Chapter is to outline and define the scope of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe's civil tort liability for tort claims that may arise due to actions and incidents on Snoqualmie Tribal lands, or actions and incidents associated with the delivery of services by the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe. This Chapter also sets forth the exclusive manner in which tort claims involving the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe shall be filed, administered and adjudicated.
This Chapter establishes a limited waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity for tort claims filed against the Tribe in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. This Chapter is not intended to be a general waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity, and it shall be narrowly and strictly construed. The limited waiver of sovereign immunity is expressly conditioned upon the claimant's full and complete compliance with all of the procedures set forth in this Chapter.
This Chapter shall apply to any and all tort claims in which the named defendant is the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, or a person acting in an official capacity as an agent, employee, or officer of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.
The Snoqualmie Tribal Council makes the following findings of fact:
(a) The Snoqualmie Indian Tribe is immune from suit, except to the extent that the Tribal Council expressly and unambiguously waives its sovereign immunity;
(b) Persons who are injured by the negligent and wrongful acts and/or omissions of Tribal officers, agents, or employees can be provided a legal remedy that is consistent with the Tribal Council's constitutional obligation to protect Tribal assets and resources that are vital to the continued operation of Tribal governmental operations and programs; and
(c) The purpose of this Chapter is to outline and define the scope of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe's civil tort liability for tort claims that may arise due to actions and incidents on Snoqualmie Tribal lands, or actions and incidents associated with the delivery of services by the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.
3 The Snolqaulmie Tribe has adopted the Federl Rules of Civil Procedure for “all suits of a civil nature.” STC 3.2 § 5.0.
4 “Section 11 of the Snoqualmie Judiciary Act (Snoqualmie Tribal Code Section 3.1.11) provides that the Snoqualmie Courts, in the absence of Snoqualmie law, shall apply these laws, in this order: (a) The laws of other Indian Tribes, (b) Federal statutory law, and (c) State (presumably Washington) statutory law.” Snoqualmie v. Lubenau, 17 NICS App. 47, 48 (Snoqualmie Ct. App. 2019).
5 In his opening brief Mr. Flint admits he filed the amended complaint “to moot the Authority’s argument that his case should be dismissed because he sued the Authority instead of the ‘Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.’” Brief of Appellant at 6.
6 We note, however, that the Act’s definition of “Tribe” as including the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe and its entities coupled with the use of both “Tribe” and “Snoqualmie Indian Tribe” throughout its provisions is inconsistent and confusing (e.g. STC 8.7 §§ 2.0, 4.0, 6.0, 9.0(B), 12.0). We further note that STC 8.7 § 3.0 does not state the Act shall only apply to tort claims in which the named defendant is the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe. We urge the Tribe to address these issues to prevent future unnecessary litigation.
7 The trial court apparently agreed when ruling Mr. Flint’s argument that his amended complaint cured the defect “is contrary to a plain reading of the Act which makes no allowance for any type of substantial compliance or sets forth a procedure for curing the initial mistake of failing to name the Tribe as a Defendant and strictly complying with the notice procedures.” Dismissal Order at 3 (¶ 11).
8 The Act’s written notice procedures and requirements are found in Section 10.0. That section does not require a claimant’s written notice name the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe as the defendant. In fact, “If the action alleges a claim involving an act or omission of a Tribal entity, services of the summons and complaint shall also be given to the Director of the Tribal entity” in addition to the Secretary of the Tribal Council and the Tribe's In-House Legal Counsel. STC 8.7 § 10.0(i).
9 Section 12.0(e) of the Act provides:
The procedures and standards for giving notice of claims to the Tribe and commencing tort claim actions in Tribal Court under this Chapter are integral parts of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided by this Chapter and shall be strictly and narrowly construed. A tort claim for monetary damages against the Tribe shall be forever barred unless written notice of the claim has been given pursuant to the requirements in this Chapter, and is commenced in Tribal Court in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
STC 8.7 § 12.0(e) (emphasis added).
10 The trial court concluded Mr. Flint’s “failure to follow and fully comply with all of the Act’s notice procedures at the commencement of his lawsuit is a flaw that forever bars him from bringing his tort claim for monetary damages against the Tribe. STC 8.7 § 12.0(e).” Order at 3 (emphasis added).
11 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Personal Injuries in Tort (Authority’s motion) at 2, 6; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Personal Injuries in Tort (Tribe’s motion) at 2, 7.
12 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1) reads:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments.
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
13 STC 8.7 § 6.0(d).
14 STCT8.7 § 4.0.
15 “Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs when an amended pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus itself timely even though it was filed outside an applicable statute of limitations.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010).