8 CTCR 32, 16 CCAR 15
 
Nathan MOULTON, Appellant,
v.
COLVILLE TRIBAL FEDERATION CORPORATION, Appellee.
 
No. AP21-011
 
Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals
January 22, 2024

          Trial Court Case No. AP21-011

          Michael Humiston, appeared for Appellant.

          Timothy H. McLaughlin, appeared for Appellee.

          Before Chief Justice Anita Dupris, Justice Dennis L. Nelson, and Justice Theresa M. Pouley

          Dupris, C.J.

         This matter came before this Court for an Initial Hearing on January 11, 2022 on an Appeal timely filed by Appellant on October 28, 2021 against Appellee on issues regarding motions for summary judgment rulings at the Trial Court level. Appellant is represented by Michael Humiston, Spokesperson; Appellee is represented by Timothy H. McLaughlin, Spokesperson.

         Appellant appeals the Trial Court Order of September 30, 2021, Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, specifically the rulings that denied his Motion for Summary Judgment, and that dismissed the case. Based on the reasoning set out below we affirm the Trial Court's rulings, with direction to the Trial Court to clarify that the cross-motion of summary judgment of Appellee is granted and the cross-motion of Appellant is denied.

         PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Appellant was hired by Appellee (CTFC) in April, 2015 under a contract to be the Fuel Director for the Corporation. His contract was extended for three years in 2016. Appellant was a contract employee, and not subject to CTFC's general personnel policies. The contract set out specifically how it could be terminated.

         CTFC gave Appellant notice on April 18, 2017 that it intended to terminate it's employment contract based on fourteen reasons, and informed Appellant he had an opportunity to be heard on the matter at a board meeting the following day. Appellant did not attend the meeting and on April 19, 2017 CTFC terminated its contract with Appellee.

         In June, 2017 Appellant brought a civil action for wrongful termination in the Trial Court, which is the basis of this appeal. In March, 2019, the Trial Court denied Appellee's Motion to Dismiss the case based on sovereign immunity. Extensive discovery transpired over the following year, culminating in cross-motions for summary judgment filed by both parties, The Order of September 30, 2021 ensued and is the basis for this Appeal.

         ISSUES

         Three issues were identified by the parties: 1. What are the procedures applicable in addressing a motion for summary judgment? 2. What is the standard the Court should use for such motions? 3. Did the Trial Court err in applying those standards?

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Issues of law, are reviewed de novo. Mixed law and fact issues are also reviewed de novo. CCT v. Naff, 5 CCAR 50 (1995). In this case, determining the procedures used in addressing motions for summary judgment (MSJ) is an issue of law; the question of whether the facts in the record are sufficient to support the Trial Court's rulings on the MSJ's is a mixed law and fact question. Therefore, all of the issues will be reviewed de novo.

         ISSUES: What is the standard for such motions, and what are the procedures to follow?

         We have already set out the standard for MSJ motions in Peone v. CCT, et al., 15 CCAR 19 (2021), in which we stated:

The accepted standard for ruling on motions for summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that supports going forward with the cause of action. The moving party has the first burden of proof on this issue, with deference given to the non-moving party. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party if the moving party has established sufficient argument to grant the motion. The Court reviews all the pleadings filed at the time, including briefs and legal memoranda on the issue of genuine issues of material facts.

         As informative as the non-tribal law was in both briefs, we need not look elsewhere when this jurisdiction's laws have already answered the question. We hold that the standard and procedures for such reviews are already established.

         ISSUE: Did the Trial Court err in applying those standards?

         Appellant asks this Court to find the Trial Court erred in its determination that his MSJ be dismissed. He asserts there is a genuine issue of material fact. He seems to make a circular argument when he posits "Upon finding that Moulton had failed to satisfy his burden of proof as to the facts being undisputed, the court effectively acknowledged that Colville Fuels' facts were disputed as well." Appellant's Brief at page 5.

         First, the Trial Court made an extensive review of hundreds of pages of discovery submitted by both parties before making its decision to grant Appellee' Motion to Dismiss. We have also reviewed all the documents, de novo. Appellant was terminated based on fourteen allegations of breach of contract. The record sets out each allegation in minute detail. It also sets out, in minute detail, all of the reasons Appellant disputed these claims.

         We are not going into details of each of the claims. They were covered thoroughly by the Trial Court. Appellant bases his assertion that his MSJ should not have been dismissed because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the scope of his employment requirements, and as to what weight or credibility should be given to a Board member's testimony in his deposition.

         Appellee goes in great detail on the different bases for each allegation of breach of contract. This information was provided to the Trial Court as well. Appellee argues That Appellant failed to assert his termination was on grounds that were arbitrary, capricious or illegal. He argued his dismissal was politically motivated but, Appellee asserts, he did not provide evidence to the Trial Court to substantiate this claim.

         Appellant wants this Court to grant him an opportunity to go forward with his claims based on his assertions that he was wrongfully terminated and the Trial Court, by entering findings of fact, ignored his allegations of genuine material facts. The Trial Court did, after reviewing all of the record, find that Appellant 'failed to provide...'specific facts' supporting his claim." Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, at page 3. The Trial Court did assess the MSJ's under the standards and procedures established in Peone, supra.

         Our review of the record supports a finding that there is no substantial evidence offered by Appellant to support his assertion of wrongful termination. We held in Peone, supra, that "[a]ssertions alone are insufficient to meet his burden of proof." This is true of Appellant's case herein, too.

         Finally, perhaps some of the confusion in the Trial Court's order is semantical. When the Trial Court entered the order on cross-motions for summary judgment, it acknowledged the correct standard for granting Appellee's MSJ, and for denying Appellant's MSJ,. It just didn't specifically say Appellee's MSJ was granted before dismissing the case.

         We hold the Trial Court applied the correct standards for reviewing the motions for summary judgment, and the record supports its findings and affirm its decision. There is no genuine material issue of fact, as a matter of law regarding Appellant's termination from employment. We further hold the matter shall be remanded to allow the Trial Court to amend its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment to include language regarding Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

         It is so ORDERED.