2004-05 Term
Supreme Court Cases Related to Indian Law
Six Indian law-related cases were granted.
Petition for certiorari was denied in 28 Indian law-related cases.
Cert Granted
Subject: Submerged lands and wetlands.
*Issues: Does Alaska, as opposed to United
States, have title to submerged lands within Alexander Archipelago
of Southeast Alaska that are behind closing lines drawn by United
States to mark seaward limit of inland waters in 1903 Alaska Boundary
Tribunal arbitration, including pockets and enclaves that are more
than three miles from coastline of mainland or any of islands behind
closing lines?
Holdings: (from Westlaw) The
United States Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that:
(1) the waters were not historic inland waters;
(2) waters did not qualify as inland waters under juridical bay
theory;
(3) federal government reserved the submerged lands underlying Glacier
Bay and the remaining waters within the monument's boundaries, supporting
federal government's claim; and
(4) Alaska Statehood Act (ASA) expressed Congressional intent to
retain submerged lands underlying the waters of Glacier Bay National
Park in Alaska as part of a federal reservation, rebutting the presumption
that Alaska held title to those lands.
Exceptions overruled.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 03/30/04. Petition granted 3/30/04. Argued 1/10/05. Decided 6/06/05.
Supreme Court Pleadings and orders: Briefs
and orders
Subjects: Real property -- Oneida Nation of New York; Indian Country (U.S.); Tax
exemption; Local taxation -- New York.
*Issues: (1) Is alleged reservation land Indian
country pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1151 and this court's decision in Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522
U.S. 520, 66 U.S.L.W. 4145 (1998), when land was neither set
aside by federal government nor superintended by federal government?
(2) Was alleged reservation land set aside by federal government
for purposes of Indian country analysis under 18
U.S.C. § 1151 and Venetie when alleged reservation was
established by state of New York in 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler,
and not by any federal treaty, action, or enactment? (3) Did 1838
Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required New York Oneidas to permanently
abandon their lands in New York, result in disestablishment of Oneida's
alleged New York reservation? (4) May alleged reservation (i) remain
Indian country or (ii) be subject to protections of Non-Intercourse
Act, 25
U.S.C. § 177, if tribe claiming reservation status and
Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that equitable considerations of laches,
acquiescence, and impossibility barred tribe's claim that its open-market
purchases of the parcels unified the fee and aboriginal title in
the parcels such that the tribe could assert sovereign dominion
over the parcels and avoid payment of city property taxes on the
parcels.
Reversed and remanded.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 12/11/2003. Petition granted 6/28/04. Argued 1/11/05. Decided
3/29/05.
Holding
below: Oneida
Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill, 337
F3d. 139, 2nd Cir. District court's determination that properties
reacquired by Oneida Indian Nation of New York are in Indian country and therefore
are not subject to taxation by New York state and its municipalities, absent
explicit congressional authorization, is affirmed, notwithstanding city's
contention that although properties were part of Oneidas' aboriginal land
and tribe's reservation as recognized by Treaty of Canandaigua, they are subject
to taxation because they are no longer within Indian country and Oneidas no
longer exist as tribe; properties in city of Sherrill, N.Y., including gasoline
station, convenience store, and textile manufacturing and distribution facility,
are located on Oneidas' historical reservation land set aside for tribe under
Treaty Canandaigua and therefore satisfy conditions of 18
U.S.C. § 1151, which defines Indian country to include "all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state"; Buffalo Creek Treaty includes
no text that provides "substantial and compelling" evidence of Congress's
intention to diminish or disestablish Oneidas' New York reservation, and therefore
cannot be read to effect formal disestablishment of such reservation; city's
contention that disputed issues of fact exist as to whether Oneidas have maintained
tribal existence so as to be entitled to claim properties as reservation land
is unavailing, appeals court having found no requirement in law that federally
recognized tribe must demonstrate its continuous existence in order to assert
claim to its reservation land.
Related News Stories: Supreme Court overturns Oneida Nation case (Indianz.com)
3/30/05. Court Sides with Sherrill. (UticaOD.com)
3/29/05. Oneida Indian Nation responds to the City of Sherrill's U.S. Supreme
Court petition. (Oneida
Dispatch) 01/29/04; High Court Wants Government's Perspective on Oneida
Tax Feud (Newsday.com) 02/23. Word from Supreme Court Expected Monday (Oneida
Dispatch) 02/21/04.
Indian land dispute could have far-reaching effects (Newsday.com)
1/8/05. Supreme Court justice fears governmental ``chaos'' if tribe wins tax
case. (Newsday.com)
1/11/05. Cornell
University oral argument preview.
Subjects: United States. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act (25
USC 450 et seq.); Contracts; Cost; Self-determination.
*Issues: (1) Can federal government repudiate,
without liability, express contractual commitments for which it
has received valuable consideration, either by spending down discretionary
agency appropriations otherwise available to pay its contracts,
or simply by changing law and contracts retroactively? (2) Do government
contract payment rights that are contingent on "the availability
of appropriations" vest when agency receives lump-sum appropriation
that is legally available to pay contracts--as is law of Federal
Circuit under Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States,
622
F.3d 539 (Ct. Cl. 1980)--or is government's liability calculated
only at end of year after agency has spent its appropriations on
other activities, as Tenth Circuit ruled below?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The United
States Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that, where Congress
had appropriated sufficient legally unrestricted funds to pay contracts
in question, government could not avoid its contractual obligation
to pay contract support costs on grounds of “insufficient
appropriations.”
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 4/03/03.Petition granted 3/22/04.Argued 11/09/04. Argued 11/09/04.
Decided 3/1/05.
