(Cite
as: 109 Cal.App.4th 939)
In
re AALIYAH G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
LOS
ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT
G., Defendant and Appellant.
No.
B161963.
Court
of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.
May
13, 2003.
[Opinion
certified for partial publication. [FN*]
]
FN*
This opinion is certified for partial publication. The only parts
of the opinion to be published are the following: the
Introduction, the Indian Child Welfare Act section of the Discussion,
and the Disposition.
SUMMARY
In a child dependency proceeding, the juvenile court terminated a
father's parental rights. The county department of children and family
services had stated in its juvenile dependency petition application and
in its reports throughout
the proceeding that the child did not have Indian heritage
and, accordingly, that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25
U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) was inapplicable. (Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
No. CK25571, Thomas E. Grodin, Temporary Judge. [FN?]
)
FN?
Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held the ICWA
had not been violated, since the juvenile court and county
department of child and family services had discharged their affirmative
duty under the ICWA and Cal. Rules of Court, rule
1439(d), to inquire whether the child had Indian heritage. The
petition application was marked "No" to show that the child
did not have Indian heritage, suggesting that an inquiry into
the child's heritage had been made. In addition, the department
had consistently reported that the ICWA was inapplicable, and neither
the father nor any of the child's relatives had suggested
anything to the contrary. (Opinion by Mosk, J., with Turner,
P. J., and Grignon, J., concurring.) *940
HEADNOTES
Classified
to California Digest of Official Reports
(1)
Delinquent, Dependent, and Neglected Children § 74--Dependency
Proceedings--Indian Child Welfare Act--Discharge of Affirmative Duty to Determine Indian
Status.
In a child dependency proceeding in which a father's parental
rights were terminated, the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901
et seq. (ICWA)), was not violated, since the juvenile court
and county department of child and family services had discharged
their affirmative duty to inquire whether the child had Indian
heritage. Among other matters, the ICWA requires a court, when
it knows or has reason to know that an Indian
child is involved, to provide notice of an involuntary proceeding
to the child's tribe (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)),
and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1439(d), implements this notice
requirement by imposing an affirmative duty on the court and
county welfare department to inquire whether a child may be
an Indian child when a juvenile dependency petition is involved.
However, in this case, the record showed that the affirmative
duty was discharged, and there was no indication the child
had Indian ancestry. The petition application was marked "No" to
show that the child did not have Indian heritage, suggesting
that an inquiry into the child's heritage had been made.
In addition, the department had consistently reported that the ICWA
was inapplicable, and neither the father nor any of the
child's relatives suggested anything to the contrary. Thus, absent some
information that the child might have Indian heritage, the court
did not have an obligation to
make additional inquiry into the matter.
[See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1989)
Parent and Child, § 724C;
West's Key Number Digest, Indians 6.6(1).]
COUNSEL
Mark A. Massey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, and Frank DaVanzo, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. *941
MOSK,
J.
Introduction
Robert G. (father) appeals from an order terminating his parental
rights to Aaliyah. He contends that his parental rights should
not have been terminated because there was insufficient evidence to
establish that the adoptive parents are capable of meeting Aaliyah's
needs and that they have no prior referrals for child
abuse or neglect. He also contends that there was insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception did not
apply. [FN1] In addition, father argues that the termination order
must be reversed because the legally required affirmative inquiry was
not made as to whether
Aaliyah has Indian heritage. We affirm the order terminating father's
parental rights. In the published portion of this opinion we
discuss whether a sufficient inquiry was made as to whether
or not the child has Indian heritage.
FN1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
Factual and Procedural Background [FN*]
FN*
See footnote, ante,
page 939.
. . . . . . . . . .
.
Discussion
.
. . . . . . . . . .
Indian
Child Welfare Act
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
stated in its petition application that Aaliyah did not have
Indian heritage, and it continued to state in its reports
throughout the proceedings that the Indian Child
Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq. (ICWA)) did not apply. (1)
Father, however, contends that the juvenile court and DCFS failed
to satisfy their affirmative duty to inquire as to ICWA's
applicability. We do not agree.
ICWA requires a court, if it "knows or has reason
to know that an Indian child is involved" in any
involuntary proceeding, to give notice to the Indian child's tribe
of the pending proceedings and its right to intervene. (25
U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
California Rules of Court, rule 1439 implements ICWA's notice *942
provisions in California courts. It provides that the court and
DCFS have an "affirmative duty to inquire whether a child
for whom a petition under section 300 is to be,
or has been, filed is or may be an Indian
child." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1439(d) (rule 1439(d).) Thus,
the juvenile dependency petition form must be checked "if there
is reason to know" the child is a member of
or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
or "if there is reason to believe the child may
be of Indian ancestry." (Rule 1439(d)(1).) Circumstances that may give
rise to probable cause to believe a child is an
Indian child include a party or welfare agency so informing
the court or providing information suggesting the child is an
Indian child, and if the child or its parents reside
in a predominately Indian community. (Rule 1439(d)(2)(A), (B).) If proper
notice under ICWA is not given, the Indian child, the
child's parent or Indian custodian, or the child's tribe may
petition
the court to invalidate the proceeding. (25 U.S.C. § 1914.)
Father argues that the juvenile court and DCFS did not
comply with their duty under rule 1439 to inquire whether
the child has Indian heritage. The record here shows that
any affirmative duty by DCFS and the court was discharged.
The petition application was marked "No" to show that Aaliyah
did not have Indian heritage. DCFS thereafter consistently reported that
ICWA did not apply, and neither father nor any of
Aaliyah's relatives ever suggested to the contrary. There is no
indication in the record that Aaliyah has Indian heritage.
Nonetheless, father contends that the mere marking of a box
and DCFS's subsequent statements in its reports of ICWA's inapplicability
were insufficient to show that any affirmative duty that rule
1439(d) imposes was discharged. Checking the "No" box suggests that
an inquiry as to Aaliyah's heritage was made. There is
no indication to the contrary. The court had no obligation
to make a further or additional inquiry absent any information
or suggestion that the child might have Indian heritage. In
the cases in which termination orders have been reversed for
the failure to comply with ICWA notice requirements, there was
information indicating that the child had Indian heritage. (See, e.g.,
In
re Samuel P.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1266 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 820] [court failed
to make an inquiry even though there was information in
the record to support probable cause to believe the children
were
affiliated with Chumash Tribe]; In
re Jonathan D.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 628] [termination order reversed
when court failed to give timely notice to Indian tribes];
In
re Marinna J.
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 267] [termination order reversed
because notice was not sent to Indian tribe despite family
report that child had Indian heritage].)
Based on the record, there is sufficient evidence that an
inquiry was made as to whether Aaliyah is an Indian
child. The record also contains no *943
indication that Aaliyah has such heritage. We therefore conclude that
there was no violation of ICWA.
Disposition
The order terminating Robert G.'s parental rights is affirmed.
Turner, P. J., and Grignon, J., concurred.
On June 12, 2003, the opinion was modified to read
as printed above. *944
Cal.App.2.Dist.,2003.
In
re AALIYAH G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT G., Defendant and Appellant.
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