2003-2003 Term
Supreme Court Cases Related to Indian Law
Four Indian law-related cases were granted.
Petition for certiorari was denied in 27 Indian law-related cases.
One case was dismissed.
Cert Granted
Subjects: Affirmative action programs -- Michigan;
University of Michigan. Law School -- Admission; Minorities
-- Education (Higher) -- United States; Equality before the
law -- United States; United States. Constitution. 14th Amendment;
United States. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Race. Ethnicity.
*Issues: (1) Does University of Michigan
Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate
equal protection clause of 14th Amendment, Title VI of 1964 Civil
Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 2000d), or 42
U.S.C. § 1981? (2) Should appellate court required to apply
strict scrutiny to governmental race-based preferences review de
novo district court's findings because fact issues are "constitutional"?
Holdings: (from Westlaw) The
Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor, held that:
(1) law
school had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student
body; and
(2) admissions program was narrowly tailored to serve
its compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body, and thus did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
Affirmed.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 8/09/02. Petition granted on 12/2/02. Argued 4/01/03. Decided
6/23/03.
*Holding below: Grutter
V. Bollinger, Sixth Cir., 288
F.3d 732, Public law school admissions policy that considers
applicants' race and ethnicity as potential "plus" factors
in pursuit of "critical mass" of under-represented minority
students, without setting aside seats for them or insulating them
from comparison with nonminority applicants, is narrowly tailored
to achieve state's compelling interest in attaining diverse student
body and thus does not violate 14th Amendment's equal protection
clause; appellate court conducts independent review of record when
constitutional facts are at issue.
Related News Stories: At U-Michigan, Minority Students
Find Access -- and Sense of Isolation (Washington
Post) Supreme Court briefs back affirmative action (Indianz.com)
Subjects: Sovereign immunity -- Tribe; Civil rights;
Criminal jurisdiction -- state; Search and seizure; Qualified
immunity.
*Issues: (1) Does doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity enable Indian tribes, their gambling casinos, and other
commercial businesses to prohibit searching of their property by
law enforcement officers for criminal evidence pertaining to commission
of off-reservation state crimes, when search is pursuant to search
warrant issued upon probable cause? (2) Does such search by state
law enforcement officers constitute violation of tribe's civil rights
that is actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983? (3) If such search is actionable under Section
1983, are state law enforcement officers who conducted search nonetheless
entitled to qualified immunity?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that tribe was not “person”
who could sue under § 1983.
Vacated and remanded.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/19/02.
Petition granted on 12/2/02. Argued 3/31/03. Decided
5/19/03.
Supreme Court pleadings and briefs and oral argument: Tribal
Supreme Court Project, Oral
argument
*Holding
below:Bishop
Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, Ninth Cir.,
291 F.3d 549. Under United States v. James, 980
F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.
1992), search warrant against Indian tribe and tribal property
violated tribe's sovereign immunity; district attorney and county
sheriff violated Fourth Amendment when they executed search
warrant to seize tribal property held on tribal land, both of
which were outside their jurisdiction, and such violation is
actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; at time search warrant was obtained,
it would have been clear to reasonable officer in Ninth Circuit
that there was no jurisdictional grant authorizing county officers
to search and seize tribal property as part of criminal prosecution
of individual Native American, and, therefore, district attorney
and sheriff are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Related News Stories: Supreme Court Hears Inyo County v.
Bishop Paiute Tribe - Tribal Supreme Court Project Plays a Key
Role (NCAI)
4/1/03
Supreme Court to consider limit of state authority on Indian land (San
Francisco Chronicle) 3/29/0
Subjects:
Mineral rights -- Indian Mineral Leasing Act (25
USC 396a et seq.); Mineral Rights -- Claims against the
United States; Mineral rights -- Leasing.
*Issues: Did court of appeals properly
hold that United States is liable to Navajo Nation for up to $600
million in damages for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with
secretary of interior's actions concerning Indian mineral lease,
without finding that secretary had violated any specific statutory
or regulatory duty established pursuant to Indian Mineral Leasing
Act?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that Tribe's claim for compensation
did not derive from any liability-imposing provision of Indian Mineral
Leasing Act (IMLA) or its implementing regulations.
Reversed and remanded.
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 3/15/02. Petition granted
6/03/02. Argued 12/02/02. Decided 3/04/03.
Supreme Court Pleadings and Briefs: Briefs
*Holding below: Navajo
Nation v. United States. Fed. Cir., 263
F. 3d. 1325. By suppressing deputy assistant secretary for Indian
affairs' decision to increase royalty rate on Indian coal lease
to reasonable level after meeting secretly with lessee and adopting
lessee's position, secretary of interior acted in direct contravention
of Indian Mineral Leasing Act's charge to obtain for Indians maximum
return for their minerals and breached government's fiduciary duty,
action that was within jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims and
subject to remedy by assessment of damages resulting from breach
of trust.
Subject:
Trust relation -- Breach.
* Issue: Does Pub. L. No. 86-392 (1960)
authorize award of money damages against United States for alleged
breach of trust in connection with described property?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme
Court, Justice Souter, held that United States's breach of fiduciary
duty to maintain and preserve trust property gave rise to substantive
claim for money damages under the Indian Tucker Act.
Affirmed and remanded.
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 1/22/02. Petition for certiorari
granted 4/22/02. Argued 12/02/02. Decided 3/04/03.