*Holding
below: Cherokee
Nation v. Thompson, 11/26/02, 311
F.3d 1054, 10th Cir. Provision of Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act stating that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision in this subchapter, the provision of funds under this subchapter
is subject to the availability of appropriations and the Secretary [of Health
and Human Services] is not required to reduce funding for programs, projects,
or activities serving a tribe to make funds available to another tribe,"
25
U.S.C. § 450j-1(b), clearly expresses Congress's intent that provisions
that obligate secretary to provide funding for various self-determination
contracts or compacts, to operate programs previously operated by federal
government, in amount equal to what would have been provided if HHS had
continued to provide, in this case, health care services itself, as well
as contract support costs (i.e., indirect costs incurred by tribe in carrying
out self-determination contract), do not create entitlement on tribes' part--independent
of appropriations to cover such amounts--to recover complete contract support
costs incurred in connection with health care services, and thus federal
government is not liable to tribes for contract support costs they incurred
in administering expanded health programs after money had already been disbursed
for years in question and no other appropriations were available.
Related
News Stories: Supreme Court to Resolve Self-determination Dispute (Indianz.com)
03/23. Summary
and analysis from Cornell University. Details
from the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University
Subjects: Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma; United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services; Breach
of contract -- United States; United States. Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (25
USC 450 et seq.); Overhead costs; Self-determination.
*Issues: 1) Does ISDEAA require secretary of health
and human services to pay contract support costs associated with
carrying out self-determination contracts with Indian Health Service,
when appropriations were otherwise insufficient to fully fund those
costs and would require reprogramming funds needed for noncontractable,
inherently federal functions such as having Indian Health Service?
(2) Does Section 314 of 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act bar respondent from recovering its
contract support costs?
Holding: (from Westlaw) The United
States Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that, where Congress
had appropriated sufficient legally unrestricted funds to pay contracts
in question, government could not avoid its contractual obligation
to pay contract support costs on grounds of “insufficient
appropriations.”
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/11/2003. Petition granted 3/22/04.
Argued 11/09/04.
Decided 3/1/05.
Holding
below: Thompson
v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 2003
WL 21511710, Federal
Cir. Availability clause of Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, 25
U.S.C. § 450j-1(b), which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision in this subchapter, the provision of funds under this subchapter
is subject to the availability of appropriations," does not excuse failure
by secretary of health and human services to pay full contract support costs
incurred by Indian tribe in administering federal programs under contract with
secretary, when there were no statutory caps on funding in appropriations acts
for relevant fiscal years, and when secretary has not shown that full payment
of contract support costs would breach statutory ban against reduction in "funding
for programs, projects, or activities serving [another] tribe" in order
to make such payments; in meeting contractual obligations, secretary lacks discretion,
in absence of statutory cap, to refuse to reprogram funds within lump-sum appropriation
for purposes other than those contemplated at time of appropriation; funds are
"available" within meaning of Section 450j-1(b) when secretary has
authority to reprogram and funds are available within lump-sum appropriation;
Section 314 of 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,
amounts appropriated to or earmarked in committee reports ... for payments to
tribes ... for contract support costs ... are the total amounts for fiscal years
1994 through 1998 for such purposes," does not defeat tribal right to contract
support costs for 1994, 1995, and 1996 fiscal years that vested long before
passage of 1999 appropriations act; ISDEAA makes it clear that funds devoted
by secretary to "inherently federal functions" are not unavailable
for contract support costs, and thus secretary was obligated to reprogram such
funds in order to pay contract support costs.
Related News Stories: Supreme Court to
resolve self-determination dispute (Indianz.com)
3/23/04. Justices considering whether government must reimburse
tribes for operating programs (Las
Vegas Review-Journal) 11/7/04. Summary
and analysis from Cornell University. Details
from the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University
Back
to Top
Cert Denied
Cogger v. Becker County, Minnesota
Docket
No. 04-1419
Subjects: Becker County (Minn.); Mobile
homes -- Taxation -- On Indian reservations; Prefabricated houses
-- Taxation -- On Indian reservations; Real property -- Defined
-- Minnesota; Real property -- Taxation -- Minnesota.
*Issues: (1) Do provisions of federal
law prohibit assessment of real property tax upon manufactured home,
vinyl skirting, three storage sheds, two wooden decks, and 8' x
6' porch? (2) Does County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251 (1992), grant states authority to reclassify manufactured
home as real property so that real estate tax may be imposed?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 04/20/2005. Petition was denied on 6/27/05.
*Holding below: Cogger
v. Becker County, 690
N.W.2d 739, Supreme court of Minnesota. Because Congress has
granted states authority to assess ad valorem taxes on real property
owned by Indians in fee title on Indian land, including authority
to determine definition of real property, Minnesota county may apply
that state's definition of real property and impose real property
tax on manufactured home, vinyl skirting, decks, and storage sheds
located on reservation within county and owned by Indian tribal
members.
Wood v. United States
Docket
No. 04-8571
Subjects: Trials (Burglary); Indians
of North America; Burglary -- Indian Country; Sentences (Criminal
procedure).
*Issues: not yet available
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 02/05/2005. Petition was denied on 6/27/05.
*Holding below:United
States v. Wood, 386
F.3d 961, 10th cir. The Court of Appeals, Baldock, Circuit Judge,
held that Sentencing Guidelines required imposition of sentence
between minimum and maximum sentences state law established for
the particular crime.
Subjects: United States. False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986; Jurisdiction -- United States. District
Court (Wyoming); Oil and gas leases; Comstock Resources, Inc.; Sales
-- United States -- Cases; Leases -- United States -- Cases; Wind
River Indian Reservation (Wyo.).
*Issues: Under False Claims Act, do individuals
who possess no personal, firsthand knowledge of any aspect of alleged
fraud have requisite "direct and independent knowledge"
to qualify as "original source" under 21
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)?
History: Petition
for certiorari was filed on 8/02/2004. Petition was denied on
6/27/05.
*Holding below: Kennard
v. Comstock Resources, Inc. 363
F.3d 1039, 10th Cir. Qui tam relators who suspected fraud on
government with respect to oil and gas leases and independently
investigated relatively obscure public documents to support their
fraud allegations are "original source" of information
that was first publicly disclosed in another complaint and thus
are not jurisdictionally barred from pursuing qui tam suit under
False Claims Act.
Related News Stories: Court Revives Royalties
Claim (Billings
Gazette) 04/07
Kahawaiolaa v. Norton
Docket
No. 04-1041
Briefs
Subjects: Native Hawaiians; United States.
Dept. of the Interior; Federal recognition of Indian tribes -- Native
Hawaiians; Issues and challenges; Equality before the law -- Native
Hawaiians; United States. Constitution. 5th Amendment.
*Issues: Do U.S. Department of Interior
regulations that preclude groups of indigenous Hawaiians from applying
for recognition that they exist as Indian tribes, pursuant to 25
C.F.R. Part 83, violate equal protection component of Fifth Amendment?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 01/25/2005. Review was denied on 6/13/05.
*Holding below: Kahawaiolaqa
v. Norton, 386
F.3d 1271, 9th cir. Department of Interior regulations restricting
federal acknowledgment of Indian tribes to those "indigenous
to the continental United States," defined as "contiguous
48 states and Alaska," 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1, 83.3(a),
and thus excluding native Hawaiians, have rational basis given unique
history of Hawaii, Congress's treatment of native Hawaiians in veritable
patchwork of legislation, findings, resolutions, and historic treaties,
and historical restrictions of acknowledgment process to continental
American Indian tribes, and thus do not violate native Hawaiians'
equal protection rights under Fifth Amendment.
VanGuilder v. United States
Docket
No. 04-1401
Subjects: Indian title -- Governors Island
(New York County, N.Y.); Governors Island (New York County, N.Y.);
Sovereign immunity; United States. Quiet Title Act; Land tenure;
Land titles; Ejectment.
*Issues: Does City
of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 73 U.S.L.W.
4242 (U.S. 2005), by necessary implication restate constitutional
law legal standing and territorial integrity of complainant herein
and, correspondingly, entitle him by operation of law alone to constitutional
law remedy of ejectment, by way of declaratory relief in lieu of
physical ejectment, in this court?
History: Petition for certiorari was filed
on 04/13/2005. Review was denied on 6/13/05.
*Holding below: VanGuilder v. United States, 2005
WL 426703, DC Cir. Litigant claiming "aboriginal title"
to certain lands, including Governor's Island in New York, has not
identified any waiver of sovereign immunity relevant to his claims
other than perhaps Quiet Title Act, has made no attempt to demonstrate
that district court erred in holding that he failed to state claim
under QTA, and has not established that he is exempt from requirements
of QTA or more general requirement that plaintiff show waiver of
sovereign immunity authorizing his claims against United States.
Ackerman v. Edwards
Docket
No. 04-1253
Briefs
Subjects:
Redding Rancheria, California; Tribal membership -- Redding Rancheria, California;
United States. Public Law 280; Jurisdiction -- California; Jurisdiction
-- Redding Rancheria, California; Civil actions arising in Indian Country
(Calif.) -- Redding Rancheria, California; Constitutions -- Redding Rancheria,
California; United States. Indian Civil Rights Act.
*Issues:
Does Pub. L. No. 280 confer jurisdiction on courts of California in suits
by Indians against officials of their own tribe to enforce their own tribal
constitution and ICRA?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 03/15/2005. Petition was denied on
5/23/05.
*Holding
below:
Ackerman
v. Edwards, 17
Cal.Rptr.3d 517, Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate
District. Pub. L. No. 280 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 et seq.), which
provides that certain states, including California, "shall have jurisdiction
over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties
... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes
of action," does not confer jurisdiction on California state courts over
disputes between tribal members and tribes, and thus trial court properly
dismissed action by putative member of federally recognized tribe against
members of tribal council, alleging that council resolution setting forth
procedures for hearings to reconsider tribal member's enrollment in tribe
violates both Indian Civil Rights Act and tribal constitution.
Prescott v. Little Six
Docket
No. 04-1197
Briefs
Subjects:
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota Prior Lake; Little
Six, Inc.; United States. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974;
Retirement planning; Sovereign immunity; Jurisdiction -- United States.
District Court (Minnesota); District courts; Jurisdiction; Deference to
tribal courts; Jurisdiction -- Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community of Minnesota
Prior Lake.
*Issues:
Must federal common law developed under ERISA yield to tribal corporate
law to determine enforceability of employee benefit plans established by
Indian tribal corporation in favor of its employees?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 03/07/2005. Petition was denied on
5/16/05.
*Holding
below:Prescott
v. Little Six, Inc., 387
F.3d 753, 8th Cir. In action under Employee Retirement Income Security
Act by former employees of Native American tribal corporation for payment
of benefits under employee benefit plans purportedly created by tribe, district
court erred by not according deference to tribal court findings, which were
not clearly erroneous, that plans were never formally approved under tribal
law, that valid and enforceable benefits arrangement therefore never existed,
and that there was thus nothing to which ERISA could apply.
VanGuilder v. New York
Docket
No. 04-1161
Subjects:
Mahican Indians -- History -- 18th century -- New York (State); Mahican
Indians -- Treaties; Mahican Indians -- New York (State) -- Relocation --
Wisconsin; Indian title -- Mahican Indians -- New York (State); Hudson River
(N.Y. and N.J.); Jurisdiction -- New York (State).
*Issues:
(1) Do 18th-century treaties under which Mahican Indians departing New York
for new reservation lands in Wisconsin deeded over previously reserved Mahican
territory to petitioner's group of stay-behind Mahicans confer legal standing
to defend or to surrender above described indigenous sovereignty under constitutional
law without regard for federal and state law? (2) Has New York's beneficial
interest always been subject to indigenous sovereignty, pending registration
on title to any given parcel of treaty?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 02/28/2005. Petition was denied on
5/2/05.