Supreme Court Pleadings: Briefs
*Holding
Below: White
Mountain Apache v. United States Fed. Cir., 249
F.3d. 1364, Pub. L. No. 86-392 (1960), which provided
that Fort Apache military post shall be "held by the United States
in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right
of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and
improvements for administrative or school purposes for as long as
they are needed for that purpose," created enforceable fiduciary
relationship between United States and tribe with respect to buildings
over which United States exercised control to exclusion of tribe,
breach of which gives rise to cognizable claim for money damages.
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to Top
Cert Denied
Kennedy v. Hughes
Docket
No. 02-1853
Subjects: Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico -- Officials and
employees; Civil rights; United States. Indian Civil Rights Act
(25 USC 70 et seq.); Searches and seizures -- Pueblo of Santa Clara,
New Mexico; Property; Imprisonment -- Pueblo of Santa Clara, New
Mexico.
*Issues:(1) Does Tenth Circuit decision set precedent that allows tribes
to single-out and violate nonmembers' constitutional rights? (2)
Did district court incorrectly interpret this court's rule regarding
requirement to exhaust remedies?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/18/03. Petition was denied on 10/6/03
*Holding
below: Kennedy
v. Hughes, 60
Fed. Appx. 734, 10th Cir., Plaintiffs' claims having been
resolved on merits by tribal court, plaintiffs do not satisfy test
of Dry Creek Lodge Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623
F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1982),
which recognized limited exception to holding of Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), that there is no private cause of
action under Indian Civil Rights Act except under ICRA's habeas corpus
provision, and thus plaintiffs' claims alleging violation of their
civil and constitutional rights as protected by ICRA were properly
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Long
v. United States
Docket
No. 02-1801
Subjects: Double jeopardy; Jurisdiction -- Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin; Jurisdiction -- United States; Theft;
Malicious mischief.
*Issues:Does federally recognized Indian tribe, whose present power
to prosecute tribal offenses was established by act of Congress,
prosecute as sovereign separate from federal government for purposes
of dual sovereignty exception to Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy
clause?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/10/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding
below: United
States v. Long, 2003
WL 140083,
7th. cir. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin, Lynn Adelman, J., 183
F.Supp.2d 1106, dismissed the indictment. Government appealed.
Congress's 1973 restoration of Native American tribe's sovereign status
is not mere delegation of federal power to tribe and, therefore, tribe
is separate sovereign for purposes of dual sovereignty exception to
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause; person prosecuted in tribal
court could be subsequently prosecuted in federal court for same offense.
Table Mountain Rancheria v. American Vantage Companies
Docket
No. 02-1770
Subjects: Non-Indians; Contractors; Breach of contract; Indian
gaming; Jurisdiction; Table Mountain Racheria of California; United
States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25 USC 2701 et seq.).
*Issues:
Are state law claims for breach of contract brought against
Indian tribe by private gaming management company, involving matters
integrally related to tribe's control over its gaming operations,
completely preempted by IGRA and pursuable only in federal court?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/2/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding
below: American
Vantage Companies v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 126
Cal.Rptr.2d 849, Consultant's contract with Indian tribe
to provide technical assistance, training, and advice to tribe in
operation of its gaming activities, and consultant's agreement with
tribe to terminate prior contract to manage tribe's casino, were determined
by National Indian Gaming Commission not to require approval of its
chairman, and thus consultant's state law causes of action against
tribe for breach of each contract and seeking money damages as sole
remedy are not preempted by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, under which
regulation of contracts is limited to management contracts and agreements
collateral thereto.
In
re Riggs
Docket
No. 02-1774
Subjects: Indian courts -- Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico
& Utah -- Enforcement of opinions and orders. Jurisdiction
-- Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah. Comity of nations.
Due process of law.
*Issues:(1) Does Navajo Nation qualify as "territory," or
"possession," or federal independent contractor, for purposes
of 28
U.S.C. § 1738 full faith and credit and comity enforcement
of Navajo Nation orders by this court by way of extraordinary writ
of mandamus? (2) Does respondents' "unified defense" so
contradict rules of ethical representation that petitioners are
denied due process and respondents should be prohibited from using
unified defense in federal courts by extraordinary writ of prohibition
by this court?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/28/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding
below: Petition for writ of mandamus asking Tenth Circuit to vacate
and replace its decision upholding dismissal of certain claims seeking
enforcement of Navajo court orders and remanding others for determination
of Navajo court jurisdiction, MacArthur
v. San Juan County, Utah, 309
F.3d 1216 (2002), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3750 (U.S.
June 2, 2003) (Nos.
02-1253,
02-1444, 02-1445),
amounts to untimely petition for rehearing and is denied; petition
for mandamus to direct district court either to recuse or to follow
different directions than those given in Tenth Circuit's 2002 decision
is denied because petitioners, who may file appeal from any judgment
adverse to them, have other adequate means to attain relief they desire
and thus are not entitled to mandamus relief.
Shook
v. Montana
Docket
No. 02-1658
Subjects: Hunting on Indian reservations -- Montana; Indians
of North America – Non-members of a tribe; Game laws -- Montana;
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Confederated
Tribes of, Montana; Equality before the law – United States;
Conflict of laws.