*Holding
below: VanGuilder v. New York, 4 N.Y.3d 753, 823 N.E.2d 1290, Supreme Court of New York, Appeal
does not lie from trial court's dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, failure
to state claim, and failure to establish statutory standing, of plaintiff's
constitutional claim that New York's interest in Hudson River drainage basin
is subject to Mahican Nation title and vests in him, and thus appeal is dismissed.
Blaine County, Mont. v. United States
Docket
No. 04-775
Briefs
Subjects:
Voting -- Blaine County (Mont.); Local elections -- Blaine County (Mont.);
Blaine County (Mont.); United States; Indians of North America -- Suffrage
-- Montana; United States. Voting Rights Act of 1965; United States. Constitution.
14th Amendment; United States. Constitution. 15th Amendment.
*Issues:
(1) Does enactment of Section 2 of VRA constitute constitutional exercise
of Congress's power under enforcement clauses of 14th and 15th Amendments
as applied to at-large voting in political subdivisions not covered by Section
5 of VRA? (2) Does alleged violation of Section 2 of VRA require proof (a)
that minority group has been denied equal opportunity both to participate
in political process and to elect its candidates of choice; (b) that causal
connection exists between past or present purposeful discrimination and
minority group's lack of opportunity to participate in political process
and to elect candidates of its choice; and (c) that minority group is politically
cohesive because it possesses distinctive and unique political interests
that can be addressed by election of its candidate of choice to political
body in question?
History:
Petition for
certiorari was filed on 12/16/2004. Petition was denied on 4/18/05.
*Holding
below:United
States V. Blaine County, Montana, 363
F.3d 897, 9th Cir. Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, which prohibits
voting practices or procedures that lead to denial of voting rights, was proper
exercise of Congress's authority under 14th and 15th Amendments, notwithstanding
Montana county's contention that geographic restrictions like those included
in Section 5 of VRA, which requires jurisdictions to submit every change in
their voting procedures to Department of Justice for preclearance, should
have been included and that Congress impermissibly failed to document nationwide
pattern of purposeful voting discrimination to justify nationwide application
of Section 2; Section 2 and Section 5 serve different purposes, and geographic
limitations of latter, which applies only to jurisdictions with recent history
of using voting tests and devices to deny right to vote, are not necessary
with respect to Section 2, given, among other things, U.S. Supreme Court ruling
in Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 71 U.S.L.W. 4375 (2003),
that Congress need not document evidence of constitutional violations in every
state to adopt statute with nationwide applicability, and, in any event, legislative
history shows that Congress did find of evidence of substantial discrimination
even outside jurisdictions covered by Section 5; Congress did not exceed its
authority when it adopted "results" test for Section 2, in light
of ruling in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), that Section
5 of VRA could constitutionally be applied to electoral procedures having
only discriminatory results without being motivated by discriminatory intent,
and fact that Section 2 is far narrower than preclearance requirement of Section
5; district court did not err in ruling that at-large voting system of Blaine
County, Mont., violates Section 2, in light of district court's findings that
(i) county's Native Americans were politically cohesive, as evidenced by their
consistent bloc voting; (ii) white majority voted sufficiently as bloc to
enable it to defeat Native Americans' preferred candidates; (iii) evidence
indicated history of official discrimination against Native Americans in elections
in state and against Native American population generally; (iv) large size
of county makes it very difficult for Native American candidates to campaign
countywide in at-large elections; and (v) county's asserted justifications
for having at-large elections were tenuous.
Related News Stories: Blaine voting system faces U.S. Supreme Court
review (Great
Falls Tribune) 3/27/05
Shenandoah v. Halbriter
Docket
No. 04-803
Briefs
Subjects:
Habeas corpus; United States. Indian Civil Rights Act; Housing -- Law
and legislation -- Oneida Nation of New York; Jurisdiction -- United States;
Discrimination in housing -- Oneida Nation of New York; Dissenters.
*Issues:
(1) Does Indian Civil Rights Act, in 25 U.S.C. § 1302(9), vest U.S.
courts with subject matter jurisdiction to, first, determine whether challenged
legislation enacted by Indian nation is in fact bill of attainder and then
to grant such habeas corpus relief under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 as is necessary
to release victims of bill of attainder from lingering restraints upon their
liberty resulting from such bill of attainder? (2) Is respondents' legislatively
enacted "housing program" bill of attainder as applied to petitioners
under three-pronged test articulated in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277
(1867)?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/10/2004. Petition for certiorari
was denied 4/18/05.
*Holding below:
Shenandoah
V. Halbritter, 366
F.3d 89, 2nd Cir. Enforcement of tribal ordinance requiring removal
or demolition of homes that cannot be repaired or rehabilitated to comply
with National Housing Act worked economic restraint, rather than restraint
on liberty, and thus was not grounds for invoking district court's habeas
corpus jurisdiction under Indian Civil Rights Act; although petitioners alleged
that ordinance was designed to remove them from tribe as punishment for their
constant dissent, terms of ordinance apply to all residents of territory at
issue, cannot be said to single out any individuals, and thus do not constitute
bill of attainder.
Related
News Stories: Supreme Court Roundup: Indian law cases rejected (Indianz.com)
4/19/05
Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation v. United States
Docket
No. 04-731
Briefs
Subjects:
Tribal trust funds -- Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming;
Breach of trust -- United States; Trusts and trustees -- Accounting; United
States. Dept. of the Interior; Gravel; Sand; Sovereign immunity -- United
States; Damages.
*Issues:Federal Cir. Do Interior Department appropriations
acts from 1990 to present that delay commencement of statute of limitations
on Indian claims for breach of trust against government "concerning
losses to or mismanagement of trust funds, until the affected tribe or individual
Indian has been furnished with an accounting of such funds from which the
beneficiary can determine whether there has been a loss," apply to
claims for breach of trust based on mismanagement of Indian trust resources
that resulted in losses to trust funds?
History: Petition
for certiorari was filed on 11/24/2004. Petition for certiorari
was denied 4/18/05.
*Holding
below: Shoshone
Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation v. United States, 364
F.3d 1339, Appropriations acts that permit Native American tribes
to bring their trust management claims after they receive accounting, regardless
of when such claims accrue, toll limitations periods only for those claims
relating to (i) government's mismanagement of tribal trust funds after their
collection, such as delay in depositing collected monies in interest-bearing
accounts or assessing penalties for late payment, and (ii) losses to trust
resulting from government's failure to timely collect amounts due and owing
to tribes under their sand and gravel contracts, but do not toll limitations
for tribal claims that government mismanaged tribal sand and gravel assets
by failing to maximize return from leases with third parties.
Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Mendez
Docket
No. 04-952
Briefs
Subjects:
Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. (Ariz.); Landowners -- Arizona; Right of property;
Sacred sites -- Defined; Freedom of religion -- United States; United States.
Constitution. 1st Amendment; Mining rights; Hopi Tribe of Arizona; Navajo
Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Zuni Tribe of the Zuni Reservation,
New Mexico; Roads -- Design and construction -- Arizona.
*Issues:
(1) Does decision by state officials to bar landowner from using his private
property because some American Indians assert that such land is "sacred"
violate establishment clause, notwithstanding claims by state officials
that "sacredness" of land is historically and culturally important
to those Indians? (2) May complaint alleging establishment clause violation,
which satisfies notice pleading, be dismissed for not alleging facts sufficient
to establish prima facie case under Lemon v. Kurtzman, given holding of
this court in Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 70 U.S.L.W. 4152 (2002)?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 01/12/2005. Petition was denied on
4/18/05.
*Holding
below: Cholla
Ready Mix, Inc. v. Mendez, 382
F.3d 969, 9th Cir. Under
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which held that government conduct
does not violate First Amendment's establishment clause if (i) it has secular
purpose, (ii) its principal or primary effect is not to advance or inhibit
religion, and (iii) it does not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion, state policy against using in state highway construction projects
materials mined from site that has religious, cultural, and historical significance
to several Native American tribes and to nation as whole does not violate
establishment clause merely because site's importance derives in part from
its sacredness to tribes; contention that, in dismissing complaint, district
court improperly evaluated strength of establishment clause claim is meritless,
because no evidence could bolster such claim, which was premised on flawed
analysis of governing law.
United States v. Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation
Docket
No. 04-929
Briefs
Subjects:
Tribal trust funds -- Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation,
Wyoming; Breach of trust -- United States; Trusts and trustees -- Accounting;
United States. Dept. of the Interior; Gravel; Sand; Sovereign immunity --
United States; Damages.
*Issues:
not yet available
History:
Petition
for certiorari was filed on 01/07/2005. Petition was denied on 4/18/05.
*Holding
below: Shoshone
Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation v. United States, 364
F.3d 1339, Federal Cir. The Court of Federal Claims, Emily C. Hewitt,
J., 51 Fed.Cl. 60, denied Government's motion to dismiss. Government appealed
and tribes cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gajarsa, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) statute relating to tribes' remedies for mismanagement of trust
funds expressly waived Government's sovereign immunity and deferred accrual
of tribes' action; (2) allegation that Government mismanaged tribes' sand
and gravel assets by failing to obtain the best possible market rates for
the contracts failed to state a claim; but (3) allegation that Government
mismanaged tribes' sand and gravel assets by failing to manage and timely
collect proceeds from approved mining contracts sufficiently stated a claim;
and (4) tribes were entitled to interest as part of their damages. Affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Rader, Circuit Judge, filed opinion
dissenting in part.
Hammond
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho
Docket
No. 04-624
Briefs
Subjects: Motor fuels -- Taxation -- Idaho; Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho;
Coeur D'Alene Tribe of the Coeur D'Alene Reservation, Idaho; Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation of Idaho; Idaho. State Tax Commission;
Gasoline; Service stations -- On Indian reservations -- Idaho; Distributors
(Commerce) -- Idaho; Non-members of a tribe; Sovereign immunity -- Indian
Country (Idaho); United States -- Hayden-Cartwright Act.
*Issues: (1) When state legislature expressly allocates legal incidence
of motor fuels tax to distributor of such fuel, may federal court nonetheless
deem such incidence to be borne by retailers? (2) Does term "United
States military or other reservations" in Section 10 of Hayden-Cartwright
Act encompass Indian reservations?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/05/2004. Petition was denied on
2/28/05.
*Holding
below:Coeur
D'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Hammond, 384
F.3d 674, 9th Cir. Incidence
of Idaho tax on motor fuel delivered by nontribal distributors for sale on
tribal reservations by tribally owned gas stations impermissibly falls on
tribes, notwithstanding state legislature's declared intent to shift incidence
of tax to distributors, and Section 10 of Hayden-Cartwright Act, which authorizes
states to tax motor fuel sales on "United States military or other reservations,"
does not manifest sufficiently clear congressional intent to abrogate tribal
immunity and allow states to tax gasoline sales on Indian reservations.
Related News Stories: U.S. Supreme Court asked to rule on state taxation
(Indianz.com) 12/2/04.
Babbitt, et al. v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
et al
Docket
No. 04-811
Subjects: Babbitt, Bruce E.; United States. District Court (District
of Columbia); Impartiality; IIM (Individual Indian monies) accounts -- Accurate
accounting and account reform; IIM (Individual Indian monies) accounts --
Records; Breach of trust -- United States; United States. Dept. of the Interior;
Trusts and trustees -- Accounting.
*Issues: Did district court's denial of personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts, notwithstanding its acknowledged and extensive ex parte
communications, foreclose finding that court's impartiality "might
reasonably be questioned" under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 12/13/2004. Petition was denied on
2/22/05.