*Issues:
Coming soon
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/9/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding
below: State
v. Shook (Briefs),
313
Mont. 347, Montana Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, Nelson,
J., held that: (1) regulation was rationally tied to fulfillment of
obligations to Indians, such that it did not violate equal protection,
and (2) state law, which includes Indian treaties reserving hunting
or fishing rights to the respective tribes, provided authorization
for promulgation of the regulation.
Ramsey
v. United States
Docket
No. 02-1547
Subjects: Fuel -- Taxation; Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakama Indian Nation of the Yakima Reservation, Washington --
Taxation; Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation
of the Yakima Reservation, Washington -- Treaties -- Canons of construction
favoring Indian.
*Issues:
(1) Are previous opinions of this court, applying canons of
treaty construction to construe language "the right of taking
... in common with citizens of the territory" in Article III,
Paragraph 2, of Treaty
with Yakamas of 1855 (12 Stat. 951), and finding that "right
... in common with" language reserved to Yakama specific and
special rights to take fish, in direct conflict with opinions of
Ninth Circuit in this case finding that identical language of same
treaty article provided Yakamas with no special and specific rights
as to travel on public highways? (2) Is opinion below, finding that
terms "in common with" and "right to travel"
in Article III provide Yakamas no rights, in direct conflict with
this court's opinion in Washington
v. Washington State Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979), construing same language to grant specific rights
to Yakama Indians? (3) Does reasoning of opinion of this court in
Tulee
v. Washington, 315 U.S. 682 (1942), construing "in
common with" language of Article III, Paragraph 2, of Treaty
with Yakama of 1855 (12 Stat. 951) as reserving to Yakama tribal
members right to take fish without payment for fees for that right,
conflict with court of appeals' ruling that identical language of
Article III, Paragraph 1, of treaty regarding right of Yakama Indians
to haul tribally produced goods to market on public highways free
of federal diesel and heavy vehicle use tax, provided no similar
exemption? (4) Is court of appeals' opinion requiring that Indian
treaty must contain "express exemptive language" on its
face before it may qualify Indian for federal tax exemption in direct
conflict with prior rulings of this court in Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), Squire
v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), and Chickasaw
Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 70 U.S.L.W. 4020 (2001),
holding that such language need only be "clearly expressed,"
with all doubtful terms and expressions construed in favor of Indians?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/22/2003. Petition was denied on 10/6/03.
*Holding
below: Ramsey
v. United States. 9th cir. 302
F.3d 1074. Language in 1855 Yakama Treaty stating that
"free access from the [reservation] to the nearest public highway,
is secured to [the Yakama]; as also the right in common with citizens
of the United States, to travel upon all public highways," does
not provide express exemptive language from which court can discern
intent to exempt Yakama from generally applicable federal heavy vehicle
and federal diesel fuel taxes, and thus, member of federally recognized
Indian tribe who lives and works on reservation is subject to federal
heavy vehicle and diesel fuel taxes for hauling timber that was cut
on reservation to off-reservation markets using diesel fuel trucks
that exceed 55,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.
Saucerman
v. Norton
Docket
No. 02-1393
Subjects: United States. Administrative Procedure Act;
United States -- Officials and employees; Tribal government
-- Officials and employees; Civil rights; Trials (Eviction);
Government liability -- United States; Sovereign immunity;
United States. Quiet Title Act (28 USC 2409); Equitable
title; Chemehuevi Indian Tribe of the Chemehuevi Reservation,
California; Havasu, Lake (Ariz. and Calif.).
*Issues: (1) Does "Indian exception" to
Quiet Title Act divest federal court of subject matter jurisdiction
to determine land status element of Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981), as Ninth Circuit has ruled, or is exception
not applicable to determination of land status as held by
Tenth Circuit in Kansas v. United States, 249
F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2001)? (2) Does solicitor's
opinion that secretary of interior has discretionary authority
to restore "equitable title" to shoreline of Lake
Havasu to Chemehuevi Indian Tribe create "colorable
claim" in United States that defeats judicial review
of laws and administrative actions that are basis of its
claim?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 2/21/03. Petition was denied on 6/23/03.
*Holding
below: Saucerman v. Norton (unreported), 9th Cir. 2002
WL 31557880. Former permittees' Administrative
Procedure Act suit against Indian tribe that evicted them
from their cabins on Indian reservation is barred by Indian
lands exception to Quiet Title Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2409a, which expressly reserves sovereign
immunity in disputes involving property held in trust for
Indian tribes as long as government has colorable claim
regarding its title as trustee to land at issue; government
established colorable claim of title as trustee to land
at issue, based on Interior Department solicitor's opinion
recognizing establishment of reservation and secretary's
authority to grant equitable title of disputed lands to
tribe, statute authorizing secretary to designate reservation
lands for construction of dam, and case law recognizing
tribe and reservation.
San
Juan County, Utah v. Riggs
Docket
No. 02-1444
Subjects: Sovereign immunity -- Tribe; Sovereignty --
Tribal; Tribal Court - Jurisdiction
*Issues: Did court of appeals err in reversing district
court's dismissal of claims against cross-petitioners and
holding that Navajo tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction
must be addressed prior to issue of cross-petitioners' sovereign
immunity from suit in tribal court?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 3/28/03. Petition denied on 6/02/03.
*Holding
below: MacArthur
v. San Juan County, Utah, 10th Cir., 309
F.3d 1216.