*Holding
below: In
re Brooks, 383
F.3d 1036, DC Cir. No reasonable and informed observer would question
impartiality of district court judge whose recusal is sought, on basis of
his ex parte contacts with special master and special master-monitor, by 11
current and former officials and employees of Departments of Interior and
Justice, each of whom was subject of contempt proceedings before judge for
conduct relating to litigation over DOI's handling of money held in trust
for individual Indians, inasmuch as judge unequivocally stated that such ex
parte communications did not provide him with substantive information or knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts, and thus petitions for mandamus seeking recusal
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires recusal when judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," are denied, despite judge's statements
in prior, related opinions that he was "personally aware" of background
of meetings between deputy secretary of DOI and monitor, and that monitor
"has always informed this [c]ourt about the nature, extent, and substance
of such meetings and discussions upon request"; according to judge, former
statement related to his request for information verifying reasonableness
and propriety of monitor's compensation requests, and latter statement refers
to judge's concern with subject matter, not actual content, of meetings.
Related News Stories: U.S. Supreme Court won't take Cobell from Lamberth
(Indianz.com) 2/23/05.
Norton rejects invitation to testify on trust fund (Indianz.com)
2/28/05.
Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v. Michigan
Docket
No. 04-581
Briefs
Subjects: United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; United States.
Congress -- Powers and duties; Casinos -- Michigan; Gambling on Indian reservations
-- Michigan; Michigan; Indian gaming -- Michigan; Tribes -- Michigan; Michigan
-- Powers and duties; Intergovernmental agreements -- Michigan; Taxpayers
of Michigan Against Casinos.
*Issues: Did Congress delegate to states under IGRA power to establish
regulatory rules applicable to Indian casino gambling within state's borders?
History:
Petition
for certiorari was filed on 10/28/2004. Petition denied on 2/22/05.
*Holding
below: Taxpayers
of Michigan Against Casinos v. Michigan, 471
Mich. 306, Supreme Court of Michigan. Although Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act provides that tribal casinos and other "Class III" gaming activities
are lawful only if conducted in conformance with tribal-state compact, states
have no authority under IGRA to regulate such gaming in absence of compact.
Peabody
Coal v. Navajo Nation
Docket
No. 04-634
Briefs
Subjects: Coal leases; Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah;
United States. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938; United States. Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; Trusts and trustees –- Accounting;
Jurisdiction -- United States; Federal question; Peabody Coal Company; Coal
mines and mining; Coal rights; Arbitration (Administrative law).
*Issues: Does federal question subject-matter jurisdiction arise
pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 over action to enforce amendment to mineral lease
between federally recognized Indian tribe and private corporation, when
both lease and amendment have been approved by secretary of interior under
1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, and when tribe has disputed validity of
lease amendment on grounds already rejected by this court in United States
v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 71 U.S.L.W. 4146 (2003)?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 11/08/2004. Petition was denied 1/10/05.
*Holding
below: Peabody
Coal Company v. Navajo Nation, 373
F.3d 945, 9th Cir. District court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over suit brought by non-Indian coal company against federally recognized
Indian tribe for enforcement of arbitration settlement agreement setting royalty
rates for coal mined pursuant to commercial lease, such suit not meeting requirements
for federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331; notwithstanding company's contention that case raises
substantial federal question of enforceability of commercial Indian mineral
leases approved by secretary of interior under federal law, its claim sounds
in general contract law and does not concern validity of federal approval
of contract or require resolution of any other substantial question of federal
law.
Related
News Stories: Peabody takes coal lease dispute to high court (Indianz.com)
12/1/04
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, et
al., v. United States
Docket
No. 04-525
Briefs
Subjects: Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
of the Lac Courte Oreilles, Reservation of Wisconsin; Red Cliff Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin; Sokaogon Chippewa Community
of the Mole Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, Wisconsin; United States. Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25
USC 2701 et seq.); Gaming -- Law and legislation; Delegation of powers
-- Wisconsin; Governors -- Wisconsin -- Powers and duties; Breach of trust
-- United States; Equality before the law -- United States; United States.
Constitution. 5th Amendment; United States. Constitution. 10th Amendment.
*Issues: (1) Does gubernatorial-concurrence provision of IGRA violate
core principles of separation of powers, including appointments clause,
by handing over final federal decision to individual (governor) who is not
subject to any presidential control? (2) Does gubernatorial-concurrence
provision violate basic principles of federalism because it rearranges structure
of state government, by which state has defined itself as sovereign, and
because it makes state constitutional officer federal decisionmaker?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 10/15/2004. Petition was denied 1/10/05.
*Holding
below: Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin V. United
States,
2004
WL 909159, 7th Cir. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provision conditioning
acquisition of off-reservation lands for location of Indian gaming facilities
upon state governor's agreement with determination by secretary of interior
that such use would be in tribe's best interest and would not harm surrounding
community does not violate constitutional separation of powers principles,
federalism principles, or appointments clause.
VanGuilder v. United States
Docket
No. 04-671
Briefs
Subjects: Sovereignty -- Tribes -- United States; United States. Congress
-– Powers and duties; Land tenure -- Indian Country (New York (State));
Indian title -- New York (State).
*Issues: (1) Does Congress have any enumerated power to alter tribal
sovereignty of Native American tribes? (2) If not, may Congress regulate
virtually every aspect of tribes through ordinary legislation?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 10/09/2004. Petition was denied 1/10/05.
*Holding
below: Opinion not yet located. First ruling below (D.C. Cir.,
8/25/04): Court denies petition for initial hearing en banc of appeal from
dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of claims to certain lands,
including Governor's Island in New York, that are based on "aboriginal
title." Second ruling below (N.Y., 9/20/04): Notice of appeal that does
not include "appealable paper" within meaning of state law cannot
be treated as initiating appeal and thus cannot be accepted for filing.
Chippewa
Trading Co. v. Cox
Docket
No. 04-395
Briefs
Subjects: Due process of law; Tobacco -- Taxation; Law -- Michigan;
Chippewa Trading Co. (Mich.); Michigan. Tobacco Products Tax Act.
*Issues:
(1) For purposes of comity, is state remedy plain, adequate, and complete
when there is facial due process challenge in federal court to remedy provisions
of state tobacco tax statute, and state officials admit in federal court
to using procedural tactics to avoid decision on merits in state court?
(2) In event state remedy is plain, adequate, and complete, may district
courts decline on basis of comity to hear Indian claims against state officials
for continuing pattern of seizure and forfeiture of inter-reservation Indian
trade in tobacco, when relief requested includes prospective injunctive
relief to end continuing violation of federal law, including Art. II of
1842 treaty with Chippewa, in which federal government promised exclusive
application of federal law to Indian trade in return for ceded land?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 9/17/2004. Petition was denied on
11/15/04.
*Holding
below: Chippewa
Trading Co. v. Cox, 365
F.3d. 538, 6th Cir. Principles of comity warrant federal court
abstention from Indian corporation's suit challenging constitutionality of
Michigan Tobacco Products Tax Act, pursuant to which corporation's tobacco
products not bearing tobacco tax stamps were seized by state during transport
between Indian reservations, because "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy"
for any constitutional shortcomings of state tax scheme is available in state
courts.
Related News
Stories: High court upholds tobacco tax decision (AP)
11/16/04.
First
National Bank of Milaca v. Benjamin
Docket
No. 04-228
Subjects: Mille Lacs County (Minn.); First National Bank of Milaca,
Minn.; Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Minnesota (Six component reservations:
Bois Forte Band (Nett Lake);Fond du Lac Band; Leech Lake Band; Mille Lacs
Band; White Earth Band); Minnesota; South Dakota; Boundary disputes; Non-members
of a tribe; Business enterprises; Indian reservations.
*Issues: When tribe attempts to resurrect reservation that nonmembers
justifiably believed long disestablished, by asserting sovereign authority
over former reservation, can nonmember doing business within former reservation
boundaries seek declaratory relief concerning those boundaries only when
tribe has sought to enforce its regulations over that nonmember business?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/17/2004. Petition denied 11/01/04.
*Holding
below: Mille
Lacs County v. Benjamin, 361
F.3d. 460, 8th Cir. Bank seeking declaratory judgment determining
legal status of Indian reservation boundaries did not establish injury in
fact, but asserted only speculative harms based on tribe's assumed future
intent to expand its jurisdictional reach within reservation, such as diminished
value of bank's collateral stemming from tribe's assertion of regulatory authority
over property in which bank holds security interest, and tribal enactments'
impact on federal banking laws and Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code, and
thus bank's suit was properly dismissed for lack of standing.
Mille
Lacs County v. Benjamin
Docket
No. 04-229
Briefs
Subjects: Mille Lacs County (Minn.); First National Bank of
Milaca, Minn.; Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Minnesota (Six component reservations:
Bois Forte Band (Nett Lake);Fond du Lac Band; Leech Lake Band; Mille Lacs
Band; White Earth Band); Minnesota; South Dakota; Boundary disputes; Indian
reservations.
*Issues: Does Declaratory Judgment Act allow district court to deny
standing to Mille Lacs County in reservation status controversy and circumvent
declaratory judgment precedent of this court in Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977), squarely on point in every significant respect,
involving same type of reservation status controversy of such compelling
importance that this court has granted petitions for writs of certiorari
seven times in last few decades to resolve similar disputes, and in process,
can court also ignore that Mille Lacs Band, United States, and this court,
nearly one century ago, specifically recognized that Mille Lacs Reservation
no longer exists in United
States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229
U.S. 498 (1913), when not single court has questioned that conclusion
since that time?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 8/17/2004. Petition denied 11/01/04.
*Holding
below: Mille
Lacs County v. Banjamin, 361
F.3d. 460, 8th Cir. County seeking declaratory judgment determining
legal status of Indian reservation boundaries presented no evidence that its
ability to enforce state or local law on reservation has been usurped or even
affected by tribe's alleged intentions to expand reach of tribal authority,
or that it is in immediate danger of sustaining threatened injury traceable
to action of tribe, and thus dismissal of county's suit for failure to establish
standing is affirmed.
Related News Stories: Minn. Tribe Wins Another Round in Reservation Dispute
(Indianz.com)
03/11
South
Dakota v. Cummings
Docket
No. 04-74
Briefs
Subjects: Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation,
South Dakota; Suppression of evidence -- South Dakota; Traffic violations
-- Off Indian reservations; Admissible evidence; Police pursuit driving
-- On Indian reservations; South Dakota.
*Issues: Did South Dakota Supreme Court contravene this court's decision
in Nevada v. Hicks when it held that deputy sheriff who observed tribal
member committing crime off-reservation may not, as matter of federal law,
pursue tribal member onto his reservation, detain him there, and take statement
from him there?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 7/12/2004. Petition was denied on
10/18/04.
*Holding
below: South
Dakota v. Cummings, 2004 SD 56, 679
N.W.2d 484, Supreme Court of South Dakota. In absence of compact
between Native American tribe and state, state police officer was without
authority to pursue fleeing tribal member onto reservation in absence of warrant
or tribal consent and, therefore, all evidence obtained after officer entered
reservation was properly suppressed at tribal member's subsequent trial; language
in Nevada
v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353, 69 U.S.L.W. 4528 (2001), to effect that nothing in relevant
statutory scheme denies state authority to enter reservation for enforcement
related to crimes committed off-reservation, is unavailing, given that state
never effectively asserted jurisdiction over reservations within its borders,
and does not provide affirmative authorization for state to extend its jurisdiction
into reservation.
Related News Stories: Court: Deputy Had No Jurisdiction (Rapid
City Journal) 04/23/04, South Dakota challenge to tribes rejected by high
court (Indianz.com)
10/19/04, U.S. Supreme Court lets stand ruling on reservation jurisdiction
(AP)
10/18/04.
Navajo Nation v. Krystal Energy Company, Inc.
Docket
No. 04-45
Briefs
Subjects: Bankruptcy; Sovereign immunity -- Abrogation -- Navajo
Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah; Krystal Energy Co. (Ariz.).