In lawsuit brought by employees of county health clinic
under contract with federal Indian Health Service to provide
health care to members of Navajo community, seeking enforcement
of Navajo court preliminary injunction premised on various
violations of Navajo law, dismissal of employees' claims
against county and various health district defendants on
basis of sovereign immunity from suit in Navajo tribal court
is vacated and case is remanded to determine threshold question
of whether Montana
v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), divests Navajo court of power
to adjudicate employees' claims.
San Juan Health Services Districy v. Riggs
Docket
No. 02-1445
Subjects: Sovereign immunity -- Tribe; Sovereignty --
Tribal; Tribal Court - Jurisdiction
*Issues: Did court of appeals err in reversing district
court's dismissal of claims against cross-petitioners and
holding that Navajo tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction
must be addressed prior to issue of cross-petitioners' sovereign
immunity from suit in tribal court?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 3/28/03. Petition denied on 6/02/03.
*Holding below: MacArthur
v. San Juan County, Utah, 10th Cir., 309
F.3d 1216.
In lawsuit brought by employees of county health clinic
under contract with federal Indian Health Service to provide
health care to members of Navajo community, seeking enforcement
of Navajo court preliminary injunction premised on various
violations of Navajo law, dismissal of employees' claims
against county and various health district defendants on
basis of sovereign immunity from suit in Navajo tribal court
is vacated and case is remanded to determine threshold question
of whether Montana
v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), divests Navajo court of power
to adjudicate employees' claims.
Riggs
v. San Juan County
Docket
No. 02-1253
Subjects: Federal courts jurisdiction; Jurisdiction
-- Deference to tribal courts; Tribal courts; Jurisdiction
-- Over non-Indians; Jurisdiction -- Over non-members of
a tribe; Navajo courts; Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico,
Utah -- Medical care; Insurer; Attorney; United States.
Indian Health Service; Health facilities -- Employees.
*Issues: Did Tenth Circuit, in remanding case to
district court and in ruling that district court had no
jurisdiction to enforce judgment of Navajo tribal court
as against defendants: (i) violate precedents of this court;
(ii) directly conflict within itself and other circuits;
and (iii) act outside its own subject matter jurisdiction,
by defining tribal court subject matter jurisdiction by
immunizing non-Indians from tribal government authority
contrary to treaties, statutes, executive orders, regulations,
policies, and contracts?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 2/6/03. Petition denied on 6/02/03.
*Holding
below: MacArthur
v. San Juan County, 10th Cir., 10/7/02. Contractual
and consensual relationships between Navajo tribe and, respectively,
insurer of and attorney for Utah county health clinic under
contract with federal Indian Health Service to provide health
care to members of Navajo community were too attenuated
to justify tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over
insurer and attorney, both nonmembers of tribe, and thus,
federal district court properly dismissed claims against
insurer and attorney brought by employees of clinic seeking
enforcement of Navajo court preliminary injunction premised
on various violations of Navajo law; with respect to county
itself and various health district defendants in employees'
suit, case is remanded to federal district court to determine
whether
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), divests
Navajo court of power to adjudicate clinic employees' claims.
Snohomish
County v. Gobin
Docket
No. 02-1029
Subjects: Tribal property -- personal property; Lands;
Right of property; Reservations; Jurisdiction -- Snohomish
County.
*Issues:
(1) Does express in rem jurisdiction over reservation fee
lands established by Congress in Sections 5 and 6 of Indian
General Allotment Act and recognized in County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251 (1992), allow Snohomish County to zone or impose
any land use regulations against fee land located on Tulalip
Indian Reservation when land is owned by member of Tulalip
Tribes? (2) In light of diminished tribal authority over reservation
fee lands recognized in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), and
minimal federal and tribal interests in maintaining exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over private open-market development,
do legitimate regulatory interests of state and local government
allow Snohomish County to zone or impose any land use regulations
against reservation fee lands or tribal members developing
those lands when land is owned by member of Tulalip Tribes?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/13/02.
Petition for certiorari was denied on 3/10/03.
Holding
Below: Gobin
v. Snohomish County, Ninth Cir., 304
F.3d 909, Congress did not expressly authorize
plenary state in rem jurisdiction over Indian reservation
land owned in fee simple by registered members of tribe when
it made such land freely alienable and encumberable, and thus,
absent exceptional circumstances not present here, county
may not assert land use jurisdiction over proposed development
on such land.
Related News Stories: Supreme
Court rejects state jurisdiction appeal 3/11/03.
Lobo Gaming, Inc.v. Pit River Tribe of California
Docket
No. 02-865
Subjects: Gaming -- Contracts -- Breach.
*Issues:
(1) Should courts resolve issues of tribal sovereign immunity
by applying uniform principles of federal law? (2) Under federal
law, does governing body of Indian tribe have authority to
waive tribe's sovereign immunity in cases in which governing
body is expressly authorized to enter into contracts on tribe's
behalf? (3) Is Pit River Indian Tribe barred from asserting
sovereign immunity from suit on contract when contract was
duly authorized and executed by tribal council and contract
itself contains waiver of tribe's immunity from suit?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/12/02.
Petition for certiorari was denied on 2/24/03.
Holding
Below: Lobo Gaming Inc., v. Pit River Tribe of California,
Cal App. Ct. (unpublished) 2002
WL 922136. Contractor brought action against Indian
tribe for breach of lease agreement, pursuant to which tribe
borrowed funds to construct two casinos and leased gaming
machines and furnishings. The Superior Court, Shasta County,
No. 140106, granted tribe's motion to quash service. Contractor
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Raye, J., held that agreement's
purported waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid.