*Issues: Do Sections 106(a) and 101(27) of Bankruptcy Code expressly
and unequivocally waive sovereign immunity of Indian tribe?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 7/02/2004. Petition was denied on
10/5/04.
*Holding
below: Krystal
Energy Company v. Navajo Nation, 357
F.3d 1055, 9th Cir. Section 106(a) of Bankruptcy Code, which abrogates
sovereign immunity of "governmental units," defined in Section 101(27)
to include "other foreign or domestic governments," abrogates sovereign
immunity of Indian tribes.
Related News
Stories: Appeals Court Rules Agains Tribal Immunity (Indianz.com)
2/11/04
Medicine Blanket v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Police Department
Docket
No. 04-5163
Briefs
Subjects: Indian reservation police -- Rosebud Sioux Tribe of the Rosebud
Indian Reservation, South Dakota; Police misconduct.
*Issues: not yet available
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/30/2004. Petition was denied on
10/4/04.
*Holding
below: Medicine
Blanket v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Police Department,
91
Fed.Appx. 533, (from the opinion) As to the merits, we affirm
the grant of summary judgment because Medicine Blanket's claims challenge
the conduct of tribal officers on a reservation, and it appears that this
matter is the subject of on-going litigation by Medicine Blanket in the tribal
court system. See In re Sac & Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa/Meskwaki
Casino Litigation, 340 F.3d 749, 763 (8th Cir.2003) (jurisdiction to resolve
internal tribal disputes and interpret tribal constitutions and laws lies
with Indian tribes and not in district courts).....
Steffler v. Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians
Docket
No. 03-10440
Subjects: Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Indians of Oregon; Jurisdiction
-- Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Indians of Oregon; Detention of persons -- Oregon.
*Issues: not yet available
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/11/2004. Petition was denied on
10/4/04.
Holding
below: Steffler
V. Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indian,
2004
WL 830080, 8th Cir. (from the court
opinion) A person must be detained in some
way by tribal authority to invoke subject matter jurisdiction under 25
U.S.C. § 1303. Moore v. Nelson, 270
F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir.2001). Because Steffler was detained only
by Oregon state authorities, and because the record does not reveal that the
tribe acted in any way to cause the detention, we conclude that the district
court did not err in dismissing Steffler's petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Michael
Minnis & Associates, P.C. v. Kaw Nation
Docket
No. 03-1714
Subjects: Kaw Nation, Oklahoma; Lawyers -- Fees; Sovereign immunity
-- Kaw Nation, Oklahoma.
*Issues: (1) Under C&L
Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532
U.S. 411, Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Third Division.
69 U.S.L.W. 4290 (2001), can tribal chairman assert sovereign immunity as
defense to suit against tribe based on contract approved by governing body
of tribe when: (a) chairman is not party to contract or to suit; (b) majority
of governing body of tribe has admitted that sums sought are due and owing
under contract and has waived sovereign immunity; and (c) tribal vice chairman,
consistent with resolution adopted by majority of governing body of tribe,
confesses judgment in open court consistent with state statutes? (2) Does
state appellate court have authority to decide internal tribal affairs contrary
to determinations by secretary of interior: (a) by recognizing tribal chairman
as being empowered to represent tribe when secretary has determined he has
no such authority; (b) by recognizing persons as valid tribal judges and
their orders and opinions as valid when secretary has determined that they
are not properly seated as tribal judges, that their orders and opinions
are not valid, and that tribal court no longer exists; and (c) by refusing
to recognize actions by governing majority recognized by secretary? (3)
Consistent with federal constitutional due process, can state court of appeals,
without briefs or argument, affirm order granting motion to dismiss filed
by nonparty after reversing basis for dismissal and converting motion to
summary judgment when plaintiff has not been given fair opportunity to litigate:
(a) issue of sovereign immunity; and (b) issue of nonparty's standing?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 6/25/2004. Petition was denied on
10/4/04.
*Holding
below: Michael
Minnis & Associates, P.C. v. Kaw Nation, 90
P.3d 1009, Law firm's contract with Indian tribe included express
stipulation to jurisdiction of tribal courts, uncontroverted evidence established
tribal chairman's express authorization by tribal general council to defend
tribe against law firm's contract action, as well as invalidity of attempts,
by putative majority of tribal executive council, to waive tribal sovereign
immunity, to consent to state court jurisdiction, to confess judgment on law
firm's contract claim, and to dismantle tribal judicial system, and thus law
firm's state court contract action is barred by tribal sovereign immunity.
Artichoke Joe's v. Norton
Docket
No. 03-1602
Subjects: Indian gaming -- Class III; Gambling on Indian reservations;
Constitutional amendments -- California; Equality before the law; United
States. Constitution. 5th Amendment. United States. Constitution. 14th Amendment;
Charities; United States. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; Intergovernmental
agreements -- Indian Country (California); California; Tribes -- Indian
Country (California).
*Issues:
(1) Does IGRA allow state to permit only tribes to engage in Class III gaming
(casino gambling, including slot machines)? (2) If IGRA allows such monopoly,
does that statute, as well as Proposition IA, which amended California Constitution
to give tribes exclusive right to operate Class III gaming, and California's
62 compacts with tribes giving them monopoly rights to conduct Class III
gaming, violate equal protection principles? (3) More generally, can Congress,
consistent with equal protection principles, authorize state to award major
segment of its economy solely to Indian tribes, while excluding others from
participating in that economic arena, even on non-Indian lands?
History:
Petition for certiorari was filed on 5/27/2004. Petition was denied on
10/4/04.
*Holding
below: Artichoke
Joe's California Grand Casino V. Norton, 353
F.3d 712, 9th Cir. Neither California constitutional amendment
that permits operation of casino-type gambling facilities exclusively by Indian
tribes and only on Indian lands, nor state-tribal compacts implementing such
right, violate Indian Gaming Regulatory Act or infringe Fifth or 14th Amendment
equal protection rights of non-Indians, who are prohibited by California law
from operating similar facilities.
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