Sun Prairie v. McCaleb
Docket
No. 02-751
Subjects: Lands -- Leasing;
Environmental regulation -- National Environmental
Policy Act (42
U.S.C. 4321 -); Federal authority over Indian
affairs -- Contracts; Bureau of Indian Affairs --
Federal authority over Indian affairs; Cultural
heritage -- National Historic Preservation Act (16
U.S.C. 470).
*Issues:
Once lease of Indian lands to non-Indian party has received
federal approval under 25
U.S.C. §§ 81 and 415,
does that non-Indian party have prudential standing to challenge
federal agency's attempt to void lease by unilaterally withdrawing
previous federal approval?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/02/02.
Petition for certiorari was denied on 2/24/03.
*Holding
Below: Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt. Eighth Cir., 286
F. 3d. 1031. Non-Indian lessee of Indian tribal
trust property on which lessee plans to construct pork production
facility lacks standing to challenge Bureau of Indian Affairs
decision voiding lease on ground that Finding of No Significant
Impact was issued in violation of National Environmental Policy
Act; although lessee has demonstrated constitutionally required
elements of standing--injury that is fairly traceable to actions
of defendant and that can be redressed by favorable court
ruling--its interest, being purely economic, falls outside
zone of interests sought to be protected by NEPA and National
Historic Preservation Act, which lessee claims were violated
by BIA's voiding of lease.
Alabama-Coushatta
Tribe of Texas v. America Tobacco Co.
Docket
No. 02-746
Subjects: Sovereignty -- Tribal; Smoking costs; Medical
care, Cost of; Smoking -- Health aspects; Health and welfare
/ social services.
*Issues: (1) Does federally recognized Indian tribe have
standing to sue on its own behalf for decimation of its discrete
and narrow population? (2) Is heightened standard being applied
in determining whether Indian tribes have standing to sue on
behalf of their tribal members?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/12/02. Petition
for certiorari was denied on 1/21/03.
*Holding
below: Fifth Circuit (Unreported and no opinion from District
Court or Court of appeals. See Westlaw table at: 46
Fed.Appx. 225). Indian tribe's sovereign status and
its allegation that tobacco-related injuries to tribal members
injured tribe itself, by adversely affecting tribe's size and
health and well-being of its members, are insufficient to establish
"direct injury" needed to support tribe's fraud, racketeering,
product liability, negligence, and warranty claims against tobacco
manufacturers.
Notti v. Cook Inlet Region Inc.
Docket
No. 02-392
Subjects:
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 USC 1601 et seq.);
Discriminatory dividend payments; Removal.
*Issues: (1) Can adoption of federal law by state statute
give rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 when federal law does not occupy field,
does not entirely displace state law, does not create federal
cause of action, and does not contain federal remedy? (2) Should
this court adopt bright-line rule requiring existence of private
cause of action and remedy under federal law before it will
allow Section 1331 jurisdiction? (3) Should this court adopt
bright-line rule that federal law that provides no private remedy
cannot supply "jurisdiction-triggering federal question"
and thus cannot give rise to Section 1331 jurisdiction?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/19/02. Petition was
denied on 1/13/03.
*Holding
below: Ninth Cir., (unpublished, but available for a fee
on Westlaw.com at 31
Fed. Appx. 586.) District court did not err in denying
motion of plaintiff shareholders in suit against Alaska corporation
organized pursuant to Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act to
remand action to state court; notwithstanding plaintiffs' contention
that district court lacked removal federal question jurisdiction
over suit, district court did have subject matter jurisdiction
over case, because complaint raised substantial federal question
of whether Section 7(r) of ANCSA authorizes regional corporation
established pursuant to that statute to pay dividends on discriminatory
basis to Native leaders who were original shareholders in such
corporation.
Aria v. United States, on behalf of the Fort Mohave Indian Tribe
Docket
No. 02-604
Subjects:
Lands -- Quiet title; Lands -- Trespass.
*Issues: (1) Did congressional enactment of Swamp and
Overflowed Lands Act of Sept. 28, 1850 establish in praesenti
grant to individually affected states such that title vested
in states as of that date? (2) Is title to swamp lands retained
by federal government until such time as federal government
elects to issue patent to state? (3) Did Ninth Circuit correctly
hold that this court's precedent establishing and reconfirming
doctrine of "relation back" as to swamp lands has
been implicitly overruled by "trend" in case law requiring
that patent be issued before state's title to swamp lands becomes
perfected?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 10/11/02.
Petition was denied on 12/16/02.
*Holding below: United
States v. Byrne, Ninth Cir., 291
F.3d 1056. In determining whether it had jurisdiction
over quiet title and ejectment action and, if so, whether it
properly determined that property in question is located in
California rather than Arizona, district court's analysis should
have commenced with date on which United States patented disputed
lands to California in 1905, and not with pre-1905 avulsive
movements of Colorado River, and thus, given undisputed testimony
that both accretion and avulsion occurred in relevant area after
that date, remand is required to permit district court to conduct
whatever proceedings it deems necessary for re-analysis using
correct premise; Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act invested states
in praesenti with inchoate title to those lands falling within
description of act, to be perfected as of date of act when land
should be identified and patent issued, and thus it was only
when secretary of interior identified and patented land granted
under Swamp Act that fee simple title vested in state and state's
title became perfect.
Montana Department of Revenue, Petitioner v. Flat Center
Farms, Inc.
Docket
No. 02-464
Subjects: Business and economic development -- Tribal
industry; Business and economic development -- Taxation;
Taxation -- State.
*Issues: Does federal law preempt assessment of
Montana state corporation license tax on Montana business
corporation doing business within Fort Peck Indian Reservation
on grounds that such assessment is presumed preempted
absent express congressional authorization, that enrollment
status of one of corporation's Indian shareholders is
shared by corporation, and that corporation is not "carrying
on business in" Montana?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 9/18/02.
Petition was denied on 12/02/02.
*Holding
below: Flat
Center Farms v. State of Montana, MT Supreme Ct.,
310
Mont. 206, 49 P.3d 578. Flat Center Farms Inc.
is tribally chartered corporation owned and operated by
Indians, conducts business entirely on Fort Peck Reservation,
and does not "carry on business" in Montana,
and therefore lower court did not err in applying long-standing
rule--that state lacks power to tax Indian income generated
from on-reservation activities absent express authorization
by Congress--and in concluding that Montana corporation
license tax may not be imposed on Flat Center Farms Inc.
Miccosukee Tribe v. Tamiami Partners. Ltd.
Docket No. 02-491
Subjects: Jurisdiction -- United States;
Contracts; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; Jurisdiction
-- Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida; Sovereign immunity --
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida; Indian Gaming -- Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida.
*Issues: (1) Do Tamiami decisions, which interpret
Federal Arbitration Act as allowing courts "to look
through" arbitration to underlying federal claims
to find jurisdiction, and which find substantial federal
question based on federal statute that provides no private
right of action, represent unprecedented expansion of
federal question jurisdiction that conflicts with majority
of circuits that have decided issues? (2) Does Eleventh
Circuit's rejection of Miccosukee Tribal Court orders,
which stayed arbitration and vacated award, conflict with
unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court precedent requiring
deference to tribal courts and precluding relitigation
of issues resolved in tribal court, and should this court
grant certiorari to decide unresolved question in Nevada
v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353, 69 U.S.L.W. 4528 (2001), regarding
scope of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers?
History:Petition for certiorari was filed
on 9/23/02.Petition was denied on 11/18/02.
*Holding below: See case below at: Tamiami Partners
Ltd. v. Miccosukee, 35
Fed. Appx. 855 (Unreported, but table available
on Westlaw.com, a fee-based service.) See related case:
Tamiami
Partners Ltd. v. Miccosukee, Eleventh Cir., 177 F.
3d. 1212 (1999). District court properly ordered enforcement
of 1993 arbitration award that ordered Indian tribe that
had terminated contract with partnership for operation
of gambling facility on reservation to either reinstate
partnership or pay damages; notwithstanding tribe's contention
that district court lacked jurisdiction to hear case,
appeals court holds for third time that district court
has jurisdiction to hear case because it implicates Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act; tribal court did not have authority
to stay arbitration or vacate award; by entering agreement
that provided for arbitration under oversight of state
or federal courts, tribe waived immunity to federal court
jurisdiction.
Rosales v. Kean Argovitz Resorts Inc.
Docket No. 02-280
Subjects:
Civil rights -- Race discrimination; Gaming; Conspiracy;
Voting -- Rights.
*Issues:
Is private conspiracy by non-Indian gaming corporations
actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), when it deprives petitioners
of right to vote because petitioners are Indians and members
of tribal political faction?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/19/02. Petition
was denied 10/21/02.
*Holding
below: Ninth Cir., (Unpublished but available on Westlaw.com
for a fee at 35
Fed.Appx. 562) Court affirms district court's
ruling that plaintiff tribal members' allegations that
defendant gaming contractors contributed money to opposing
political faction and referred to plaintiffs as "half
blood Indians" suggested at most that defendants'
conduct was motivated by political beliefs and not racial
animus, amounted to nothing more than naked allegation
of racial discrimination, and thus failed to state race-based
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Tang v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe
Docket No. 01-1057
Subjects:
Tribal courts -- Jurisdiction; Civil jurisdiction, Federal
-- Exhaustion of tribal remedies; Tribal courts -- Appeal
and Review.
*Issues:
None provided
History:
Petition for certiorari filed (in forma pauperis) 4/26/2001.
Petition was denied 10/07/02.
*Holding
below: Tang v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Ninth Cir.,
(Unreported) 31 Fed.Appx. 438, The federal courts lack jurisdiction
to consider Tang's claims against the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe because Tang has not yet exhausted his remedies by
appealing tribal jurisdiction to the tribal appeals court.
See Allstate
Indem. Co. v. Stump, 191
F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir.), amended by 197 F.3d
1031 (9th Cir.1999).
Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement
and Power District
Docket No. 01-1762
Subjects: Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District; Indian preference in hiring -- Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah -- Members; Hopi
Indians; Independent contractors -- On Indian reservations -- Navajo
Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Sovereign immunity -- Tribes -- United States; Tribal self-determination -- United States; United States. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act; United States. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title 7; Discrimination in employment; Sovereign immunity -- Tribes -- Officials and
employees.
*Issues:
(1) Does tribal sovereign immunity render Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act impotent in claims between non-member employee
and nonmember employer engaged in business on reservation
when tribe has passed legislation mandating discriminatory
employment practices? (2) Can tribal officials be sued as
indispensable and necessary parties for purpose of prospective
relief in situations in which tribal nations pass and enforce
legislation that conflicts with federal law regarding employment
and exceeds scope of tribe's sovereign powers?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/30/02. Petition denied
on 10/07/02.
*Holding
below: Dawavendewa
v. Salt River Agr. Imp. and Power District, Ninth Cir.,
276
F.3d. 1150. In Hopi plaintiff's suit against lessee
of Navajo Nation challenging lessee's enforcement of lease
provision giving employment preference to members of Nation,
Nation is necessary party because plaintiff cannot be accorded
complete relief in Nation's absence, suit threatens to impair
Nation's contractual interests, and any disposition of suit
in Nation's absence threatens to leave lessee subject to substantial
risks of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations, but
Nation cannot be joined because it has not waived its tribal
sovereign immunity and Congress has not clearly abrogated
tribal sovereign immunity in cases under Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act; plaintiff's suit was against lessee only,
he specified no action by tribal officials performed in contravention
of constitutional or federal statutory law, relief he seeks
would operate against Nation as signatory to lease, and thus
plaintiff may not circumvent Nation's sovereign immunity by
joining tribal officials in its stead; both Nation and lessee
could incur prejudice if decision were rendered in Nation's
absence, no relief mitigates prejudice, no partial relief
is adequate, and plaintiff may have alternative forum available
via suit brought on his behalf by Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and thus Nation is indispensable party whose absence
requires dismissal of suit without prejudice.
Bank One NA v. Shumake
Docket No. 01-1732
Subjects:
Tribal courts -- Jurisdiction; Civil jurisdiction, Federal --
Exhaustion of tribal remedies.
*
Issues: 1) Should prudential, judge-made "tribal exhaustion"
doctrine be expanded to displace statutory command of Federal
Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 4, which creates juridical remedy in federal
district court for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate? (2)
Does Indian tribal court jurisdiction extend to civil suits arising
out of alleged commercial relationships between members and nonmembers
of tribe, when such assertions of jurisdiction are not necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal tribal
relations--question left open by this court in Nevada
v. Hicks, 533
US 353, 69 U.S.L.W. 4528 (2001)?
History: Petition for certiorari filed 5/22/02. Petition was
denied on 10/07/02.
*Holding below: Bank
One, N.A. v. Shumake, 5th Cir., 281
F.3d 507, District court's dismissal of bank's suit
to compel arbitration of claims brought against it in tribal court
by members of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians asserting that
bank financed satellite system purchases through use of bogus
credit cards and concealed material information with respect to
credit transactions is affirmed, district court having properly
determined that tribal exhaustion doctrine required giving tribal
court first opportunity to rule on question of its jurisdiction.
Bay View Inc. v. United States
Docket No. 01-1863
Subjects: Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (43
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) -- Revenue sharing; Tribal
property.
*Issues:
(1) May Congress, in legislation enacted at request of one
of parties to litigation, retroactively terminate vested property
rights in transactions long completed without United States incurring
liability under Fifth Amendment? (2) Did Federal Circuit violate
standards set by this court in dismissing on pleadings petitioner's
fact-intensive complaint of retroactive taking of its property
rights by Congress? (3) Has court of appeals ignored plain meaning
and congressional intent of key provision of ANCSA that requires
Alaskan Regional Corporations to share with each other and then
with Village Corporations "70 percent of all revenues received
by each Regional Corporation from the timber resources and subsurface
estate patented to it"? (4) Does decision of Federal Circuit
in depriving over 200 Alaska villages of their share of revenues
from sale of timber and mineral resources conflict with settled
construction of ANCSA, and similar act, by Ninth Circuit and Alaska
federal court?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/16/02. Petition was
denied on 10/07/02.
*Holding
below: Bay
View v. United States Federal Cir., 278
F. 3d.1259. Proceeds from Alaska native corporations'
sales of net operating loss deductions, arising from their sale
of timber and other natural resources at less than their tax basis,
did not constitute "revenues ... from the timber resources
and subsurface estate[s]" that each "Regional Corporation"
created by Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act is required by
ANCSA to share with "Village Corporations" in its region,
and thus Fifth Amendment's takings clause was not violated by
retroactive 1995 amendment to ANCSA that exempted pre-1989 sales
of NOLs from ANCSA's revenue sharing requirement.
Kornwolf
v. United States
Docket No. 01-1534
Subjects: Environmental
regulation -- Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16
U.S.C. 703); Environmental regulation -- Bald
Eagle Protection Act (16
U.S.C. 668); Cultural resources; Eagle feathers.
*Issues:
1) Is Andrus v. Allard still good law despite its inconsistency
with subsequent opinions of this court, almost unanimous criticism
of commentators, and confusion it has promoted in lower courts?
(2) Is it unconstitutional taking of private property to impose
criminal sanctions on sale of innocuous, historically significant,
antique Indian artifacts containing golden eagle feathers when
petitioner's ownership of those artifacts predates statutory protection
of golden eagle, there is no evidence that ban on sale substantially
advances protection of golden eagle, and effect of ban is to destroy
economic value of artifacts?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/11/02. Petition was
denied on 10/07/02.
*Holding
Below: United
States v. Kornwolf, (PDF) Eighth Cir., 276
F.3d. 1014. Under Andrus v. Allard, 444 US 51 (1979),
provisions of Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act and Migratory
Bird Treaty Act that ban sale of eagle feathers do not create
unconstitutional taking when applied to sale of Indian artifacts
containing eagle feathers that owner had acquired prior to effective
dates of statutes.
Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Young
Docket No. 01-1786
Subjects:
Sovereign immunity -- Tribal; Employment; Business and economic
development -- Contracts; Statutes -- State.
*Issues: (1) Did tribe waive its sovereign immunity such
that it can be held liable for alleged breach of employment agreement--even
though it was never party to agreement--based on state law doctrines
extending liability to noncontractual parties? (2) Did tribe waive
its sovereign immunity for purpose of subjecting itself to Michigan's
judgment interest statute even though it never expressly agreed
to subject itself to statute? (3) In actions against sovereign
Indian tribes, can state courts vitiate federal law governing
waivers of sovereign immunity, which requires such waivers to
be express and unequivocal, by applying state law doctrines or
statutes?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/3/02. Petition was denied
on 10/07/02.
*Holding
below: Young v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
Mich. (unreported) 2001
WL 672070. Plain language of joint venture master agreement,
which was signed by tribe, demonstrates that parties thereto intended
that such agreement and other documents "executed and delivered
at [c]losing," including employment agreement, be construed
as one agreement, and thus (i) breach of employment agreement
constitutes breach of joint venture master agreement, which explicitly
waives tribe's sovereign immunity from suit to enforce that agreement
and all agreements executed and delivered at closing, (ii) claim
of breach was subject to arbitration under terms of joint venture
master agreement, and (iii) tribe could be held liable for such
breach; award of statutory interest from date arbitration award
was issued through date judgment entered on award is satisfied
is statutorily required by state law, despite tribe's contention
that its waiver of sovereign immunity, even if it applies to claims
of breach of employment agreement, does not apply to awards of
postaward and postjudgment statutory interest.
Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Norton
Docket No. 01-1703
Subjects:
Tribes -- Federal recognition of; Cultural heritage --
History.
*Issues:
Can Bureau of Indian Affairs deny tribal descent by dismissing
key pieces of evidence under conclusiveness standard, ignoring
reasonable inferences, and discounting each piece of evidence
in isolation without regard to cumulative weight of evidence?
History:
Petition for certiorari filed 5/16/02. Petition was denied
on 10/07/02.
*Holding
below: Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Norton, D.C. Cir., 25
Fed.Appx. 2. (Unpublished) Assistant secretary for
Indian Affairs reasonably concluded that group of people seeking
federal recognition as Indian tribe failed to comply with regulation
requiring it to show, as prerequisite for recognition, that its
membership consists of individuals who descend from historical
Indian tribe, documentation of such descent not having been offered
and other evidence being limited.
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
Docket No. 01-1671
Subjects: Gaming -- Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25
U.S.C. 2701 et seq.); Tribal sovereignty and
powers; State rights; Gambling -- Law and legislation.
*Issues:
(1) Does Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, instead of Pueblo's Restoration
Act, govern gaming activities on reservation lands of Ysleta del
Sur Pueblo? (2) If not, should gaming provisions of Pueblo's Restoration
Act be interpreted consistently with this court's decision in
California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
US 202 (1987), thus preventing grave miscarriage of
justice?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed 5/13/02. Petition was denied
on 10/07/02.
*Holding
below: Unreported decision. Fifth Cir., 1/17/02. Summary judgment
in favor of Texas in its action to enjoin gambling on Indian reservation
and injunction directing Ysleta del Sur Pueblo to stop gambling
activities at Speaking Rock Casino are affirmed for reasons stated
by district court, namely that Pueblo's Restoration Act, which
prohibits Pueblo from engaging in gaming activity that would not
be permissible for ordinary citizen of Texas, precludes gaming
activities at Speaking Rock Casino, which violate Texas Penal
Code.
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Case Dismissed
Sac
& Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa v. Iowa Management
& Consultants, Inc.
Docket
No. 02-1563
Briefs
& Pleadings
Subjects: Indian gaming -- Sac & Fox Tribe of the
Mississippi in Iowa; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) (25 USC 2701 et seq.); Jurisdiction; Iowa. Supreme
Court; State courts -- United States; Contracts -- Federal
approval of; Arbitration (Administrative law).
*Issues: Does IGRA completely preempt state court
jurisdiction over dispute concerning nature and validity,
under tribe's gaming ordinance and federal law, of contract
between that tribe and non-Indian casino management company?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed on 4/23/03. Rule 46 dismissal on 6/24/03.
*Holding
below: Iowa
Management & Consultants v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the
Mississippi in Iowa, Iowa Supreme Court, 656
N.W.2d 167. State court has subject matter
jurisdiction over (i) consulting firm's demand, under arbitration
clause of its contract with Indian tribe, to compel arbitration
of firm's claims for compensation under contract, and (ii)
tribe's federal defenses to effort to compel arbitration;
case is remanded to resolve genuine issues of material fact
with respect to tribe's challenge to validity of entire
agreement, including arbitration clause, based on failure
to secure approval of contract by National Indian Gaming
Council as required by section of Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 25
U.S.C. § 2711, that requires NIGC approval of all
management contracts to which tribe is party.
Supreme Court pleadings and briefs and oral argument: Tribal
Supreme Court Project
